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Abstract 
The recent information technology development has vastly helped in accelerating and facilitating 
the banking services and operations in general. In spite of this accelerated development in the 
banking sector, the risk of invading electronic banking systems is evident. This is manifested in 
many harmful functions such as unauthorised money transfer, disclosure of client information, 
denial of online banking services as well as various threats linked with online banking at different 
lineages especially through authentication of the client online.   
This thesis utilizes cloud computing in the banking system from technological and economic 
perspectives, and the possible benefits that a cloud computing provider gives. The definitions and 
functions of enterprise architecture both for cloud computing and the financial sector are 
discussed, then the new architecture model that I developed by merging the cloud and e-banking 
architectures is thoroughly explained.  
This study presents a novel, unique tamper proof USB, sustained with an operating system 
dedicated to serve the bank’s clients.  This device is realised by embedding the bank application 
in this tamper proof USB while creating an isolation layer in the client’s PC when the client plugs 
in this USB. The modified operating system platform is based on the puppy Linux operating 
system. It has the capability to multiplex physical resources at the granularity of an entire 
operating system while being able to provide isolation between different operating systems.    
This tamper proof device is supported by four authentication measures which are; unique tamper 
proof ID, User account, password and fingerprint with a client secure socket layer. Moreover, I 
designed two different channels, one with cloud for authentication and transferring an encrypted 
session key while the other channel is used for communication between the client and the bank 
after re-authentication accompanied by a one-time password and finger printer image 
authentication parameter plus session key.  
The simulation testbed is used to solve the fundamental flow of the mechanism in sufficient 
detail, using Network Miner to parse libpcap files to do a live packet capture of the network 
traffic between cloud provider and the client; using Foglight monitoring tools to utilise the 
simulated server. Netwalk tools are used to represent the percentage of IP usage and Kali Linux, 
wireshark for penetration testing.    
 Key words: online transaction, Security, tamper proof devices, cloud computing, architecture 
model  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The Internet has become an important banking sector feature. It is the bank tool for various 
services provided by many sectors including the financial sector. Banks started to use the internet 
not only as an innovative payment method for increasing client convenience, but also as a way to 
reduce costs and enhance profits. 
The term Electronic Banking (e-Banking) or Internet Banking is an advanced and comprehensive 
concept that emerged in the early nineties as a concept of financial services by remote control [32, 
38], remote electronic banking or home banking. Clients require the bank to create services with 
restricted access. The bank provides the client with a package of software- either free or for a fees 
and this enables the client to use bank services at a certain distance. Alternatively the client 
purchases a package of software known as Personal Financial Management software (PFM). 
Hence the concept of financial services is based on distance PC banking between the Bank and 
the client’s personal computer. 
Other Electronic banking, also known as Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT), is simply the use of 
electronic means to transfer funds directly from one account to another, rather than by cheque or 
cash.  Electronic funds transfer can be used to:  
 Pay cheques deposited directly into your bank or credit union checking account.  
 Withdraw money from your current account or an ATM machine with a personal 
identification number (PIN), for convenience, at any time.  
 Instruct bank or credit union to automatically pay certain monthly bills from a specific 
account, such as auto loan or mortgage payment. 
 To transfer funds each month from your checking account to mutual fund account. 
 To deposit benefits cheque or tax refund deposited directly into cheque account. 
 Buy groceries, gasoline and other purchases at the point-of-sale, using a check card rather 
than cash, credit or a personal check. 
 Use a smart card with a prepaid amount of money for use instead of cash at a pay phone, 
expressway road toll, or on college campuses at the library's photocopy machine or 
bookstores. 
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 Use computer and personal finance software to coordinate the total personal financial 
management process, integrating data and activities related to income, spending, saving, 
investing, recordkeeping, bill-paying and taxes, along with basic financial analysis and 
decision making.  
1.1 Motivation  
The main motivation for this research is to propose and develop lightweight (processing 
power, memories, performance’s)  mechanisms and protocol that can protect the online 
banking account, control access and react quickly, accurately against online banking 
authentication attacks. The proposed mechanisms should make the online banking transaction 
services resilient against any intruders by protecting all the resources such as client identity, 
bandwidth, communication channel and the banking application. The common security goals 
are ensuring end-to-end data integrity and confidentiality.  
1.2 Objective 
 The main objectives of the thesis can be described as follows: 
 Study the financial sector and understand characteristics, development and the relation 
between business and information technology applications. 
 Detail analyses of the existing electronic banking mechanisms such ATM, online banking, 
telephone/IVR which provide new challenges such as intruder, hijacking and other 
cybercrime methods.   
 Analyse the security and networking requirements for online banking and evaluate the 
security, resilience authentication, disruption and account attacks. 
 Propose a new method for mitigating authentication attacks on electronic banking by 
using the virtualisation technique and public/private key cryptography.  
 Create a new architecture model to clarify the heterogeneity between the bank’s existing 
models and cloud existing models to invent a new homogenous architecture based on the 
similarity between the two models to facilitate the banking sector when using cloud 
computing technology.  
1.3 Problem Statement 
Studying the strengths of the security in the financial sector and cybercrime in general, obviously 
cybercrime still exists and the risk to the financial sector is becoming worse [28, 32], especially 
on the client side [7]. Security concerns still exist although the topography of banking has 
changed dramatically with the initiation of online banking as a new approach to running the 
banking business. However banks’ clients are seeking more comfort in accessing banking 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 3 
facilities and expect their banks to deliver value added services through channels like online 
banking.  
Most authentication methods used at the moment like static password, Soft-token Certificate/SSL-
TLS, hard-token Certificate/SSL-TLS, one-time Password/Time-based Code Generator and 
Challenge-response [32] can be bypassed using a man-in-the-middle attack [41,53].   In order to 
combat security breaches associated with online banking, a number of techniques mitigate the 
intrusion attacks on various online banking activities and many solutions are proposed and 
implemented but unfortunately online banking still suffers from unauthorized access to clients’ 
accounts and the loss of large amounts of money.   
This situation of the banking authentication method makes it a requirement for banks to adopt and 
leverage another new approach for success in the performance of internet banking.    
Online banking is not merely a technical IT aspect but rather a whole business approach. This 
encompasses internet banking applications such as funds’ transfer, bill payment and other services 
together with online accounting and financial management services, which are beyond the scope 
of the technical application, adding value to the clients. Subsequently, banks need a confirmed 
identity for the claimant to guarantee the right person gets access to that account.  
1.4 Major Contribution  
The growing demand for a consistent and secure online banking system with the need to have 
security solutions that incorporate the concept of online banking necessitated the contribution in 
this thesis. The novel work undertaken in this thesis was tailored towards addressing the problems 
discussed in the previous section. In this work, the following contributions are made:  
1. Propose and Implement the New Secure Transaction Sharing (STS) Protocol  
Secure Transaction Sharing (STS) protocol using additive homomorphic encryption as an 
operation performed on a set of ciphertexts such that decrypting the result of the operation is the 
same as the result of some operation performed on the plaintext access. Use homomorphic 
cryptographic for re-encrypting the message over a cloud provider without needing to know the 
plain text transfer from the client to the bank. 
2. Study and Develop a Trusted Operating System   
Study and develop an extension of the existing puppy Linux operating system by rebuilding the 
puppy Linux boot loader framework utilized to transfer measurement values from Application to 
Kernel. Several mechanisms were implemented for communicating between application and 
kernel, such as a grant table, ring buffers, an event channel, and Store.   
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3. Realisation of a Tamper Proof Authentication Device 
Design and implement an authentication Tamper proof device for extremely high security 
demands and confidentiality of the online banking application using the biometric security 
technology system. Therefore, we add a java code to our lightweight application domain to 
support web browser application request for authentication parameters, which is part of the online 
banking system. 
4. Development of a Reference Architecture of Framework    
Propose and implemente a reference architecture framework. The reference architecture model for 
cloud computing might change to satisfy what the financial sector is looking for. Defining 
building blocks and outlining foundations to support coordination and comprehension between 
cloud provider and financial sector.   
5. Simulations and Performance Evaluation  
The function of simulation is to solve the fundamental flow of the mechanism and equation in 
sufficient detail. Once this is achieved, we can predict the consequences of change in operating 
practice. This will assure the model accuracy, and achieve better results in identifying bottlenecks. 
Therefore Simulation is an excellent presentation and auditing tool.  
Using Network Miner to parse libpcap files to do a live packet capture of the network traffic 
between cloud provider and the client; using Foglight monitoring tools to utilise the research 
server. Use Netwalk tools to represent the percentage of IP usage and Kali Linux, wireshark for 
penetration testing.    
In figure 1.1 the Contribution diagram shows the major contribution combined with the highlight 
point for each element of that contribution flowing sequentially.  
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 Figure 1.1: contribution diagram  
 
 
 
  
Propose and 
implement and present 
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Transaction Sharing 
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 Describe and discuss the three entities combined to create connectivity for 
online banking application  
 Study Paillier additive Homomorphic cryptosystem 
 STS protocol and Algorithm  
 Authentication scheme is the process of validating and authentication   
 
Chapter 6 
 Study the technological components of enterprise architecture 
 Represent the technologies that support end-user interactions 
 Define building blocks and outlining foundations 
 Design reference architecture according to the target operating model 
requirements.  
 Consequently, design reference architecture with flexibility to allow plug-
and-play approach towards new distribution channel products through 
Cloud integrated solutions. 
 
Chapter 5 
 Present the operating system model, 
 design the security frames for the online banking application 
scenario 
 process of dealing with command  
 the module loading at boot up 
Chapter 5 
 Tamper proof hardware component 
 Combination of hardware and software 
 Divide tamper proof into three stages 
 discuss the simulation results of tamper proof 
Chapter 6 
 Investigate efficient methods for handling user access rights 
 Using Network Miner to parse libpcap files 
 Using Foglight monitoring tools to utilise the research server  
 Netwalk tools in our system function to represent the percentage of 
IP usage   
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1.5 Organization of Thesis  
The main focus of this thesis is on providing an access control system that addresses 
authentication and authorization issues while taking the identified limitations in the online 
banking transaction environment into consideration. The remaining part of the thesis is organized 
as follows: 
Chapter 2, state of the art and related work: Overview of Financial Institutions Banking history: 
This chapter defines financial institutions and gives a historical background including the 
development of this sector. Illustrating the major type of financial institution and the services 
offered by financial institutions and customer interaction through new modern technology, this 
chapter also mentions the electronic banking operating system method and the type of electronic 
currency in addition to patterns of electronic banking services; it explains the advantage of this 
technology and disadvantage and provides a cloud definition.  
Chapter 3, Security and Access Control 
 Reviews security from the general network and online banking perspectives as well as accesses 
control and its implementation in disruptive electronic banking concepts and attack tree, Trojan 
methods: this chapter analyses the potential risk and explains the most common way used by 
hackers to penetrate the financial sector and explores modern piracy tools. Also it gives a detailed 
description of the threat to personal data like phishing, farming and how to frog the address 
through DNS. After that it clarifies the efficiency of the current solution to mitigate these risks, 
with a slight definition of Homomorphic cryptography and Pillar cryptosystem. 
Chapter 4, new financial model and definition  
 This chapter defines and describes the three entities combined to create a connectivity model of 
our design proposal for online banking application then a prototype of the appliance and the 
topology. This chapter reviews the Secure Transaction Sharing (STS) proposal and problem 
statement (Fine-grained access control). Also this chapter introduces and describes authentication 
schemes and the authentication code.  
 Chapter 5, Authentication concept model  
Tamper proof security is the topic of this chapter; with the adoption of dynamic cloud services 
boundary leading the network, the system and application of the financial sector is to be 
controlled by the service provider domain. To compensate for the loss of control of the security 
boundaries the financial sector should rely on other high-level control. This chapter proposes 
control manifesting as strong authentication and authorization based upon different identity 
factors and identity access.  
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 7 
Chapter 6, 
This chapter defines the enterprise architecture concept and the necessity of enterprise architecture 
to any global organization, with the essential background of enterprise architecture and related 
work. After that it explains IT architecture components and financial architecture plus cloud 
computing architecture. Then a new model merges these architecture models to bring a new 
perspective model to be implemented in the financial sector when using cloud computing 
technology. For the tamper proof model experiment, this chapter provides a testbed of the work 
done and illustrates our work and result. 
Chapter 7  
Contribution and future work.   
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Chapter 2 Online banking transaction overview and architecture 
Background Study of online banking and technical environment  
Banking has witnessed a large number of transformations in the past and up to the high tech 
digital world of today where systems play the role of stewards to personal valuables. The focus of 
this chapter is: (1) overview of financial institutions banking history, disruption and development 
as well as electronic banking, (2) traditional methods of delivering financial services, (3) 
technology used to offer banking services and advantages and disadvantages of electronic 
banking. The chapter is organized as follows: section 2.1 discusses banking history, development 
as well as examples of traditional methods of delivering financial services. Section 2.2, 2.3 and 
section 2.4 present an overview of traditional methods of delivering financial services and 
electronic banking method. Section 2.5 is an overview of operating systems and section 2.6 cloud 
computing definition with 2.7 as a summary. 
2.1 Short Banking History 
In 1156, in Genoa, occurred the earliest known foreign exchange contract [34, 38]. In 1440, 
Gutenberg invented the modern printing press although Europe already knew of the use of paper 
money in China. In 1455 the Turks overran the Serbian silver mines, and in 1460 captured the last 
Bosnian mine. The last Venetian silver gross was mined in 1462. Even the smallest of small 
change became scarce [35]. This is the point in time where the beginning of modern banking can 
be traced. In 1472 the Monte deiPaschi di Siena bank was founded, the oldest current bank in the 
world. At that time moneychangers were already called bankers, though the term "bank" generally 
referred to their offices, and did not transmit the meaning it does today. In 1565 the London Royal 
Exchange was established, marking the beginning of a new concept [35].  
In the 20th century the banking system all over the world saw a rise and fall, including the 1929 
Wall Street Crash, when 9,000 banks closed, wiping out a third of the money supply in the United 
States [56], then being heavily influenced by the political situation in the First and Second World 
Wars. In the last quarter of the 20th century, computer technology was embedded in the financial 
sector to aid banks. As a result, this generated profitable times and banks did lucratively well 
during the late 1990s. When the tech bubble burst, it precipitated a string of new legislation to 
prevent conflicts of interest within banks. Investment banking research analysts had been actively 
promoting stocks to investors while privately acknowledging they were not attractive investments. 
These kinds of scandals spread across America in the late 1990s [9]. 
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2.2. Traditional Methods of Delivering Financial Services 
The 21st century was marked by three major events in the banking world: 
• Great adoption of computer networks, that provided new ways of communication, data 
integration and a larger resource pool. 
• Rise to power of developing countries like India, China and some Middle East countries 
due to an increase in international capital flow. 
• Washington Mutual collapses (2008), the largest bank failure in history that propagated 
through the market and started the chain reaction of a global recession.  
The latest was based on the speculative bubble in housing prices within the American market. In 
March, 2008, the Federal government began using a variety of bailout measures to prop up other 
firms from collapsing, but the measurements came too late therefore the crisis manifested at a 
global level. 
2.2.1 Overview of Financial Institutions 
Finance is defined as “the science of funds management” [1]; therefore the main role of financial 
institutions is to act as financial intermediaries. There are three major types of financial 
institutions: [37] 
• Deposit-taking institutions that accept and manage deposits and make loans, including 
banks, building societies, credit unions, trust companies, and mortgage loan companies 
• Insurance companies and pension funds 
• Brokers, underwriters and investment funds. 
Most financial institutions are generically known as banks, but this term accumulates many types 
of institutions and services, some of them obviously far from what a bank was initially created to 
be. Banking activities can be classified as follows: [33] 
 Retail banking: dealing directly with individuals and small businesses. The types 
of banks under this category are: Commercial banks, Community banks, 
Community development banks, Credit unions, Postal savings banks, Savings 
bank, Ethical banks, Direct or Internet-Only banks. 
 Business banking: providing services to mid-market business 
 Corporate banking: directed at large business entities 
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 Private banking: Have high net worth individuals and families as main clientele, 
providing them with wealth management. 
 Investment banking: related to activities on the financial markets, banks which 
provide capital to firms in the form of shares rather than loans 
 Islamic banks are differentiated by the fact that all banking activities must avoid 
interest, a concept that is forbidden in Islam. [38] 
 Conglomerates are financial service firms that are active in more than one sector 
of the financial services market. 
 Financial services’ companies are corporate entities that provide both banking 
and insurance 
 Central banks: government-owned banks. 
All financial institutions share similar core values and services, but set themselves apart using 
additional domain-specific products. 
2.2.2 Services Offered by Financial Institutions 
The notion of "financial services" has been in use largely due to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [1] 
of the late 1990s. Two separate service types emerged: 
• Primary operations of keeping money safe and allowing withdrawals; issuance of checkbooks, 
credit cards and other payment instruments; providing personal loans, commercial loans, 
mortgage loans and overdraft agreements for the temporary advancement of the bank’s own 
money to meet monthly spending commitments of a customer in their current account; notary 
service for financial and other documents [15]. 
• Other services like foreign exchange services; wealth and asset management; tax planning; 
capital market services; hedge fund management; custody services; insurance and annuities, life 
insurance, retirement insurance, health insurance, property and casualty insurance; reinsurance; 
intermediation or advisory services and angel investment [10]. 
All these types of services have been influenced by countless evolutions in human society and 
therefore are highly dependent on customer interaction. For example, foreign exchange services 
were invented during the colonization times when the need for local currency was more frequent 
and the loan was invented in the medieval trade fairs of Europe. In more modern times, the health 
insurance phenomenon as it is understood today began during the Civil war (1861-1865) in the 
United States, offering coverage against accidents related to train or steamboat travel [34]. 
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2.2.3 Financial Institutions’ Client Interaction  
A bank has no purpose unless the market demands its existence. Also a service provided by a 
financial institution needs to find its customer niche market so, over time, different channels have 
been put in place to facilitate customer interaction [4, 10.11]. The main channels today are:  
• Branches, ATMs,  
• Call centers, Mail services, 
• Telephone banking, Mobile banking, On-line banking, Video banking 
• Relationship managers. 
These channels demand not only financial, human and technological investment but also the 
know-how. This is why financial institutions need specialized assistance. 
Bankers are good at handling money and predicting capital investments, but there is a gap that 
needed to be filled: the technical knowledge to make this complex entity run smooth and 
flawlessly.  
Banking emerged with concepts such as electronic commerce (E-commerce) and online banking 
services, which in turn led to facilitating flexible and quick and easy financial transactions leading 
to economic benefits in reducing the time and money spent on obtaining services.  
2.3 Electronic Banking Methods 
 Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), also called 24-hour tellers, are electronic terminals 
which give consumers the opportunity to bank at almost any time. To withdraw cash, 
make deposits or transfer funds between accounts, a consumer needs an ATM card and a 
personal identification number. Some ATMs charge a usage fee for this service, with a 
higher fee for consumers who do not have an account at their institution. If a fee is 
charged, it must be revealed on the terminal screen or on a sign next to the screen. 
 Direct Deposit and Withdrawal Services allow consumers to authorize specific deposits, 
such as paychecks or social security checks, to their accounts on a regular basis. It is also 
possible to authorize the bank, for a fee, to withdraw funds from your account to pay your 
recurring bills, such as mortgage payment, installment loan payments, insurance 
premiums and utility bills. 
 Phone Systems let consumers phone their financial institutions with instructions to pay 
certain bills or to transfer funds between accounts. 
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 Point-of-Sale Transfer Terminals allow consumers to pay for retail purchases with a 
check card, a new name for a debit card. This card looks like a credit card but with a 
significant difference  the money for the purchase is transferred immediately from your 
account to the store's account. You no longer have the benefit of the credit card "float", 
that is the time between the purchase transactions and when you pay the credit card bill. 
With immediate transfer of funds at the point-of-sale, it is easy to go overdrawn on your 
checking account and incur additional charges unless you keep careful watch on 
spending. 
 Personal Computer Banking Services offer consumers the convenience of conducting 
many banking transactions electronically using a personal computer. Consumers can view 
their account balances, request transfers between accounts and pay bills electronically 
from home. 
2.3.1 Types of Electronic Currency 
Check cards, the new name for debit cards, can be used instead of cash, personal cheques or credit 
cards. As stated, when you use a check card you transfer funds immediately from your account to 
the store's account. A growing number of consumers use check cards because they eliminate the 
hassle and risks of writing cheques or carrying large amounts of cash; important facts are: [15] 
 You have less bargaining power with a check card than with a credit card. With a credit 
card you have the right to refuse to pay for the purchase if you are not satisfied. With a 
debit card you have already paid for the product, so you have less bargaining power with 
the merchant. 
 A thief with your check card and PIN number can take all the money in your account. The 
thief can even make point-of-sale purchases without your PIN.  
 Your liability is limited to a fixed amount if you report the check card lost within two 
days, any longer and your liability can increase. After a certain time you can be 
responsible for the entire amount.  
 In an era of increasing bank fees, consumers can expect to pay for the service of using a 
check card. 
 It is the consumer's responsibility to keep check card receipts and deduct the currency 
amounts of the purchase from your bank balance immediately, in order to avoid overdraft 
changes.  
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Smart Cards, sometimes called stored-value cards, have a specific amount of credit embedded 
electronically in the card. Smart cards can be used to cover bills or prepaid amounts such as pay 
phone charges, bridge, parking fees, gas and electricity or Internet purchases. These cards make 
the transaction fast, easy and convenient. 
Smart card technology is in a period of rapid change. Ultimately consumers should be able to 
customize their smart cards to suit their financial needs with access from their personal computer 
or cellular phone. Some important consumer issues are:  
 Smart cards are the equivalent of cash so must be guarded. 
 Procedures for recovering the value of a malfunctioning smart card are unclear. 
 The computer chip within the card will contain both financial and personal information. 
Privacy and security issues could be a problem.  
 Smart cards may not be covered by the Electronic Funds Transfer Act in case of loss or 
misuse of the card. 
Digital Cash is designed to allow the consumer to pay cash rather than use a credit card to 
purchase products on the Internet. One type of digital cash allows consumers to transfer money 
from a financial institution or a credit card into an "electronic purse". The cash is held in a special 
bank account that is linked to your computer. Another type of digital cash converts money into 
digital coins that can be placed on your computer's hard drive. 
Digital cheques allow consumers to use their personal computers to pay recurring bills. 
Consumers can use computer software provided by a bank, or they can use personal finance 
software packages such as Quicken or Microsoft Money and subscribe to an electronic bill-paying 
service. 
The technology of paying bills electronically by home computers is advancing rapidly, but 
relatively few businesses currently can accept payments made directly by computers. Digital 
checking is expensive. Fees generally run from $5 to $10 a month for 20 transactions. Privacy and 
security issues are major consumer concerns. Encryption technology may lessen privacy concerns 
in the future [69]. 
2.3.2 Patterns of Electronic Banking Services: 
Not every Bank site on the Internet means an electronic bank, According to global and specific 
studies of points of supervision and control of the U.S. and Europe; there are three basic images 
for an e-banking website [34]: 
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I: - Location Information, Informational, a basic level of e-banking or a minimum of electronic 
banking activity, the bank provides information about its programs and its products and services. 
II: - Location Communicative interactive or communication to allow the site some kind of 
communication exchange between the bank and its clients such as your e-mail and filler requests 
for samples on-line or modifying the information restrictions and accounts. 
III: - Location Cross-transactional and this is the level that the bank exercises its services and 
activities in an electronic environment, and includes this image to allow the client access to 
his/her account, to manage and make payments with cash and pay the value of invoices and 
perform all services and make transfers between accounts within the bank or with third parties. 
Internet banking has been able to provide tremendous opportunities for banks; it allows banks to 
expand and create significant competitive opportunities in their markets through continuity in the 
activities of attracting deposits and granting credit; it also allows them to provide new banking 
products and services or to support and strengthen the competitive position in the market. 
          No doubt the continued development of banking services available through the Internet 
contributes in one way or another to improving the efficiency of payment systems. Banking 
systems also gain by reducing the cost of operations for retail customers in the banks both at the 
regional and international level; consequently, customers and banks have the ability to raise the 
efficiency of the work. 
2.3.3 Electronic Banking Procedure and Sequence 
Online banking is a highly profitable channel for financial institutions. It provides customers 
convenience and flexibility and can be provided at a lower cost than traditional branch banking. 
Financial institutions have spent a great deal of time and money developing online banking 
functionality to allow customers an easy and convenient way to manage their money. These 
changes have created the opportunity for customers to move away from using bank branches that 
are costly to operate. In fact, some banks are driving customers to the online channel by charging 
fees for tasks commonly available to a customer in a branch, such as charging for teller visits [8]. 
Online customers have the ability to log into their accounts to pay bills, transfer money from one 
account to another, and perform account maintenance, such as address, phone, and e-mail 
changes. In many cases, accessing online accounts also gives the user the ability to see account 
numbers, routing numbers, balance, and transaction information. At one time, most of these 
services required customers to physically enter a physical building; these services can now be 
performed in an online environment. Financial institutions continue to add more services to the 
online channel, without increasing the amount of authentication needed to perform the services. 
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Generally, Internet banking is a series of operations carried out by the bank's client: by logging on 
to the website of the bank through a Web browser installed on your computer you can perform 
various banking transactions such as:  
Transfer funds between accounts. 
Transfer funds to accounts of a third party within or outside the bank. 
Enquire about account balances. 
View last transactions. 
Display an image from the instruments. 
Use the applications for loans. 
Personal online banking, which lets you watch and make your transactions, keeps you in touch 
with your account and your bank from anywhere around the clock. 
Online banking can take place in four main stages as shown in figure 2.1 below: front end 
application, user communication stage, user authentication stage and back end bank data base 
stage.  
Application Server for online 
bank
Transaction unit 
1. upload Documents
2. Withdrawal   
        
Synch Unit
1. Synchronize    
Document Statuses
2. Retrieve Statement
Download Unit
GATEWAY
Back-End Banking system
 
 Figure 2.1 four main stages for online banking 
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1. The user is running an OS system. 
2. After opening the browser they access the Internet banking site and identify themselves 
and enter PIN and password by using the keyboard. 
3. Encrypt the data entered and transmitted or passed to the Bank site. 
4. The Bank is to decrypt data sent, and then performs user verification. 
 
There are three essential components of this structure [1]: 
1. User: there are two users who deal with the system, they are either a normal user (client) 
called the bank customer and administrator, an individual system or another program to 
oversee the application of the bank. 
2. Application server: a bank that is responding to requests from users and will oversee the 
database and pass all requests to the database through this server. 
3. Database: usually a stand-alone server responding to requests sent by the server application. 
 
The application shown above is based on Protocol reply/request, where the user creates a request 
to the server, the server replies by implementing logical operations required or the application is 
installed; the request to connect to the database may or may not require this. 
2.4 Other Types of Methods Using E- Banking 
There are other types of methods of personal computers and Internet banking systems:  
I. Banking transactions through mobile:  
Express banking transactions using mobile or Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) to perform 
banking operations of checking stock or operations on accounts and transactions. The first 
accounting services through short message service (SMS) appeared in 1990; the smart phones 
using WAP technology enabled mobile Web usage and European banks were the first to provide 
mobile banking services with WAP technology for customers. 
Up to 2011 mobile banking transactions were completed using SMS via mobile Web. The success 
of Apple with the IPhone operating system based on the technique of the Android operating 
system, and the appearance of Google and other web browsers on the scene have been influential 
factors in increasing the use of special software the customers call apps, and had an impact on the 
development of banking applications via mobile phones. 
The use of mobile banking has increased by more than a third in the past year (2013), and it 
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appears likely to continue to increase as more and more clients use smartphones. While still 
small, the use of mobile phones to make payments at the point of sale has increased even more 
rapidly. Over a quarter  of mobile phone users express some interest in using their phones to 
make payments at the point of sale, giving mobile payments substantial growth potential as the 
ability to make these payments becomes more widespread. 
Figure 2.2 shows that the reason limiting client adoption of mobile banking and payments is 
concerns about the security of the technology and a sense that they don’t offer any real benefits to 
the user over existing methods for banking or making payments. With regards to security, clients 
have actually become more likely in the past year to report that they simply don’t know how safe 
it is to use mobile banking, suggesting that clients need to be provided with reliable and accurate 
information on the level of security associated with the various means of accessing mobile 
banking.    
 
 
Figure 2.2 mobile usage stattictis [83] 
From Figure 2.2 we can know the main reasons for deciding not to use mobile payment 
II. Telephone Banking:    
The service provided by the financial institutions allows customers to conduct transactions via 
land line phone, and most telephone banking services using an IVR system (Interactive voice 
response) that responds to the client according to the figures of the services requested by using the 
keyboard on the phone or through technical distinction sounds. 
To provide protection and confidentiality, clients must be confirmed first by oral password (voice) 
or by using the numeric keypad on the telephone or answering a question from the bank. 
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I'm concerned about the security of…
It's easier to pay with another method
I don't see any benet from using mobile…
I don't have the necessary feature on my…
I don't trust the technology
I don't really understand all the different…
I don't need to make any payments
The cost of data acess on my wireless plan…
I don't know of any stores that allow…
Other
It's dif•cult or time consuming to set up
The places  I shop don't accept mobile…
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2.4.1 Advantages of Electronic Banking Services 
 Provide quick service and avoid the problem of waiting at banks to conduct a transaction 
or even to access the bank, whenever there is distance between the user and bank [4]. 
 Low-cost:   
Firstly, from the client’s side and the proportion of money lost in roaming and 
searching for the service. 
Secondly, from the bank, as follows 
o Minimize human errors as they are very likely if the bank officer performs the 
banking process manually for many account numbers with long and many fields 
to be filled for each transaction. 
o The world these days is marked by the emergence of many advanced technologies 
and the Internet. 
o objects moving towards the Internet have increased; therefore, convergence and 
overlapping activities were logical linking various financial trading systems
o The ways the bank deals with markets by buying certain goods from the market, 
followed by the withdrawal of the corresponding value from the customer and 
converting to a direct market account.[9] 
All these factors resulted in a great many people banking online knowing that manual transactions 
still exist, but there is a very large acceleration in the search for the service online if possible. 
Online banking does not mean changing habits and financial transactions known to the client, but 
using techniques from computer and Internet networks to give you an option to overcome 
obstacles that could constitute a burden of time and cost and so therefore be effective and 
represent added value in a world of financial transactions. 
2.4.2 Disadvantages of Online Banking Services 
 Must provide Internet service. 
 Must acquire basic skills in dealing with computer and Internet. 
 Of the biggest problems facing these services is a problem of trust: users unsure of 
correct procedure; this request can be transformed into non-authorized access, and could 
delay the response for long periods as a result of being attacked.[33] 
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 The problem of learning a new technique: some people feel uncomfortable with trying to 
learn new techniques, particularly techniques for the financial side. 
  Abandon paper-based transactions: some people prefer to deal directly with people in 
cases involving money [38]. 
 This flexibility encourages many threats of fraudulent websites, theft of personal 
documents, whether passwords, account numbers, confidential card numbers or other 
confidential documents those are supposed to be safe by pirates online. 
Standardizing the security of Internet banking was identified quickly, causing the creation of a 
number of guidance documents and best practices, such as those published by the Basel 
Committee. Within the Basel framework, a number of Internet banking security controls should 
be implemented, including 
1- Authentication of Internet banking customers. 
2- Non repudiation and accountability for Internet-banking transactions. 
3- 3- Appropriate measures to ensure segregation of duties. 
4- Proper authorization controls within Internet banking systems. 
 5- Databases and applications. 
6- Data integrity of Internet banking transactions. 
7- Records and information. 
8- Establishment of clear audit trails for Internet banking transactions. 
9- Confidentiality of key bank information.   
2.5 Operating System Environment 
2.5.1 O.S Introduction  
The extension of the existing operating system aims to build a secure operating system for 
desktop and laptop computers. The stress is on security, which is achieved by exploiting the 
isolation capabilities of the bar-metal machine, with integrated capability to modern hardware 
technologies, such as Intel VT-d and Trusted Execution Technology [106]. 
2.5.2 Problem with Current Operation System 
Current mainstream operating systems that are used for desktop computing, e.g. Windows, Mac 
OS x based systems prove unsatisfactory when it comes to security.  
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Linux VS Windows [29] 
Price Although the majority of Linux variants have 
improved dramatically in ease of use, 
Windows is still much easier to use for most 
computer users because of the familiarity of 
Windows and because it's more likely they are 
using a Windows computer at home, in 
school, or at the office.   
Microsoft has made 
several advancements and 
changes that have made it 
much easier to use its 
operating system, and 
although arguably it may 
not be the easiest 
operating system, it is still 
easier than Linux. 
Reliability The majority of Linux variants and versions 
are notoriously reliable and can often run for 
months and years without needing to be 
rebooted. 
Windows, still cannot 
match the reliability of 
Linux. 
Software Linux has a large variety of available software 
programs, utilities, and games. However, 
Windows has a much larger selection of 
available software. 
Because of the large 
amount of Microsoft 
Windows users, there is a 
much larger selection of 
available 
software programs, 
utilities, and games for 
Windows.  
Software 
Cost 
Many of the available software programs, 
utilities, and games available on Linux are 
freeware or open source. Even such complex 
programs such as Gimp, Open Office, Star 
Office, and wine are available for free or at a 
low cost. 
Although Windows does 
have software programs, 
utilities, and games for 
free, the majority of the 
programs will cost 
anywhere between $20.00 
- $200.00+ US dollars per 
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copy. 
Hardware Although hardware manufacturers have made 
great advancements in supporting Linux it still 
will not support most hardware devices. 
However, for the hardware devices that have 
driver support they usually work in all 
versions of Linux.  
Because of the number of 
Microsoft Windows users 
and the broader driver 
support, Windows has 
much larger support for 
hardware devices and 
almost all hardware 
manufacturers will 
support their products in 
Microsoft Windows. 
Security  Linux is and has always been a very secure 
operating system. Although it still can be 
attacked when compared to Windows, it is 
much more secure. 
Although Microsoft has 
made great improvements 
over the years with 
security on their operating 
system, their operating 
system continues to be the 
most vulnerable to viruses 
and other attacks. 
Open 
Source 
Many of the Linux variants and many Linux 
programs are open source and enable users to 
customize or modify the code however they 
want. 
Microsoft Windows is not 
open source and the 
majority of Windows 
programs are not open 
source.  
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Support Although it may be more difficult to find users 
familiar with all Linux variants, there are vast 
amounts of available online documentation 
and help, available books, and support 
available for Linux. 
Microsoft Windows 
includes its own help 
section, has vast amounts 
of available online 
documentation and help, 
as well as books on each 
of the versions of 
Windows.  
 
Table 2.1: Comparison between Linux and Windows  
When we compare Linux against Mac OS we found that Mac OS is based on a Berkeley 
Software Distribution (BSD) code, while Linux is an independent development of a Unix-
like system, this means that these systems are similar, but not binary compatible. 
Furthermore, Mac OS has a lot of applications not open source and built on unknown 
libraries, the other thing Mac OS only available on Apple computer.   
  The major problem with current systems is their inability to provide effective isolation between 
various programs running on one machine. If the user’s web browser gets compromised (due to a 
bug exploited by a malicious website), the OS is usually unable to protect other users’ 
applications and data from also being compromised. Similarly, if certain system core components 
get compromised, e.g. WI-FI driver or stack, none of the above mentioned systems can defend 
themselves from a complete compromise of all the applications and data [101].  
The above situation is a direct result of certain architectural design decisions, which include over 
complexity of OS API, insecure GUI design, and the monolithic kernel architecture. Systems that 
are based on such insecure architecture simply cannot be given strong security. 
The reactive approach, as many vendors use today, tries to patch every single known security bug. 
But such an approach does not scale well especially for users who require more than average 
security. Patching can only address known and popular attacks, but offers no protection against 
new, or less popular, more targeted threats. Consequently, we need a different approach to build a 
secure system. 
Obviously building a new system can be a very time consuming task that is why reusing as many 
read to use building blocks as possible is important. This in turn implies the use of virtualization 
technology, which is used for two primary reasons: offering excellent security isolation 
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properties, as well as the ability to reuse a large amount of software, including most of the 
applications and drivers written for mainstream OSes, like Linux or Windows. 
2.5.3 Common Desktop and Security 
2.5.3.1 GUI 
One of the main goals of puppy OS in our scheme is to provide seamless integration of the 
banking application hosted in USB onto a common user desktop, so that it is easy for the non-
technical user to work with the application. Another important goal is to provide a near- native 
performance, especially for displaying banking applications that use rich graphics and 
multimedia, like web browsers. 
2.5.3.2 The Network Domain 
In a typical operating system like Windows or Linux, the core networking code, that includes 
network card drivers and various protocol stacks (802.11, tcp/ip , etc), runs in the kernel. This 
means that a potential bug in the network code, when exploited by an attacker, always results in 
full system compromise.  
In our architecture we try to limit potential attack vectors in the system as much as possible. That 
is why the whole networking code, including drivers and protocol stacks, has been built on an 
unprivileged zone called the network domain. 
The network domain has direct access to the networking hardware, i.e. the Wi-Fi and Ethernet 
cards. The access is granted by new Intel VT-d technology “if used”, which allows for safe device 
assignment to unprivileged code. When a potential bug in the networking code, e.g. in the Wi-Fi 
driver, is exploited by an attacker, all that attacker can gain is the control over the network 
domain, but not the application. This does not give the attacker any advantage compared to what 
he or she can already do when controlling e.g. the hotel LAN or Wi-Fi network (which assumes 
all the usual networking attacks like sniffing of unencrypted traffic or performing man-in-the-
middle attacks). Particularly, our applications use a form of cryptography-protected network 
protocols. The table below represents the network configuration setup for our puppy O. S.[104] 
1 activate network by right clicking on network icon  
2 selects setup networking and chooses which option to connect to the internet   
3 selects wired or wireless LAN to connect internet via wireless LAN 
4 when clicking on above option a new screen appears then select simple network setup 
5 in interface tab select wlan0 which appears as an available network then enter key 
6 Download jre1.8.0_11 in order to run file.jar   
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Table 2.2:  Network configuration setup for our modify puppy Linux O.S. 
2.6 Cloud Computing Definition  
Cloud computing [58] is a means by which highly scalable and technology enabled services can 
be easily consumed over the Internet on as-needed-basis. This innovative paradigm has generated 
a significant interest in both the market place and the academic world, resulting in a number of 
notable commercial and individual cloud computing services, e.g., from Amazon, Google, 
Microsoft, Yahoo, and Salesforce.   
In general, cloud computing architecture is divided into two layers: the bottom resource layers and 
the upper service layer. The bottom is the foundation, based on virtualized resources in the form 
of storage and computing, and the upper service layer provides specific services. 
Cloud Computing is clearly one of the enticing technologies, at least in part because of cost-
efficiency and flexibility. 
7 Encoding=UTF-8 
Name [en_US]= name of a file                            # name of an app. 
Generic Name=GUI Port Scanner                       # longer name of an app. 
Exec=java -jar /path of file/name of file.jar      # command used to launch an app. 
Terminal=false                       # whether an app requires to be run in a terminal. 
Icon [en_US] =/path of picture/name of picture .png # location of icon file. 
Type=Application                                                # type. 
Categories=Application; Network; Security;        # categories in which this app 
should be listed. 
Comment [en_US]= name of file Graph Editor   # comment which appears as a 
tooltip Save it to name of file.desktop  
8 Drag and drop file to desktop 
9 change the name of file by right clicking on file and selecting edit item then enter 
the name of a file to appear in the desktop 
10 Optionally can change the icon of a file by right clicking and selecting file'name of a 
file' and choose set icon and simply drag and drop the specified icon    
11 The final step is click on file and it will open in browser   
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2.6.1. Cost Minimizing 
Assume  our  service  has  a  predictable  daily  demand  where  the  peak requires 100 servers at 
noon but the trough requires only 20 servers at midnight; as long as the average utilization over a 
whole day is 50 servers, the actual utilization over the whole day (shaded area under the curve) is 
50 x 24 = 1200 server-hours; but since we must provision to the peak of 100 servers, we pay for 
100 x 24 = 2400 server- hours, a factor of 1.5 more than what is needed. Therefore, as long as the 
pay-as-you-go cost per server-hour over 3 years is less than 15 times the cost of buying the 
server, we can save money using utility computing.  
 
Figure 2.3: Provisioning for peak load and underproviding  
From Figure 2.3 can show that in: (a) even if peak load can be correctly anticipated, without 
elasticity we waste resources (shaded area) during nonpeak times. (b) Under provisioning case 
1: potential revenue from users not served (shaded area) is sacrificed. (c) Under provisioning 
case 2: some users desert the site permanently after experiencing poor service; this attrition 
and possible negative press results in a permanent loss of a portion of the revenue stream.  
However, with all these cloud computing capabilities and potential to save cost, large 
enterprises and others should step back, move cautiously and analyze the security risks and 
concerns associated with cloud computing before adapting the technology. 
Table 2.3 shows the categories of the cloud services and which provider can support that kind 
of service. 
Provider IaaS PaaS Compute 
Billing 
Model 
Storage 
Billing 
Model 
Relational 
Database 
Service 
Hybrid 
capabilities 
Windows 
Azure 
No Yes     
(.Note, 
Java,     
Ruby, 
Python, 
PHP) 
Pay-per-use Pay-per-use Yes     (SQL 
Server) 
Yes      (on- 
premise   to 
cloud) 
Amazon 
Web 
Services 
Yes No Pay-per-use Pay-per-use Yes 
(MySQL- 
based) 
Yes      (via 
third-party 
tools) 
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Rack space Yes Yes   
(LAMP, 
.Net (PaaS) 
Pay-per-use 
(IaaS); 
Month
ly 
(PaaS) 
Pay-per-use 
(IaaS); 
Included     
in 
monthly    
fee 
(PaaS) 
Yes 
(Fathom DB) 
No        (but 
dedicated 
resources to 
cloud 
planned) Joyent Yes Yes       
(Java, 
Ruby, 
Python, 
PHP) 
Month
ly 
(IaaS); PaaS 
pricing not 
announced 
Included     
in 
monthly    
fee 
(IaaS) 
No Yes      (on- 
primise    to 
cloud) 
Google No Yes   
(Python, 
Java) 
Pay-per-use P y-per-use No No 
GoGrid Yes No Pay-per-use 
or pre-paid 
Included 
with each 
instance 
No Yes 
(dedicated 
resources to 
cloud) 
Table 2.3:  Competitive matrix.  
 
Nevertheless, several security issues in the cloud are impeding the vision of cloud computing as a 
new IT procurement model. This security observation can be put into three categories [5]. 
•Traditional security -Involves concerns related to computer and network intrusions. Some of 
these attacks include VM-level attacks [25], cloud provider vulnerabilities [57], phishing cloud 
providers, authentication and authorization, and forensics in the cloud. Cloud providers respond to 
these concerns by arguing that their security measures and processes are more mature and tested 
than those of the average company.  
•Availability –Involves concerns on critical applications and data availability. Server uptime 
issues, single points of failure and attack, and the inability of an enterprise to ensure that the cloud 
provider is faithfully running a hosted application and giving the valid results make companies 
nervous. 
•Third-party data control -For the data owner who out-sources data to the cloud, the cloud acts 
as a semi-trusted third-party.  Data placed in the cloud can reside anywhere. Outsourcing data to 
the Cloud should not lead to de facto outsourcing of data control [71]. 
In general, encryption is a useful tool for protecting the confidentiality of sensitive information 
transactions so that even if a transaction is compromised by an intruder, the information remains 
protected even after the transaction has been successfully attacked or stolen. Provided that the 
encryption is done properly and the decryption keys are not accessible to the attacker, encryption 
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can provide protection for the sensitive data stored in the database, reduce the legal ability of the 
data owners, and reduce the cost to society of fraud and identity theft.  
2.6.2 Background Works on Cloud Computing. 
 Cloud computing is an emerging fielding with many research and implementation challenges. 
While it is tempting to view cloud computing in terms of existing computing models, the cloud 
presents many unique characteristics outlined in [72]. Data security in the cloud is one of them. 
As mentioned before, the cloud presents unique challenges; techniques designed for computing 
environments may move to the cloud or be used in a hybrid environment. Our fundamental 
theorem is based upon additive homomorphic encryption (such as Paillier’s cryptosystem [109] 
and cashing re-encryption [64, 74] to secure data in the cloud and in transit from the cloud to a 
client.  
2.7 Summary  
This chapter discussed the banking system and tried to give a quick glance of the banking sector 
background. Also this chapter demonstrated the electronic method used to facilitate the banking 
services. After that we presented the advantages and disadvantages of electronic and online 
banking services. Finally, we gave an overview of operating system technology and made a 
comparison between different operating systems. 
The guidance for banks issued by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 
describes enhanced authentication methods underlining the ineffectiveness of single-factor 
authentication [13]. More standards, such as the International Organization for Standardization’s 
ISO21188:2006, describe a framework of requirements to enable certificate-based solutions for 
secure Internet banking applications [19]. ISO21188:2006 defines security targets, as well as 
procedures that facilitate the risk management process. However the electronic/online banking 
problems still grow and become more sophisticated.    
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Chapter 3 Overview Security, Authentication and Access Control 
Security is simply the state of feeling safe and protected from threat and danger. The 
increasing preference for online communication and transactions underscores the need for 
security of information in addition to security of communication infrastructures and devices. This 
is because of the vital nature of information to communication as well as being a critical resource 
in carrying out organizations’ activities. The security concept varies from one networking 
environment to another and also depends on the operating assumptions of the network in question. 
Understanding the basic concepts security was designed to address is very important. Wireless 
networks provide the simplest means of connectivity and are the most vulnerable to network 
threats hence the need for access control. Security issues in wireless networks have been 
discussed in [31-60] and a detailed discussion is out of the scope of this work. 
The focus of this chapter is to review security from the general network and online 
banking perspectives as well as access control and its implementation in disruptive electronic 
banking concepts discussed in the previous chapter. The chapter is structured as follows: section 
3.1 reviews the network security with focus on basic security terminologies, network security 
threats, security services, cryptography and cryptographic algorithms. Section 3.2 discusses 
security issues in online banking with focus on goals, threats, requirements, design consideration, 
transaction security, factors affecting electronic banking security and key research challenges. 
Section 3.3 presents an overview of cryptography and access control with focus on requirements, 
access control elements, existing research works and access control implementation in the online 
banking environment. Section 3.4 is intruder methods used to hack internet users and section 3.5 
covers the general defence used in the financial sector. Section 3.6 gives some information about 
homomorphic cryptography and section 3.7 is a summary 
3.1 General Network Security  
Network security discussed in [45-74] is the process of preventing and detecting 
unauthorized use of resources as well as reacting against an established threat or danger. How 
well the network is secured against threats will depend on the ability of a node to: verify the 
authenticity of every received packet (preventive); identify when malicious activities have taken 
place and the entity involved (detective); and reject every future packet from the malicious entity 
and notify the administrator for expulsion (reactive). This section discusses basic security 
terminologies, network security threats, security services, cryptography and cryptographic 
algorithms. 
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3.1.1 Basic Security Terminology 
This section presents and describes some basic security terminologies used during the 
course of this research work. 
Plaintext: The original readable message in plain form before being encrypted into ciphertext or 
after being decrypted. 
Ciphertext: The output result obtained when an encryption is performed on a plaintext using a 
cipher to make it unreadable before decryption.  
Cipher: This is an algorithm for performing an encryption or decryption and its operation is 
dependent on a key.  
Key: This is a piece of information or parameter used to determine the output of a cryptographic 
algorithm. It is often of various sizes depending on the algorithm used. 
Encryption: The process of distorting data (plaintext) with a key and an algorithm (cipher) to 
make it unreadable to an unauthorized party.  
Decryption: The process of applying a relevant key to an encrypted data and an algorithm to 
make the resultant output readable to an authorized party. 
Signature: A signature is a bit string attached to the document when signed (e.g one-way hash of 
the document encrypted with the private key). Digital signature algorithms are public-key based 
algorithms with secret information to sign documents and public information to verify signatures. 
Nonce: This is a number or bit string used only once in a secured communication.  
Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC): This is a specific construction for 
calculating a message authentication code (MAC) involving a cryptographic hash function (MD5 
or SHA) in combination with a secret key. 
(Secure Sockets Layer) SSL:  Standard security technologies for establishing an encrypted link 
between a server and a client—typically a web server (website) and a browser; or a mail server 
and a mail client. 
Transport Layer Security (TLS): TLS [45] is a transport-layer security protocol that uses a key-
agreement protocol such as Difﬁe-Hellman [45] to establish a Conﬁdentiality channel with 
integrity guarantees between two parties. Authentication of the server is provided by an X509 
certiﬁcate chain rooted in one of several trusted third parties whose certiﬁcates are provided to 
client’s out-of-band. 
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3.1.2 Cryptographic Hash Function: 
 This is a deterministic procedure that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bit 
string (hash value) that changes with a change to the data.  
Timestamp: This is a sequence of characters denoting the date and/or time of occurrence of an 
event.  
Certificate: A certificate is a tool used to bind a public key to a principal or a public key to an 
attribute. Certificates (with X.509 as example) are always generated by a trusted authority to 
ensure the correctness of conveyed information.  
Attribute: This is a specification that defines an object’s, element’s or file’s property. It 
comprises a name and a value in the case of an object; a type or class name in the case of an 
element; a name and extension in the case of a file. 
3.2 Security Goals 
Security goals are measures aimed at preventing and detecting the activities of malicious entities 
through the provision of information security. The general goals in network security are: 
Only intended audience should know the content of transmitted or stored data  
Every data must have a source to facilitate detection of any possible modification 
Every communication event must be traced to an entity 
Network services should be available and function correctly 
Certain services or resources should be restricted to only authorized entities 
3.2.1 Security Threats 
A threat as defined in [41] is “any possible event or sequence of actions that might lead to a 
violation of one or more security goals.” The actual realization is known as an attack. System 
threats are always targeted at the protocols and can be directed against: the cryptographic 
algorithms used in protocols; the cryptographic techniques used to implement the algorithms and 
protocols as well as against the protocols themselves. These threats are either passive (where a 
non-participant in a protocol eavesdrops on some or all of the protocol without affecting the 
protocol) or active (an attack where the attacker under the disguise of being someone else tries to 
alter the protocol to his/her own advantage). This is much more serious in protocols where there is 
lack of trust among the communicating parties. The form of active attacks depends on the network 
and requires active intervention. The classified attacks are eavesdropping, masquerading, 
modification, replay, repudiation, authorization violation and Denial of Service.  
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3.2.2 Security Services 
Security service according to [51] is “an abstract service that seeks to ensure a specific security 
property.” It can be realized through the use of cryptographic algorithms and protocols or 
conventional method. A combination of both cryptographic approach and conventional method is 
considered more effective. The five known security services of confidentiality, data integrity, 
authentication, non-repudiation and access control are discussed below. 
Confidentiality is the process where the content or meaning of transmitted information is 
concealed in the form of a ciphertext to restrict access to only authorized entities during 
transmission over an insecure channel. Both symmetric and asymmetric key algorithms are 
suitable in carrying out this process. This service can mitigate masquerading, eavesdropping and 
authorization violation attacks.  
Data Integrity is the process which ascertains the originality of a transmitted message and 
assures the communicating entities that the transmitted message was not tampered with. This is 
realized by the use of symmetric-based HMAC or an asymmetric-based digital signature to 
provide protection against malicious alteration. This service can mitigate masquerading, 
authorization violation, modification and man-in-the-middle attacks. 
Non-repudiation (Accountability) is the process which prevents a communicating party from 
refuting the validity of an already taken action like sending of a message. This service is only 
possible with asymmetric cryptosystems that create digital signatures since a symmetric 
cryptosystem does not have a mechanism to prove the creator of the original message. A third 
party involvement has been identified as a way of enforcing this service. This service can mitigate 
masquerading, authorization violation, repudiation and modification attacks.  
Authentication is the process of verifying either the true identity of another communicating party 
or the source of data origin when the verifying party does not have personal information of the 
other’s identity. This service can be realized by both symmetric and asymmetric based techniques. 
This service can mitigate masquerading, modification and man-in-the-middle attacks.  
Access Control is the process of protecting the network from unauthenticated entities and usage 
of system/network resources from unauthorized entities. An access control system that 
incorporates the AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) operations is usually 
considered very effective. It can be realized by both symmetric and asymmetric based techniques. 
The service mitigates masquerading, authorization violation, modification and denial of service 
attacks. 
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3.3 Cryptography 
Cryptography discussed in [52] is the study and practice of providing information security. It 
employs mathematical techniques with cryptographic keys to provide protection against network 
attacks. Kirchhoff’s principle of having a publicly-known algorithm and a secret key is the base 
on which modern cryptographic systems are built. The presence of redundancy (to make 
transmitted messages unintelligible) and message freshness (to prevent replay of old messages) 
are the two fundamental cryptographic principles underlying all the cryptographic systems. A 
cryptographic algorithm used in cryptographic protocols is a mathematical transformation of input 
data to output data; while cryptographic protocol is a series of steps and message exchanges 
between multiple entities with the sole aim of achieving a specific security objective.  
  Cryptographic Algorithm  
Cryptographic algorithm is a sequence of finite instructions employed for calculation and data 
processing to achieve cryptographic (security) goals. The two known types are symmetric-key and 
asymmetric-key cryptography.  
Symmetric-key Cryptography is a cryptographic method that uses the same key for message 
encryption and decryption. Examples of symmetric-key algorithms include Data Encryption 
Standard (DES), triple-DES (3DES) and Advance Encryption Standard (AES) which is the most 
secured and widely use. These algorithms can be used in electronic code book mode, cipher block 
chaining mode, cipher feedback mode, stream cipher mode and counter mode. AES supports key 
lengths and block sizes from 128 bits to 256 bits in steps of 32 bits, and specifies that the block 
size must be 128 bits and the key length must be 128, 192 or 256 bits. Its characteristics are: 
 It is not easily scalable 
 Online exchange of keys over insecure media is not safe 
 Has no provision for non-repudiation 
 Authentication is provided only for communicating entities with the secret key 
 Provides integrity and prevents outsiders from carrying out modification 
Asymmetric-key Cryptography also known as public-key cryptography does not require an 
initial exchange of secret keys for secure communication between two communicating parties. 
Different keys are used for both encryption and decryption and derivation of decryption key from 
encryption is impossible thus making publishing of the public key possible. The two known types 
are RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) cryptography and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). 
Though ECC with some interesting features is an emerging alternative to RSA, RSA is still the 
most widely used. These two cryptosystems have been discussed in [68-69] with their advantages 
and disadvantages highlighted. RSA is the preferred choice for implementation because it has a 
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very low verification time compared to ECC. It involves three steps of key generation, encryption 
and decryption. It forms the base of most practical security because of its strong nature and is 
based on some principles from number theory. The characteristics of asymmetric cryptography 
are: 
 Scalable with increasing number of users. 
 Online exchange of public keys over insecure media is safe. 
 Has provision for non-repudiation. 
 Authentication is provided for any communicating entity.  
 Provides integrity and prevents outsiders/insiders except the sender from carrying out 
modification.  
3.4 Intruder Methods used to Hack Internet User  
The normal operating environment in the user's computer is vulnerable to a number of risks and 
threats because of the bad use of the system or installing the system incorrectly as well as using 
unreliable software; and if a user tries to conduct transactions via such an environment, there is no 
guarantee of the safety of the transactions [28, 29, 32, 53, 102].  
Generally, we find that any information sent between any two entities may be vulnerable to 
intruders in four ways: Interception, that there is someone in the middle between sender and 
receiver who will copy the contents of the message and send.  Interruption, that there are people in 
the middle between sender and receiver that can grasp the message and not send it to the other 
party.  Amendment (Modification), to have someone in the middle between sender and receiver to 
modify the contents of the message then send it. Fabrication, an identity theft of one of the parties 
whether the sender or receiver. 
 On the other side online banking has grown and flourished over the years, but is now facing 
challenges due to the risks of phishing, data compromises, and other attacks. The rise of these 
attacks could cause a drop in the use of online banking and negatively affect client confidence in 
the ability of a financial institution to protect them. Clients are questioning the safety of their 
money and information and are expecting banks to fix the problem. Generally speaking there are 
four main types of attacks on e-banking. All of the attacks seen at the moment fall into the first 
two categories: 
1-  Getting authentication credentials from the client victim  
2- Modifying the client victim’s legitimate transactions.  
3- Denying them access to their banking  
4- Merely observing the transactions of the client victim  
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A very well-known online fraud is phishing, which is an attack designed to convince the victim to 
give away their online banking credentials to a third party. This and similar scams or attacks 
which reveal credentials to the attacker fall into the class of credential harvesting. 
The researcher defines phishing as: a technique used to deceptively obtain information, including 
personal data, banking and credit information, passwords and other account numbers from 
Internet users by using emails and websites designed to look like a legitimate business, financial 
institution, or government agency. The purpose of obtaining the information is usually to commit 
identity theft or identity fraud. Phishing is an evolving scam; with every attack comes a new 
method to help the phisher lure more victims. It is difficult to detect and prevent attacks because 
they seldom have the same characteristics. There are several different types of phishing attacks 
including misleading e-mails, man-in-the-middle, URL obfuscation, page content overriding, 
malware phishing, key loggers and screen grabbers, session hijackers, web Trojans, IP address 
manipulation, and system reconfiguration attacks. 
There is a Web browser threat (Man-in-the-Browser); this type of attack redirects the user to fake 
sites. Most banks provide a password (often a One-Time Password (OTP)) to protect the user 
from getting their password stolen and reused again after the authorizing client logs off.  This 
security method can be hacked to disrupt the functionality of changing the password every time, 
using a proven tool to modify the file (in windows SAM file), which converts domain names to 
addresses (host file) or intercepts a user during receipt of banking services by bank page coverage 
of HTML Injection.  Another threat that can affect the SSL or Secure Socket Layer connection 
(Man-in-the Middle) is an encryption protocol that provides a guarantee to connect safely online 
and almost all bank sites use these protocols to protect communications between them and their 
customers, but SSL protocol cannot ensure a 100% secure connection.  
The attacker can succeed in penetrating the client side SSL session in the following sequence:  
1- The attacker manipulates and converts address names in the domain name server (through 
DNS spoofing) and changes protocol conversion to logical addresses  from physical 
addresses (ARP spoofing). 
2- Then they prepare a fake page with a false certificate. The browser then opens the 
meeting and asks if the certificate is valid and not false as shown in figure 3.1 
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Figure 3.1: security certificate alert 
3- Validating the warning message shown above will appear to the user, but few users are 
experienced with the types of attacks and will press the button "yes" without thinking. 
4- Despite the number of binaries that encrypts the communication (128 bits) the attacker 
can penetrate this connection.  
5- Then the attacker uses fraudulent certificates and uses a tool called (SSL Dump) to 
decrypt the packets and gain user information.  
3.4.1 Malware or Malicious (and Other Malicious Code-Based Redirection Schemes):  
adopt the method that the user is not defined by malware (Malicious Code) on his computer 
desktop or to redirect the user without his knowledge to a location similar to the location where 
they want to access and collect information that the user enters, and this process is called 
forwarding (Redirection).  
And from other types of malware: 
 Recording software keyboard buttons (key logger): where to record what the user enters in 
terms of characters and numbers to enter the financial account, and send it to the hunter (Phisher) 
to withdraw funds from that account. 
 Backdoor: this program gives the hunter access to device user data and financial accounts, to 
transfer funds, so it appears that the same user has done this process and therefore in many cases 
when the user denies  the money transfers from the account it is difficult to substantiate the claim. 
3.4.2 Scams.Phish Phishing Websites/Emails 
Phishing websites are the most commonly seen form of credential harvesting attack on the web, as 
seen from figure 3.2, usually combined with an email which tricks the user into accessing the 
website. They are purely a social engineering attack which relies on user misunderstanding of 
security features and problems with how security indicators are presented to users. 
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Figure 3.2 Attack graph for S.phish 
Extended character sets:  In order to have a successful phishing website the URL must look 
plausible. The first technique for doing this is using web browser support for extended character 
sets in domain names. Homograph attacks were first described in 2002 [82]. The current standard 
for encoding Unicode characters in a legal URL is the puny code standard [105] which uses two 
hyphens as an escape. Such URLs are displayed as the Unicode characters in the address bar and 
in links. Because Unicode contains several distinct characters which appear very similar (for 
example ‘g’ (Unicode 0x0581) and ‘h’ (Unicode 0x10b9), from the Armenian and Georgian 
alphabets respectively) it is possible to create a URL which is distinct, but appears the same to the 
human eye. This was used to attack PayPal [51]. 
Typo-squatting: Typo-squatting is a technique where attackers register similar domains to the 
target website, either through simple spelling mistakes or common typing errors. These are used 
to host pornographic websites, ads, malware and sometimes phishing attacks. McAfee recently 
released a report on typo-squatting [12]. 
Sub-domains: A common phishing technique is to rely on the fact that the user cannot tell the 
difference between similar URLs such as www.XXX.com and www.XXX.secure-banking.com. 
The average member of the public will see the word XXX and assume they are owned by the 
same company, whereas in fact there is no guarantee that this is the case at all. This technique is 
helped by the fact that many companies are using URLs outside their normal domain for 
legitimate sites [18]. This makes it almost impossible for a user to tell them apart. Because 
phishing is such a wide-spread threat, many people have been deploying or proposing solutions. I 
will try to reflect on the available measures used to combat phishing attacks and evaluate their 
effectiveness. 
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3.4.3 Electronic Banking Attack Trees 
Schneier was the first to associate the term “Attack Tree” [32] with the use of tree style models 
for expressing different ways in which a system can be attacked. He proposes an attack tree as a 
formal and methodical way for describing the security of the system based on varying attacks. 
Attack trees provide a way for modeling goals of an attack and alternative ways to achieve that goal. 
Attack trees provide formal methodology for analyzing the security of systems and subsystems. 
They provide a way to think about security, capture and reuse expertise about security, and 
respond to changes in security. An attack tree has a root node and leaf nodes. The root node 
represents the target of the attack, while the leaf nodes represent the means for reaching the 
target, which are the events that comprise the attack. The attack tree is depicted in figure3.3 
and the area which this thesis focuses on has a bold Red colour. 
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Figure 3.3 banking attack method [32] 
The attack tree is used to gain a general view on the different types of attacks, the analysis of 
which should facilitate the process of studying the adequacy of existing countermeasure used by 
the bank.   
 Chapter 3: Security and Authentication Access Control 
 
 40 
The attack tree has one root node, representing the final target to the attacker, which is the 
compromise of the user’s bank account. An intruder may use one of the leaf nodes as a 
means for reaching the target. To categorize Internet banking attacks, each component to the 
process should be examined: the user terminal/user (UT/U), the communication channel 
(CC) and the Internet banking server (IBS). The following types of attacks are identified: 
•UT/U attacks—these attacks target the user equipment, including the tokens that may be 
involved, such as smartcards or other password generators, as well as the actions of the user 
himself/ herself. UT/U attacks include: 
–UT/U1—Procedural attacks: 
 UT/U1a: User surveillance (piggybacking)—similar to the personal identification number 
(PIN) thefts facilitated by the installation of cameras in automatic teller machines 
(ATMs); the user’s actions may be monitored to capture credentials. 
 UT/U1b: Theft of token and hand written notes giving Internet banking user names 
are usually long and have to be written down. Users may also keep their passwords 
written, despite the security guidance provided by their banks. Notes may be stolen, 
providing access to the user’s credentials. Tokens may also be stolen, providing the 
attacker with one authentication factor that, when combined with other types of 
attacks (such as PIN calculators), can lead to identity theft. 
–UT/U2—Malicious software installation. The embedding of malicious content for compromising 
the user’s login information and password (e.g., keyboard logger or screen capture in image or 
video files) may take place via a number of different methods, including: 
 UT/U2a: Hiddencode—this is the use of hidden code within a web page that 
exploits a known vulnerability of the customer’s web browser and installs malicious 
software in the user terminal. The exploit may target permissions on Java run time 
support, Active X support, multimedia extensions, and automated download and 
running of software through the browser. 
 UT/U2b: Worms and bots — Worms search for vulnerabilities and exploit them 
automatically. This includes the exploitation of instant messaging and chatting 
communication software (that allows the embedment of dynamic content), which 
may automatically be deployed using bots. 
 UT/U2c: E-mails with malicious code—this is the submission of e-mails with 
malicious content, such as executable files or HTML code with embedded applets. 
–UT/U3—Token attack tools: 
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 UT/U3a: Smart card analyzers—Attacks against smart cards, such as power 
consumption analysis or time analysis, may expose the security of the smart card by 
revealing cryptographic keys and passwords. Such attacks are sophisticated and not 
easy to implement, but are very effective, especially if the necessary counter 
measures (noise generators, time-neutral code design) against the types of attacks 
are not implemented by the smart card manufacturer. 
 UT/U3b: Smart card reader manipulator—this is applicable to non-certified smart card 
readers within secure interfaces, which may expose the contents of the smart card by 
conducting unauthorized operations. 
 UT/U3c: Brute-force attacks with PIN calculators —these attacks focus on breaking 
the security of tokens that generate random PINs. The attack exploits the fact that a 
time window is necessary, for synchronization reasons. In some implementations, 
except for the present PIN, the subsequent and preceding codes are active for the same 
purpose. It is reported that it is possible to break such mechanisms with a minimum 
window of three PINs. 
–UT/U4—Phishing[7] These attacks use social engineering techniques —masquerading as a 
trustworthy person or business in electronic communication—in an attempt to fraudulently 
acquire sensitive information, such as passwords and credit card details. The term was 
initially used in the mid-1990s by hackers who were stealing America Online (AOL) 
accounts by scamming passwords from unsuspecting AOL users. The attacks include: 
 UT/U4a: Social engineering—the attacks focus on the compromise of the user’s 
credentials by non-technical means, such as phone calls or the submission of e-
mails masquerading as an official bank, asking the user for user name and 
password. 
 UT/U4b: Web page obfuscation—these attacks are based on links that do not 
correspond to the destination they describe, or the use of Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses instead of universal resource locators (URL) for confusing the user. 
Other techniques deploy hidden frames. These are used for covering the real 
activity of a web page by using several frames with malicious content, while the 
user sees only the URL of the master frame set. Other methods use graphics that 
spoof the interface of a web browser, such as the address bar. 
• CC attacks—this type of attack focuses on communication links. Examples include: 
 CC1: Pharming—These involve compromising domain name servers (DNSs), 
altering DNS tables and connecting the user to fraudulent sites, instead of the official 
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bank’s site, where information regarding the user’s account may be derived. 
 CC2: Sniffing—Active sniffing attacks masquerade the two communicating entities 
to each other (user client and the Internet banking server) to capture information, 
such as user name and password. Passive sniffing captures information from the 
communication medium, without interception. 
 CC3: Active man-in-the-middle attacks—this type of attack regards a schema 
where the attacker receives and forwards information between the UT and the 
IBS. The attacker sends malformed user packets or injects new traffic, such as 
transfer commands, from one account to another. 
 CC4: Session hijacking—Attacks that force the user to connect to the IBS with a 
preset session ID. Once the user authenticates to the server, the attacker may utilize 
the known session ID to send packets to the IBS, spoofing the user’s identity. 
•       IBS attacks—these types of attacks are offline attacks against the servers that host the 
Internet banking application.  Examples include: 
 IBS1: Brute-force attacks—Brute-force attacks in certain password-based 
mechanisms are reported to be feasible by sending random user names and 
passwords. The attacked mechanisms implement a scheme based on guessable user 
names and four-digit passwords. The attack mechanism is based on distributed 
zombie personal computers, hosting automated programs for user name-or password-
based calculation. This attack may be combined with user name filtering methods for 
determining the identity of the user. These methods filter the different responses of 
the server, in the case of valid or invalid user names. 
 IBS2: Bank security policy violation—violating the bank’s security policy in 
combination with weak access control and logging mechanisms, an employee may 
cause an internal security incident and expose a customer’s account. 
 IBS3: Website manipulation —exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Internet 
banking web server may permit the alteration of its contents, such as the links to 
the Internet banking login page. This may redirect the user to a fraudulent website 
where his/her credentials may be captured. 
From attack tree topology can be found a major root node comprising user terminal and 
user. To implement security, authentication mechanisms that complement each other’s 
resistance to attacks identify the appropriate patterns. For example, hard tokens may be 
combined with biometrics and supported by a number of countermeasures toward a 
mechanism that is resistant to all of the attacks described in the attack tree. 
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Security assessment conducted for the Internet banking authentication mechanism was 
presented by way of applicable attack and not applicable attack manner for each authentication 
factor.   
3.4.4 Pharming  
 Domain name system server: any site on the internet uses a domain name, usually as a title (e.g. 
www.examplebank.com),yet the real title is to be determined through the Internet (IP) protocol; 
the address usually consists of four digits in the fourth edition of (IPv4). When the user types a 
domain name in the title field with their browser and presses a button and enters, the domain 
name is translated to an address IP domain name system server (DNS) and then the browser will 
connect to the server via this address and then load the webpage. After a user visits a site often, it 
stores this address for this site to a user's computer in the cache for DNS; this way it does not 
require the computer to connect to the domain name system server whenever the user wants to 
visit the same site [42]. 
 How to forge the addresses through DNS: 
This process does not use any new ways: it can be done using known methods such as poisoning 
the cache of the domain name system, or simulation of domain names or domain hijacking, but 
these methods are used for different purposes. While in the past these methods were used to 
disable the old services and cause problems for users, now the problems relate to money. These 
routes still exist because the site managers and owners do not give protection for monitoring the 
domain name system server as it would cost millions in firewalls.   
The illustration in figure 3, 4 shows how counterfeiting operates: 
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Certificate Template fake Certificate 
Template
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Figure 3.4: counterfeiting operates 
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1. Intentionally broken to DNS in cache on the user's computer or on a network server or local 
Internet service provider's server. The intruder uses many methods to change the Internet 
Protocol address of a known location’s — perhaps a bank — site to another site address that is 
usually similar in name 
2. The user types the correct address for the location that was forged by their browser's address 
field and then presses the Enter button   
3. The user's computer searches in temporary memory the Internet Protocol address for this site 
or domain name system server or asks for this address if it does not exist in the cache  
4. If the forged site exists in the cache, the Internet Protocol addresses the browser as false, and if 
a browser question server was poisoned, it gets a fake address. 
5. Browser connects to this title without knowing this is a false site.  
After the intruder redirects the user to a fake site several methods can then be used to simulate the 
original site in order to obtain confidential information from the user such as their password or 
bank account number. In this method counterfeiting can deceive the broken server of a multitude 
of users without their knowledge. 
 How to carry out a forgery: the user can perform an operation using multiple methods of 
forgery:- 
 Poison the cache of the local domain name system: several methods can be used including 
sending an email virus or exploiting any vulnerability in a system to change the title to a specific 
location in the cache. 
 Poison the cache of DNS server: domain name system servers save all previous requests of 
users in the cache for a specified period in order to speed up the response to users of sites with 
most applications. This cache can reportedly be poisoned by exploiting a vulnerability in the 
server operating system or application that is used to provide the same service. 
  DNS Hijack: All domain names enrolled are reregistered with store information about the scale 
and location of the DNS servers for this domain and if there is a need to change this information 
the owner's permission must be taken first. The owner is able to change the registrant to another 
registrar, but this requires the approval of the owner and the old registrar and the new registrar 
together. If there is a gap in the system of registration of domain names, the hacker can exploit 
this vulnerability to change the information or to transfer it to another registrar.   
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Man in the middle (MITM) Hacking Online Banking and Credit Card Transactions  
The Scenario 
You get internet through Wi-Fi Hot Spot to surf the web. Through the net you check your bank 
balance and perform some online banking and maybe purchase something online. As an end-user, 
you feel this is a nice quick service and quite secure, as you see the lock in the bottom corner of 
your Internet browser, symbolizing that the online banking or online credit card transaction is safe 
from snooping eyes. What lets you be more confident about your data, including username, 
password, credit card info, etc. will be that it is encrypted with 128-bit encryption.   
A common thought is that doing that is secure, as this is done via SSL. For the most part, this is 
true and the sessions are secure. The HSBC Bank in 2012 (for example), posts the following 
security adverts on their website as shown in figure 3.5: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: HSBC bank post security adverts  
The question here is: do the software and tools fix the problem and secure the client completely? 
Anti-virus, firewalls and other security software are important but unfortunately not enough. 
Various studies and recent incidents show that these tools are not always effective in preventing 
criminals from taking money from your account. As criminals become more sophisticated, your 
bank strongly recommends additional layers of protection on your computer to enable safe online 
banking.  
The problem is that it is not “virtually impossible” for someone else to see your data, such as 
login information or credit card numbers. It can actually be relatively easy if you as an end-user 
are not knowledgeable about how you can be exploited and know the signs that this is occurring. 
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Figure 3.6: fack Secure SSL Session 
Continuing with the scenario, an intruder has intercepted the online banking login credentials and 
credit card information and can log into the online banking website or purchase items with the 
victim’s credit card via an SSL Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) , as can see from figure 3.6 there are 
fake lock to give fouls indicate that web is secure. 
 
 
Applicability of Attacks in Different Authentication Mechanisms 
Attack/Authenticatio
n Method 
Static 
Password 
Soft-token 
Certificate/ 
SSL-TLS 
Hard-token 
Certificate/ 
SSL-TLS 
One-time 
Passwor
d/ Time-
based 
CodeGenera
tor 
Challenge 
response 
Biomet
rics 
Knowledge- 
based 
UT/U1a:Usersurveillance A X X A X X X 
UT/U1b:Token/notes theft A X A A X X X 
UT/U2a: Hidden code A A A A X A A 
UT/U2b:Worms A A A A X A A 
UT/U2c:E-mails with 
malicious code 
A A A A X A A 
UT/U3a:Smartcard 
analyzers 
X X A A X X X 
UT/U3b:Smartcard reader 
manipulator 
X X A X X X X 
UT/U3c:Brute-force 
attacks with 
PIN calculators 
X X A A X X X 
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UT/U4a: Social 
engineering 
A X X X X A A 
UT/U4b:Webpage 
obfuscation 
A X X X X A A 
CC1:Pharming A X X A A A A 
CC2:Sniffing A X X A A A A 
CC3:Activeman-in-the-
middle attacks 
A X X A A A A 
CC4:Session hijacking A X X A A A A 
IBS1:Brute-force attacks A X X A X A X 
IBS2:Security policy 
violation 
A A A A A A A 
IBS3:Website 
manipulation 
A X X A X A A 
Legend 
A:Applicable 
X:NotApplicable 
CC: communication channel  
IBS: Internet  banking server 
UT/U: user terminal/user 
 
Table 3.1: Authentication Mechanisms Vulnerability (32) 
From Table 3.1 can show applicability of Attacks in Different Authentication Mechanisms  
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3.5 General defences  
3.5.1 Static Password 
The most common authentication mechanism, the static password, is based on proof by 
knowledge. Password-based mechanisms are widely utilized in Internet banking applications. 
Even in the case of custom non-web-based Internet banking software, the authentication 
process is usually password-oriented. This mechanism is prone to all types of attacks, 
excluding those customized to smart cards, which are not applicable, and IBS2, which concerns 
an internal attack. Capture, replay, guessing or phishing are common defective attacks. It is 
taken for granted that password authentication takes place through a Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL) channel after authenticating IBS, which is a standard approach that banks follow. Static 
passwords, however, may be captured when attacking the secure channel establishment process 
(e.g., by deploying sniffing attacks, where the SSL channel is split into one SSL channel 
between the UT and the attacker and another between the attacker and IBS). The splitting may 
be performed in one-way SSL authentication (using only the certificate of the IBS) by sending 
fraudulent certificates to the user, who usually does not check the true origin and validity [32, 
41, and 53]. 
Soft-token Certificate/SSL-TLS 
This mechanism conducts mutual authentication between the UT and IBS, based on 
certificates in the user’s browser. The mechanism is prone to UT/U2 attacks, which 
compromise the UT, where the user certificate is stored. The latter may permit access to the 
user certificate, resulting in identity theft. 
Hard-token Certificate/SSL-TLS  
This mechanism is based on the “proof by possession” principle, since the user possesses an 
object as a token toward authentication [94]. The use of hardware tokens addresses the 
vulnerabilities of storing the certificate in the user’s browser.  This mechanism, however, is 
prone to a number of hardware (UT/U3) and software attacks, which analyze the operation of 
the hard token. Other attacks (UT/U2) exploit vulnerable interfaces of the hard token, which 
may permit unauthorized hard-token commands, such as digital signing, leading to identity 
theft. Token theft (UT/U1b) is also an issue, but it has to be combined with the PIN 
compromise. 
3.5.2 One-Time Password/Time-Based Code Generator  
This mechanism may also fall into the category of proof by possession authentication 
mechanisms [96]. One-time passwords are generated by a random calculator, using a seed that 
is pre shared between the user’s device (protected by a PIN) and the IBS. In mobile banking, 
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the random codes may be submitted to the UT by the mobile operator through SMS, or 
generated by an application downloaded to the user’s mobile device. The user reads the SMS 
or software/hardware- generated code and provides the one-time code to the banking 
application for authentication. These mechanisms are prone to a number of attacks, including 
the regular device theft attacks (UT/U1b), combined with user surveillance (UT/U1a) or notes 
for obtaining the PIN. More sophisticated attacks are deployed exploiting the PIN time 
window (UT/U3c). This fact makes brute-force attacks possible (IBS1), since the likelihood of 
guessing possibilities is increased. Other attacks (UT/U2, CC, IBS3, UT/U1a) are also 
possible since the codes are submitted through the browser, but for a very limited time frame 
(as long as the code is active plus the time window).  Hardware attacks (UT/U3) are also 
possible by deploying the hardware analysis methods presented in the attack tree description. 
3.5.3 Challenge-Response 
This mechanism is similar to the previous one, adding uniqueness to the authentication 
process. IBS generates a challenge that is processed by the UT/U for producing a response. 
Challenge-response is prone to man-in-the-middle and session hijacking attacks (CC), since 
an entity may intercept the communication between the UT/U and IBS, and capture and 
replay messages from the predefined session method described in the attack tree description. 
This mechanism covers all root node attacks facing the user terminal and user; unfortunately 
it fails against the communication channel attack.  
3.5.4 Biometrics  
Biometrics [76], provide strong authentication by adding the “proof by property” 
principle, completing or substituting the existing “proof by knowledge” and “proof by 
possession” mechanisms. Biometrics-based mechanisms, however, should be created by 
following best practices and standards to reach an acceptable security level. Internet banking 
applications incorporating biometrics have been introduced by realizing the common 
scenario of identity verification by the remote comparison of a biometric template 
(comparison of the enrolled template at IBS, with a template generated by a biometric 
measurement at the time of authentication). Other state-of-the-art scenarios describe local 
biometrics authentication for gaining access to a device or token. Biometrics are prone to 
malicious code attacks (UT/U2), phishing attacks (UT/U4) and communication links (CC) 
that may expose the user’s personal data and threaten the whole security chain, since 
biometric templates may be compromised and replayed. For example, phishing techniques in 
architectures that require remote biometric template comparison may request the submission 
of the user template (even in encrypted form) and resend them to the IBS for compromising 
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the user’s bank account. 
3.5.4.1 Fingerprint  
3.5.4.1 Fingerprint Encryption Technology  
Fingerprint encryption technology is a biotechnology based tamper proof authentication 
technology used in our application. It translates the fingerprint into a fixed length encryption key 
through the fingerprint encryption algorithm, and then generates the fingerprint features value 
encrypted by the encryption key. Every value is unique for every enrollment. Thus, the fingerprint 
encryption technology is considered to be a high-level security method in authentication systems. 
3.5.4.2 Fingerprint Principles  
The tamper proof fingerprint authentication factor is a popular biometric trait used for recognizing 
a person. Properties which make fingerprints popular are their wide acceptability in public and 
ease in collecting the data. 
Genrally speaking every fingerprint consists of a number of ridges and valleys. Ridges are the 
upper skin layer segments of the finger and valleys are the lower segments. The ridges form 
so- called minutia points: ridge endings–where a ridge ends–and ridge bifurcations–where a 
ridge splits. 
At registration-enrollment the minutia points are located at the device and the relative positions to 
each other and their directions are recorded. This data forms the template to authenticate a person. 
At the matching stage, the incoming fingerprint image is pre-processed and the minutia points are 
extracted. The minutia points are compared with the registered template, trying to locate as many 
similar points as possible within a certain boundary. The result is usually the number of matching 
minutiae. A threshold is then applied, determining how large this number needs to be for the 
fingerprint and the template to match. Fingerprints have general characteristic ridge patterns that 
allow them to be systematically identified  
 Fingerprints follow three fundamental principles:  
1- Fingerprint is an individual characteristic 
2- No two people have been found with the exact same fingerprint pattern 
3- Fingerprint pattern will remain unchanged for the life of an individual; however, the print 
itself may change due to permanent scars and diseases.  
3.5.4.3 Ridge Characteristics 
Fingerprint characteristics can include sub-areas of certain interest including ridge thickness, 
curvature, or density. Due to this increased depth of data a pattern-based algorithm is less 
dependent on the size of the fingerprint sensor and is independent of the number of minutiae 
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points in a fingerprint. Pattern-based algorithms do not, to the same extent as minutia-based 
methods, suffer from difficulties of recognizing a finger with varying fingerprint quality. 
 Fingerprints also have minutiae points, which are points where the ridge structure changes.  These 
are useful in matching a fingerprint to a specific person and figure 3.7 define all characteristic  
 
 
          
        Core              Ending Ridge       Short Ridge         Dot or Island       Fork or Bifurcation 
 
 
 
  Enclosure                    Bridge                          Hook                              Delta                   specialty  
                                 
                                      Crossover                                      Eye  
Figure 3.7: Fingerprint characteristics 
3.5.4.4 Fingerprint Classes: 
The graphical image is obtained from a capture device to distinguish it from a template stored in a 
database. Processing software examines the fingerprint image and locates the image center, which 
may be off-center from the fingerprint core. The image is then cropped a fixed distance around 
this graphical center. The cropped region is then compressed and stored for subsequent matching. 
Fingerprints can be classified into three different groups based on the pattern of the ridges. 
Arches 
Ridges enter on one side & exit on the other side 
            
   Plain Arch                       Tented Arch 
Loops 
Ridges enter on one side & exit on the same side 
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L - Radial Loop              L – Ulnar Loop 
R - Ulnar Loop               R- Radial Loop 
Whorls 
Consist of circles, more than one loop, or a mixture of pattern types 
                                   
                 Plain Whorl                      Central Pocket Whorl 
                                            
         
           Double Loop Whorl                           Accidental Whorl 
The verification procedure in figure 3.7 begins with the pre-processing of the incoming fingerprint 
image. The registered small images from the template are then compared with the fingerprint 
image to determine to what degree the template matches the image. A threshold describing the 
smallest allowable deviation is then used to decide if the finger matches the stored template.  
 3.5.5. Knowledge-Based 
This mechanism consists of a number of questions that the user has to answer to gain access 
to the account. This could be also considered as behavioral biometric authentication, 
depending on the content of the questions or, instead, a more sophisticated combined password 
mechanism. Although this mechanism is resistant to UT/U1 attacks, it is prone to most of the 
other attack types, since malicious code may copy answers and create a knowledge database for 
the user (UT/U2).  The user may also answer questions from an attacker, due to being tricked 
by phishing (UT/U4), man – in – the – middle attacks (generally CC) or malformed IBS 
websites (IBS3). Brute- force attacks are difficult to deploy due to the multitude of possible 
answers. 
a. An analysis of e banking  vulnerability  
i. Attack tree  
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ii. Attack strategy  
iii. Active vector 
iv. Vulnerability analysis  
v. Credential harvesting  
b. Banking provided measurement  
c. Define effectiveness 
d. Efficient cryptographic protocol preventing man in the middle attack  
3.5.6 Current Solutions to Solve the Problem 
Requirements  Bank A  Bank B  Bank C 
Server authentication SSL/ TLS SSL/TLS SSL/TLS  
User authentication ID/ password OTP 
Private key (SW) 
 ID/ password  / third 
parties 
ID/ password  
Data integrity SSL / TLS SSL / TLS SSL / TLS 
Non – reputation - Digital signature - 
Confidentiality SSL / TLS SSL / TLS SSL / TLS 
Malware detection Anti-virus Anti-virus Anti-virus 
Network access control Firewall  Firewall Firewall 
Anti – key logger Keystroke enc - - 
Table 3.2: Current Solutions functionality and ranking to solve the banking problem [32] 
There is some technology in general use outside of the Internet banking ﬁeld which can be used to 
secure online transactions as can see in table 3.2. 
Using digital certificates: a digital certificate is an electronic document submitted digitally to 
bind the public key with the identity you want to publicize and therefore prevent plagiarism or 
forgery, which might happen to those who hold public and private transactions relating to 
financial aspects. But there are a number of problems related to digital certificates: 
The process of renewing certificates: when a certificate expires, to renew it the customer must 
go personally for approval of a new certificate and to verify their identity. But this renewal 
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process is creating a nuisance, so this method has been replaced by dealing with the granting of 
certificates, but the threats are many; the attacker can receive the certificate renewal request, and 
then respond that it is responsible. 
 Display private key disclosure: the private key may not change for a whole year and this gives 
more opportunity for hackers to detect that key. 
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CA Authority
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Figure 3.8 security PKI certificate flow  
From figure 3.8 shows the sequence flow of certificate from client A until reach bank server cross 
CA which is cloud provider in our case  
Hardware protection unit (Hardware Security Module):- 
 This method is based on using the user information task such as the private key and certificates 
and keys that are exchanged in the SSL. It also has many different functions, which include the 
establishment of an electronic signature private key, as well as creating the electronic signature 
and the generation of random numbers and all these functions are programmed directly on 
physical hardware. Problems related to this method are: 
i) High cost. 
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ii) Loss of flexibility: If you find a weakness in the encryption algorithm used, it is 
difficult to amend on this machine because the ratio has been programmed in physical 
assets. 
iii) Failure and damage: difficulty maintaining a secret key if the device has been lost 
and used by someone else and if a damaged device must be replaced by another 
device. 
iv)  Verification via mobile phone (Mobile Phones): The idea of using mobile phones 
in the verification process integrated with a third party far from cyberspace. When the 
username and password are sent to your bank, the banks send a special code to your 
mobile phone number already registered in the bank database. Through that message 
it confirms that the bank’s site is correct and performs normal banking operations but 
the problems with this solution are as follows: 
o Dependence on third party: you may get problems with reliance on telecom 
companies to provide services related to sensitive matters such as money transfer. 
o  With the entry of third generation mobile phones they have become a part of the 
internet so mobile devices have become equally threatened by viruses, e.g. 
Trojan. 
o  Solution assumes that anyone who wants to use this technique should acquire a 
mobile phone. 
The mobile phone solutions are as follows:  
1. The client starts to connect to the desired location using the computer and by the Protocol 
(Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) HTTPS it logs on to the bank page. The client’s 
computer sends a message (Hello) to the bank, where the agreement is available when the 
client is on the algorithms that will be used for encryption. 
2. The bank’s letter (Hello) is sent to the client, the bank approves algorithms that have been 
chosen by the client and the certificate is requested. 
3. Building on the success of the bank certificate verification, a message appears in the client 
mobile phone to request the client to enter a personal identification number (PIN) in order to 
ascertain that the bearer of this phone is a real client. 
4. The client shall enter the PIN. 
5. Subsequently, the client certificate is merged with its first key and the signed public key and 
is encrypted using secure socket layer for the bank, after verifying the PIN. 
6. The bank verifies the client certificate signed by decryption via public key, and then the bank 
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generates a session key, according to the process of generating the information distributed 
between them. 
7. The client computer generates the same session key, which will be used in encryption and 
decryption. At this point, the verification ends between the bank and the client. 
 One-time password OTP [68]: another idea relying on providing a device that generates a 
password one time only is known as PAL (OTP One Time Password). This idea has been popular 
with proven efficiency and reduces damage to recipients across the banking services. The scenario 
is as follows: the client opens a device for generating a code after entering their user name and 
password on the site; they then enter the bank’s code required by the bank and generated from this 
device, often a process code can be connected to the network to generate HTML code or there is a 
static algorithm in that device to let the bank verify the client. This allows the client to be sure that 
the page is actually its own bank’s page, not a fake page. On the other hand, we need to note the 
high cost of the machine and reduced ease of use for the client. 
TLS 
 There is a mechanism for similar certiﬁcates to provide client authentication, but very few sites 
use it and very few users have appropriate certiﬁcates. 
Because of the extensibility of browser platforms, it is often possible to provide fake TLS 
indicators that will pass even close scrutiny. In addition, due to the costs associated with acquiring 
TLS certiﬁcates many sites have certiﬁcates that are not rooted in the trusted certiﬁcates shipped 
with the browser. When presented with such certiﬁcates, browsers will typically prompt the user 
to accept them. Such prompts do not provide information that will allow the majority of users to 
make an appropriate security decision since they do not understand the terms used. In such cases 
the user, who just wants to access the content, has the habit of accepting any question they are 
asked if it will allow them to do what they want to do. 
Spam ﬁltering 
There are many forms of unsolicited bulk email (spam) and it is a large problem in itself. This has 
led to a number of ‘classiﬁers’ [51, 55] which try to analyse features of emails to assign a score 
corresponding to the likelihood of the email being spam. This score is used to discard mail whose 
score is above a given threshold. Since for a large amount of phishing attacks initial contact is 
performed via unsolicited email claiming to be from a bank these are potential targets for being 
discarded by a spam classiﬁer. 
Spam classiﬁers work by trying to identify features in which legitimate email and spam differ. 
This is known to be a hard task for a number of reasons: 
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Software cannot generally know what email a user does not want to receive. Many emails which 
the user wants to read they do not know in advance that they are going to receive. 
Password wizards 
All major web browsers today give the option to remember passwords for websites and to auto-
complete the log-in forms so that the user does not have to remember the password. Traditionally, 
this has been regarded as security vulnerability, since the password can be recovered from where 
it has been stored in the web browser. However, there may be cases where it improves security. 
The web browser is much better than the user at distinguishing whether a site is the same site that 
it has visited previously. While the user might be tricked by URLs that are similar but not the 
same, the web browser will not. If the user only ever logs in using the saved password then it will 
be obvious when they visit a phishing website, since the browser will not offer to complete the 
form. 
Take down 
One of the main defenses today is the completely reactive one of take down. There are a number 
of groups monitoring phishing emails and websites. Suspicious ones are then reported to the ISPs 
in question and removed. By deﬁnition, there will be some lag between a new phishing website 
being released and the site being removed in which victims can fall foul of the scam. However, 
this is not the only problem. A number of ISPs have been lax at responding to take-down requests 
[16], which increases the window for successful scams. 
Some phishing gangs have developed phishing attacks using a large number of websites hosted on 
compromised machines. Thus, each email can be sent out with a different link to the host, which 
makes the observers’ work much harder.  
Web browsers 
Since the main part of a phishing attack happens through web browsers, the leading browser 
manufacturers have all come up with defenses in the latest versions of their products. All of the 
software solutions are ineffective against compromise of the user’s computer, but some of them 
combat other threats. 
Trust Bar 
TrusstBar [55] is a combination of a black list and some enhancements to TLS. The black list is 
similar to all of the others; there is an option to report sites that are vetted by the TrustBar authors 
to be added to the black list. Since this is a black list speciﬁc to TrustBar, as with eBay Toolbar, it 
will evolve more slowly than other lists. 
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DSS 
Dhamija and Tygar have proposed a system called Dynamic Security Skins [32] (DSS). This 
combines the personalization present in YURL pet names and the synchronization from SRD with 
a trusted input window to create quite a convincing anti-phishing solution. 
The idea behind DSS is that the user only enters their credentials into an input window provided 
by DSS, not directly into the web page. When installing DSS, the user selects a ‘skin’ for the 
input window. This is a custom image that is always displayed behind the user name and 
password ﬁelds in the input window which makes it hard for an attacker to spoof the input 
window, since they cannot replicate the image. The input window also displays a dynamically 
generated pattern (called a visual hash) which has been created in cooperation with the server and 
is mirrored on the input form to which the input dialog is currently attached. In DSS, 
authentication is done not by sending a password to the server, but by using the SRP [75] 
protocol. SRP is a form of Zero-Knowledge proof where the server can authenticate the user 
without a password being sent over the network. The result of the SRP authentication is a hash 
which is only known to the server holding the veriﬁer and to the client with the password. This 
hash is used to generate a visual hash which is displayed both on the page and in the trusted input 
box. 
Because the password is not sent to the server, a middle-person attack cannot learn the password 
or know what images to display on a spoofed webpage such that they synchronize with the trusted 
input window. DSS is not designed to protect against a compromised end station or one with any 
sort of keystroke logger. 
TANs 
Transaction Authorization Numbers (TANs) [32] are one-time passwords used by some banks. 
The customer is issued with a sheet containing multiple passwords; typically this is done via some 
out-of-band mechanism, usually the postal service or in person at a bank branch. For each 
transaction, the next TAN in order is requested in order to complete the transaction. 
TANs are either essentially the same as Lamport hash chains [32] used by authentication systems 
like One-time Passwords-[68] or more simply just a list of random numbers which are stored on 
the server. As with other one-time password authentication systems, TANs protect against 
snooping of the credentials on a legitimate transaction in order to use them later. However, TANs 
are no defense against a middle-person attack in which the victim is convinced to connect to the 
attacker instead of the real bank and the transaction challenges and responses are forwarded 
between the real bank and the user, but the transaction details are altered to transfer funds to the 
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attacker instead. There have also been cases of phishing websites harvesting several codes for 
later use, without the complexity of a middle-person attack [32]. 
SecurID 
The RSA SecurID range raises the bar slightly for attacks on online transactions. However, none 
of the solutions prevent middle-person attacks, which are in current use. The USB variants fail 
particularly badly in the presence of a compromised terminal. 
 CAP 
One form of multi-factor authentication which banks are starting to introduce derives from the 
EMV (Chip and PIN) speciﬁcation [100] and is called the chip authentication protocol [100]. This 
is currently being rolled out in the UK by Barclays [32]. 
The CAP reader is a handheld device very similar to a calculator. It has a gap in the top for 
inserting a credit or debit card, a PIN pad and a small display on the front. It uses the feature of 
the EMV protocol whereby the card will produce the message authentication code (MAC) of data 
with which it is supplied using the secret key it shares with the bank. There are two primary 
modes of operation with CAP: generating random nonces and challenge/response. 
Random nonce generation 
The ﬁrst mode is used for most types of transactions. The card is used to generate a random 
nonce. When performing a transaction, the website will ask the user to generate a code with the 
reader which they do by inserting their debit card and pressing the ‘new code’ button. The CAP 
reader displays the code on the screen and the user transcribes this into the website and the server 
checks the MAC is valid. This scheme has many ﬂaws. In particular, it is essentially a weaker 
form of SecurID. It is susceptible to real-time and off-line middle-person attacks because the user 
cannot know what they are authorizing. In addition, the code is not time-dependent, so can be 
cached by the attacker for later use. 
Challenge-Response 
The second mode is a challenge-response mode. Current proposals use this mode for transactions 
such as setting up new mandates. In this case, the user is asked to enter some details from the 
transaction as part of the challenge. These are then sent to the card which produces the MAC 
under the key shared with the bank. The user copies the number into the website as before. This is 
an improvement over many of the schemes discussed, but unless the user has to enter all the 
details of the transaction there is still scope for a middle-person attack. In addition, since it is only 
used for setting up mandates, there are many types of transactions that are still vulnerable. 
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It has been shown that the common, well-known attacks on Internet banking are not the only 
attacks that criminals are capable of performing. It was also shown that the majority of the 
protection currently afforded to Internet banking and similar targets is aimed at stopping the 
common attacks but not the more sophisticated attacks. Even those that claim to be more thorough 
do not successfully prevent the exploits. The particular attack to which there is no robust defense 
is that of compromise of the computer used to access the online banking service. The Trojan is the 
most powerful attack vector available to attackers and the most difficult to defend against. It is no 
wonder, therefore, that many systems for protecting online banking have chosen to conveniently 
ignore this in their attacker model. For a while, this was an acceptable amount of risk because that 
class of attack was relatively uncommon. Even now it is not wide-spread, but the instances of it 
which have been seen, suggest that as less complicated attacks become less successful there will 
be no problem with the attacker switching to using Trojans. 
What is required is a defense which is robust even in the presence of a Trojan on the computer 
being used to access the service. The attacker places himself between the victim and the target of 
the attack. The classic middle-person attack involves the attacker somehow spooﬁng the target so 
that the victim connects to the attacker by mistake. The chosen protocol attack is, however, much 
more general than that. Solutions for this involve ensuring that messages are unambiguous as to 
their purpose and destination and not allowing any one to use the same authentication system. The 
problem with this is that there is a growing desire from consumers and merchants for a single 
system they can all use. In addition, the unambiguity of the message must be clear to the user, not 
just to the computers involved. This poses a problem when the assumption is that the computer in 
use is compromised. This lack of transparency is at the root of all phishing and pharming attacks. 
If the user could be sure they work in a healthy environment and completely isolated, fraud would 
not be possible. 
3.5.7 Related Solution  
Vasco - DIGIPASS Nano® 
Vasco Company announces their product as:  
Mobile banking applications face multiple challenges. In order to gain widespread user 
acceptance, they must be secure without compromising user-friendliness. VASCO addresses these 
challenges with its innovative solution DIGIPASS Nano. DIGIPASS Nano enhances the security 
of online service channels through the use of e-signatures and end- user authentication. 
VASCO fulfills a growing need by enhancing the security of online service channels through the 
use of e-signatures and the authentication of end- users. DIGIPASS Nano® is a reflection of 
VASCO’s innovation and continuously evolving efforts to bring high-level security to all 
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environments. The solution allows mobile phone users to embed the best-of-breed authentication 
technology into a familiar, daily-used device. 
With its unique form factor, DIGIPASS Nano offers banks and corporations new perspectives in 
using mobile devices as authentication means, providing them with a new channel to interact with 
their customers. Mobile users will be able to perform secure transactions, access business-critical 
data or transfer money anywhere at any given time. 
 
Figure 3.9 Vasco announcement  
Figure 3.9 show Vasco SIM card product and from my view I can say this solution is quite good 
but depends upon company support and lock-on technology   
VASCO DIGIPASS Token Authentication & Token Management Module 
Access Matrix™ Universal Authentication Server (UAS) is a versatile authentication server 
which enables organizations to unify their different authentication mechanisms and simplify 
integration complexities by providing off-the-shelf strong authentication modules for common 
applications.  The out-of the-box end-to-end token life cycle management module greatly 
streamlines the administration and management of token logistics. 
 
Figure 3.10 Vasco product  
From figure 3.10 above shows that Vasco declarer Supports Full Range of Tokens with 
Access Matrix™ hierarchy based administration model is also designed for Managed Security 
Service Providers and SAAS vendors with multi-tenancy support. UAS has  been  tightly  
integrated with  Vasco’s  VACMAN Controller  Library to provide all key token features for 
authentication (both synchronous  and challenge response),  authorization, signature, verification  
and  host  return  code.  It also provides  advanced  token  management features  to  address  
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various  aspects  of token logistics such as token issuance, pin-mailers, lost tokens, out-of-sync 
tokens which are critical to the day to day operations. 
End to End Token Management for VASCO Tokens 
UAS-VTM provides a convenient way to manage the entire life-cycle of Vasco Tokens from 
token assignment, token status tracking, application integration, OTP comparison, and auto re-
sync, lost tokens and token replacement. 
Comprehensive Support for VASCO Security Features 
UAS-VTM is seamlessly integrated with Vasco’s VACMAN Controller and provides a set of 
flexible integration APIs to support the Vasco advanced security features. 
Support Full Range of VASCO DIGIPASS Tokens 
UAS-VTM has been certified to work with the entire product line of Vasco DIGIPASS  
Tokens: hard, soft, web and mobile tokens. 
Most of these features can be used to secure bank transactions but need multi service provided by 
the company. 
  Gemalto eBanking-  
Gemalto eBanking are experts in strong authentication. They declare that they provide technology 
that allows people everywhere to prove their identity and intentions online; safe from harm, with 
their privacy respected and secure from fraud. 
“In doing so we enable cost savings, new revenue models, increased efficiency for retail as well 
as corporate banks.   
However, if you dig deeper than that – what makes everything else possible is trust. The trust 
between the bank and its online customer, trust in the technology itself and the possibilities it 
brings, trust as the foundation for a safer and more convenient digital world”. 
Gemalto Ezio Plug&Sign Device 
 
Figure 3.11 Gemalto products  
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From Figure 3.11 shows the varity of Gemalto USB types, Ezio Plug &Sign is a self-contained 
device that embeds a portable infrastructure, including all applications to securely view, accept 
and sign transactions. 
 
Figure 3.12: Gemalto Ezio  
Figure 3.12 is Gemalto's Ezio Suite brings together a unique authentication server, plug-in 
modules and a range of authentication devices. The result is a completely flexible, future-proof 
system that lets you mix and match authentication devices, standards and algorithms. It also 
supports advanced technology such as Sign-What-You-See.  
3.6 Homomorphic Cryptography  
A homomorphic encryption scheme is a crypto system that allows computations to be performed 
on data without decrypting it [52, 73, 78]. In other words it is a form of encryption that allows 
computations to be passed out on ciphertext —an operation performed on a set of ciphertexts such 
that decrypting the result of the operation is the same as the result of some operation performed on 
the plaintexts. A given cryptosystem is considered additively homomorphic iff 
                                  ∃△: ε(x1) △ ε(x2) = ε(x1 + x2) 
Paillier's Homomorphic Cryptosystem:  
The Paillier scheme was first published by Pascal Paillier in 1999 [107, 108,109]. The Paillier 
probabilistic scheme has created a good amount of interest and further study since it was 
originated. The homomorphic property allows this scheme to do normal addition operations on 
several encrypted values and achieving the encrypted sum, the encrypted sum can be decrypted 
later without even knowing the values that made up the sum.This thesis used Paillier 
homomorphic because it is light and easy to use without many complicated mathematic tools 
required like other homographic cryptosystems.  
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3.7 Summary  
In this chapter, I have reviewed security from the general network perspective describing the basic 
security concepts required for network security implementation. The possible network threats 
were then highlighted while the security services used to counter the threats and the cryptographic 
algorithms implemented by these security services were also discussed. I then gave an insight into 
security issues in online banking. In the course of the discussion it was discovered that the notion 
of security in a general network is not different from that in the online banking network. The 
implementation approach however differs because of the conflicting design assumptions of online 
banking and Internet which calls for a new concept in security implementation. Identified attacks, 
factors affecting online banking security and key research challenges have also been discussed. A 
closer look at the identified tree attacks in the banking sector reveals that having access operations 
is desirable. I then presented an overview of control with focus on implementation requirements, 
the two elements of authentication and authorization, existing works with consideration for these 
elements and finally establishing the similarity between the two established security companies 
making new security products  as well as the applicability concepts in authentication for access 
implementation in the banking environment. 
 The next chapter presents an overview of security validation, reviews of some existing network 
simulation models and discusses the simulation framework development process. 
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Chapter 4 New Secure Financial Model using public and private clouds  
This chapter describes and discusses the three entities combined to create my proposed 
connectivity for online banking application then the prototype of appliance and the topology. The 
chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 is the prototype of appliance sequence and topology, 
4.2 reviews Secure Transaction Sharing (STS) proposal and problem statement for fine-grained 
access control. Section 4.3 introduces and describes an authentication scheme and the 
authentication code. Section 4.4 presents the bank involved URLs in this process. 
Cloud computing   used to transfer data from client to the bank as out –of-band channel; we used 
cloud because Cloud computing technology can provide banks competitive advantage in the 
market cost reduction, higher margins, simplified maintenance and management of application, 
greatly extended scalability, agility, high availability, automation, large data storages and reliable 
backup mechanism are the clear benefit bank can gain from the cloud provider.   
The communication between the bank client and the cloud go through a public cloud and is 
secured by many security parameters like SSL client, fingerprint authentication factor and 
session key.  
  The cloud is used to transfer data from client to the bank and from the bank to client; well-
established holomorphic encryption algorithms applied to allow cloud storage handle data encrypt 
prior send to cloud, and decrypt it after moving it back to the bank or client. Used Private Cloud 
to communicate between the bank and cloud provider, hence the cloud infrastructure is operated 
solely for the bank and managed by the bank. It will be secure by the bank security policy and 
equipment.  
The three entities combining to create connectivity for online banking application are: 
 Public cloud (cloud provider) 
 Private cloud (connectivity relation interface between bank and cloud provider) 
 Internet Banking (the bank interface link between client and the bank application) 
At the first step the client inserts his/her tamper proof device; the device contains the bank 
application under the (Puppy Linux) OS platform with auto run application interface; then it asks 
the client to enter a username, password/pin, fingerprint as can be seen from figure 4.1 and the 
system compares automatically the biometric fingerprint (tamper proof companies with finger 
print screen) and tamper proof ID.  
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Figure 4.1: bank application interface 
There are six steps: 
1. Unique tamper proof ID automatically acquired to check public provider and at the same 
time create a hash value for other authentication factors combined with unique Tamper 
proof ID. Username, pin number or ID number, and finger print all encrypted by constant 
Key given to client when asked to open account. 
2. Cloud provider matched the authentication factor; cloud providers send these values to 
the bank system through a private connection after success matching. 
3. The bank checks these values by decrypting the message from the client using the same 
key; if matched, then a one time password (OPT)/ challenge response and random key is 
generated (to make a second channel between the bank and client directly encrypt all 
other values by this key except username). 
4. Send this random key to the bank interface and to public cloud to send again to the client. 
5. The client then responds to this parameter to create a new session using the key sent from 
the bank but the username is encrypted by a constant key and band with other values 
encrypted by a random key generated by the bank’s private key. 
6. Check these values by decrypting the username using the same constant key and 
decrypting other values using the random key; if there is a match then the client can 
access the account. 
4.1 Prototype of Appliance   
1. Customer plugs in tamper proof to access their account 
2. Puppy Linux operating system pops up and opens pre-bank Interface 
3. Client enters four part authentication factor 
a. User name 
b. Account number / pin number 
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c. Password (combined with tamper proof ID feed automatically) 
d. Fingerprint  
4. Client Submits request 
5. Cloud provider checks tamper proof ID and fingerprint 
6. Cloud provider  sends request to the bank 
7. Bank returns Order ID (OTP/challenge response) and Session ID 
8. Cloud provider saves Order ID and Session ID 
9. Cloud provider redirects to the client received URL 
10.  Cloud opens First Authentication for the client 
11.  Client  uses session ID and other fingerprint factor 
12.  Client submits authentication 
13. Bank checks authentication 
14.  Bank opens Second Authentication challenge/ response and OTP  for the client 
15.  Client responds to new authentication  
16.  Bank approves client authentication 
17.   Client  Success 
From the diagram in figure 4.2 the client tries to access the account by providing username, 
password, T.P ID and fingerprint and sends the request to the public cloud. The public cloud 
checks just T.P. ID and fingerprint. If it is right it passes the request to the bank through a private 
cloud connection. The bank checks the parameters then passes the session key through the cloud 
to access the internet bank application to start a direct conection to the client. 
Check other 
authentication 
factor
Client 
Interface link 
between cloud and 
bank client
Cloud 
serverch
Bank server
Interface link 
between cloud and 
bank 
Check 
authentication 
factor
Bank application 
intrface
2
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Figure 4.2: client authentication factor flow 
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4.2 The Proposed Security Scheme  
A new protocol, Secure Transaction Sharing (STS), provides the bank with fine-grained access 
control over data outsourced to the cloud environment. STS allows the bank to authorize Clients 
to securely access their data. We will then extend this solution to address the problems of 
collusion between the CSP and a client. 
4.2.1 Proposed STS Framework 
STS protocol is constructed using additive homomorphic encryption as an operation performed on 
a set of ciphertexts such that decrypting the result of the operation is the same as the result of 
some operation performed on the plaintext. Homomorphic Addition given the cryptosystem is 
considered additively homomorphic iff  
∃ △: ε(x1) △ ε(x2) = ε(x1 + x2) 
4.2.1.1 Paillier Additive Homomorphic Cryptosystem  
The Paillier cryptosystem, named after and invented by Pascal Paillier in 1999, is a probabilistic 
asymmetric algorithm for public key cryptography [107, 108. 109]. The scheme is an additive 
homomorphic cryptosystem; given only the public-key and the encryption of m1 and m2, one can 
compute the encryption of m1 + m2, 
Definition 1. Let k ∈ Z be some number. The sets Zk   Z∗   are defined as 
Zk  = {z|z ∈ Z, 0 ≤ z < n} 
Z*k  = {z|z ∈ Z, 0 ≤ z < n, gcd(z, k) = 1}. 
The corresponding multiplicative group will be denoted (Z∗ , ·), with modulo k 
multiplication. 
Definition 2. n = pq will be the product of two primes p and q. 
Definition 3. A number z ∈ Z∗ is said to be an n-th residues modulo n2 if there 
exists  
a number y ∈ Z∗   such that  z = yn    mod n2  
Let N R be the set of n-th residues modulo n2. 
Definition 4 (Euler’s Φ–Function). Let x =    pli −1 (pi − 1) with pi  pairwise different 
prime numbers. 
Chapter 4. New financial model and definition  
 
 
 69 
i 
Euler’s Φ–Function is defined as 
Φ(x) = 
Y 
p
li −1 (pi − 1). 
Lemma 5. 
Φ(x2) = xΦ(x) 
Lemma 6. For any x ∈ Zn,   (1 + n)x = 1 + xn    mod n2 
These are roots of unity in (𝑍*n2) 
 Proofv by induction over x.  Basis x = 0 is obviously true.  
         Inductive step x → x + 1: 
 
(1 + n)x = 1 + xn    mod n2 
⇒ (1 + n)x+1 = (1 + xn)(1 + n)    mod n2 
= 1 + xn + n + xn2 = 1 + (x + 1)n mod n2                         
Algorithm  
The scheme works as follows:  g ∈ 𝑍*n2 
Key generation   
1. Choose two large prime numbers (often 512 bits or above) p and q randomly and 
independently of each other such that gcd(𝑝𝑞, (𝑝 − 1)(𝑞 − 1)) = 1  . This property is 
assured if both primes are of equal length.  
2. Compute 𝑛 = 𝑝𝑞  and λ =  𝑙𝑐𝑚 (𝑝 − 1, 𝑞 − 1) 
3. Select random integer g where g Є Z* n2 
4. Ensure n divides the order of g by checking the existence of the following modular 
multiplicative inverse:  μ = ( L ( gλ mod n2))-1mod n , 
Where function L is defined as.     𝐿(μ) =  
μ−1
𝑛
 
 
Note that the notation 
𝑎
𝑏
 does not denote the modular multiplication of a times the modular 
multiplicative inverse of b but rather the quotient of a divided by b, i.e., the largest integer 
value μ ≥ 0 satisfies the relation μ  μb. 
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 The public (encryption) key is (n, g). 
 The private (decryption) key is (λ, μ). 
If using p, q of equivalent length, a simpler variant of the above key generation steps would be to 
set 𝑔 = 𝑛 + 1, λ =𝛼(𝑛) and μ = 𝛼(𝑛)−1mod n, where 𝛼(𝑛) = (p-1) (q-1). 
Encryption 
1. Let m be a message to be encrypted where m ∈ 𝑍n  
2. Select random r where r ∈ 𝑍*n    
3. Compute ciphertext as: c = 𝑔𝑚. 𝑟𝑛 mod 𝑛2          
Decryption 
1. Let c be the ciphertext to decrypt, where c ∈ 𝑍* 𝑛2   
2. Compute the plaintext message as: m = L (𝑐λ mod 𝑛2). μ  mod n 
 Decryption is "essentially one exponentiation modulo 𝑛2." 
4.2.1.2 Homomorphic Properties 
A notable feature of the Paillier cryptosystem is its homomorphic properties. As the encryption 
function is additively homomorphic, the following identities can be described: 
 Homomorphic addition of plaintexts 
The product of two ciphertexts will decrypt to the sum of their corresponding plaintexts, 
D (E (m1 , r1). E (m2 , r2) mod  𝑛2 = m1 + m2 mod n.  
The product of a ciphertext with a plaintext raising g will decrypt to the sum of the 
corresponding plaintexts, 
D (E (m1, r1).  𝑔𝑚2 mod  𝑛2 = m1 + m2 mod n.  
 Homomorphic multiplication of plaintexts 
An encrypted plaintext raised to the power of another plaintext will decrypt to the product 
of the two plaintexts, 
D (E (m1, r1)m2  mod 𝑛2 = m1  m2 mod n,  
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D (E (m1, r1)m1  mod 𝑛2 = m1  m2 mod n,  
More generally, an encrypted plaintext raised to a constant k will decrypt to the product 
of the plaintext and the constant, 
D (E (m1, r1)k ) mod 𝑛2 = km1 mod n.  
However, given the Paillier encryptions of two messages there is no known way to compute an 
encryption of the product of these messages without knowing the private key. 
Background 
Paillier cryptosystem exploits the fact that certain discrete logarithms can be computed easily. 
For example, by binomial theorem, 
(1 + 𝑛)𝑥 = ∑ (
𝑥
𝑘
) 𝑛𝑘 = 1 + 𝑛𝑥 +  (
𝑥
2
) 𝑛2 + ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑛
𝑥
𝑘=0
 
This indicates that: 
(1 + 𝑛)𝑥  ≡  1 + 𝑛𝑥  (mode 𝑛2 ) 
Therefore, if: 
𝑦 =  (1 + 𝑛)𝑥   mode 𝑛2  
Then 
x ≡ 
𝑦−1
𝑛
 mode n 
Thus: 
L ((1 + 𝑛)𝑥   mode 𝑛2 ) ≡x (mode n), 
Where function L is defined as L (u) = 
𝑢−1
𝑛
  (quotient of integer division) and x ∈ 𝑍n. 
4.3 Security Semantics  
Irrespective of the above-mentioned homomorphic properties however, the system is malleable, 
and therefore does not adopt the highest echelon of semantic security that protects against 
adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) [73, 92]. Usually in cryptography the notion of 
malleability is not seen as an "advantage," but under definite applications such as secure 
electronic transaction and threshold cryptosystems, this process may not acceptable. 
In my proposal I used a homomorphic cryptographic for re-encrypting the message over cloud 
provider without the need to know the plain text transfer from client to the bank or vice versa. To 
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avoid the malleability of homomorphic cryptography I obtain cashing re-encryption algorithm 
combined with this protocol to secure the communication transaction between client and the bank 
over cloud services.     
4.3.1 Statement of Fine-Grained Access Control  
Our Fine-grained access control scheme was used to achieve fine-grained data sharing and access 
control over cloud. The Secure Transaction Sharing (STS) framework uses homomorphic 
encryption and cashing re-encryption as the underlying subroutines. 
Cloud 
Public and proxy re authenticate
l  
li   r  r  t ti t
Client 
Bank
Authorizes 
Out
sou
rce
 Acc
ess
 
Figure 4.3: three participant entities 
As can see from figure 4.3 the Diagram showing the three entities participating in my proposal   
In our statement setting, the bank encrypts data locally to ensure privacy. Moreover the bank 
shares the authentication access to cloud provider as out of band and other authentication channel 
access.  To facilitate fine-grained access control, asset of attributes is associated with each client’s 
account transaction, which helps to control client access to a specific set of account fields for each 
authorized user. The bank issues a decryption key tamper proof for each authorized client account 
according to access rights. 
Subjects include re-authorizing a revoked client account who later rejoins the system with 
potentially different access privileges, potential collusion between a revoked client and an 
authorized other client account, and collusion between a client and the Cloud Service Provider as 
discussed later in this chapter.  
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4.3.2 Private Cloud (bank trusted zone): 
Bank trusted zone is an area service that receives four variables and checks all these variables; if 
matched then it returns other parameters. Also this function generates a random key for 
encryption and sends this key to the bank and to the client upon a one-time password (OTP) 
algorithm with a challenge response feature.  
4.3.3 Authentication Schemes  
Authentication is the process of validating something as authentic. Whenever the user tries to 
access a resource, the server will check if the user has appropriate permissions to access the 
resource or not. Network eavesdropping attacks consist of monitoring network traffic between 
two target nodes. The attack is achieved by joining the network of one of the two target nodes, 
such as a hub LAN, switched LAN, or WLAN. Once the attacker is in the network, they use 
different techniques, depending on the type of network, to start capturing network traffic. For 
instance, in networks composed of hubs, the attacker just needs to run a network sniffer in 
promiscuous mode; in switched networks an extra condition, such as an ARP poisoning attack, is 
required. Wireless networks require the attacker to join the network before executing the attack on 
the hub or switch behind the access point. If encryption is used on the wireless access point, it 
would need to be circumvented prior to further testing.  All of these variations have different 
protection methods, depending on the attack type. Testing for them is done with the aid of 
network attack and monitoring tools. My proposal used a one time password and challenge 
response to mitigate this risk plus generating another encryption key. 
Three types of one time password are used in my experiment  
 A mathematical algorithm to generate a new password base on previous password  
 Time – synchronization between the authentication server and user  
 Mathematical algorithm for new password based on challenge and control  
The authentication code   
U: user 
S: server (cloud) 
A: an attacker  
UC: user account 
PW: password  
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Dong.ID: tamper proof identity  
FP: fingerprint  
H: one way hash function  
N: random number  
⊕ or number   
U __ S : transmitting U to S authenticated channel     
Scheme consists of two phases:  
1- Registration phase 
2- Authentication phase  
Phase one  
Registration phase 
R1: A user (U) input <UC, PW, FP>, tamper proof identity (generate automatically) 
Generate three random numbers  
N0 , N1 , N2 
U Tamper proof N1, N2 
Calculate  G0 , G1, G2, D1 , D2  by 
G0= h (UC, PW, FP, N0) 
G1= h (UC, PW, FP, N1) 
G2= h (UC, PW, FP, N2) 
D1= h (G0, G1) 
D2= h (G1, G2) 
R2: user sends < UC, G0,G1, D1, D2> to cloud 
R3: cloud stores the received message < ID, G0,G1, D1, D2> 
  Phase two (authentication)   
In this phase the user requests the ith service. 
U: execute ith authentication session    
U finishes the (i – 1) th authentication session of the scheme 
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U cloud <Ni, Ni+1> 
 The bank sends to cloud provider the public (encryption) key which is (n, g). 
 The private (decryption) key is (λ , 𝜇).  
S cloud <UC,Gi-1,Gi,Di,Di+1> 
ith secure authentication as 
A1.  
U input (UC,PW, FP> 
U sends a login request to S cloud 
Verify STS Homomorphic algorithm as follows:  
Select two large prime numbers p and q randomly 
Algorithm 
The scheme works as follows: 
Key generation 
Compute n = pg and λ = lcm(p-1, q-1). 
Select random integer g where g ∈ 𝑍* n2  
Ensure n divides the order of g by checking the existence of the following modular 
multiplicative inverse:   μ = L (𝑔λ mod 𝑛2)-1  mode n, 
Where function L is defined as L (u)= 
𝑢−1
𝑛
  .  
 
Note that the notation 
𝑎
𝑏
  does not denote the modular multiplication of a times the 
modular multiplicative inverse of b but rather the quotient of a divided by b, i.e., the 
largest integer value v ≥ 0 to satisfy the relation a ≥ vb. 
A2  
S ------- U  Ek (UC ⊕ Ts ⊕i) 
S computes <UC ⊕ Ts ⊕i> , where  Ts is S’s current timestamp and I is current session 
number  
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S encrypts <UC ⊕ Ts ⊕i> , using the share key K send the form to the bank through 
private channel. 
S send Ek<UC ⊕ Ts⊕i> to U 
A3        
U -------S Ek (UC ⊕ Ts⊕i), Gi-1⊕ Gi⊕ Gi+1, Di+1⊕ Di+ 2 h (Di+2)   
U decrypt Ek (UC ⊕ Ts⊕i)  
U check (Tu – Ts) ≥   ∆ T.  if (Tu – Ts) ) ≥   ∆  T , U quits the login request , where   ∆ T is 
expected valid time interval.   
Otherwise, U generates a new random number Ni+2 
U computes < Gi, Gi+1, Gi+2>, where 
 Gi = h(UC, PW, FP, Ni) 
 Gi+1 = h(UC,PW, FP, Ni+1) 
 Gi+2 = h(UC,PW, FP,  Ni+2) 
 Di+2 = h(Gi+1, Gi+2) 
U stores < Ni+1 , Ni+2> instead of <  Ni, Ni+1> 
U computes < UC ⊕ Tu ⊕ i> where Tu is U’s current timestamp and i is the current 
session number 
U encrypts < UC ⊕ Tu⊕ i> using the share key K received from the bank via cloud 
provider 
U sends (Ek(ID ⊕Tu⊕i), Gi-1⊕ Gi⊕ Gi+1 , Di+1⊕ Di+2, h(Di+2)> to S  of cloud 
A4  
Encryption at bank servers 
Let m be a message to be encrypted where m ∈ 𝑍 n        
Select random r where r ∈ 𝑍* n  
Compute ciphertext as: c = 𝑔𝑚. 𝑟𝑛 mod 𝑛2     
Decryption 
Let c be the ciphertext to decrypt, where c ∈ 𝑍* n2  
Chapter 4. New financial model and definition  
 
 
 77 
Compute the plaintext message as:  m = L (𝑐λ mod 𝑛2). μ mode n   
 Decryption is "essentially one exponentiation modulo n2."  
 
S receives from the bank < Ek(ID ⊕ Tu⊕ I ), Gi-1⊕ Gi⊕ Gi+1,Di+1⊕ Di+2, h(Di+2)> 
 S bank decrypts Ek(ID ⊕ Tu⊕ I ). 
S bank checks (Tu – Ts ≥  ∆ T. if (Tu – Ts ≥  ∆ T , S rejects the login request, where ∆ T is 
the  expected valid time interval. 
Otherwise, S computes D’ i+2 = (Di+1⊕ Di+2) ⊕Di+1.    
S checks if h(D’i+2) is equal to h(Di+2). 
If h(D’i+2) = h(Di+2), then S obtains Gi+1 = (Gi-1⊕ Gi⊕ Gi+1) ⊕ Gi-1⊕ Gi 
S bank computes D’i+1= h (Gi, Gi+1), using the stored Gi and the obtained Gi+1. 
If they are equal,  
U is authenticated  
S stores < ID, Gi , Gi+1, Di+1 , Di+2>  in place of <ID, Gi-1, Gi , Di , Di+1> 
Otherwise  
S rejects U’s login.  
4.4 Authentication Connectivity Link Between Cloud Provider and Bank Data Base 
However without loss of generality, let us assume that the Bank’s account is composed of records 
and each data record d has n attributes. Each record d can be represented as d1, dn, where di is the 
value of I the attribute of n. In order to mask the number of attributes as well as actual attribute 
values of d, the Bank selects n + m random integers (denoted by r1 ,..., rn+m) from the domain ZN 
for each record d. Note that the value of m may vary for each data record d and is chosen 
randomly from [1,Rmax], where Rmax is an additional security parameter decided by the Bank 
depending on the security requirements. For example, Rmax can be set to100 for sensitive data such 
as client’s lending amount. On the other hand, for normal amount transaction Rmax can be set to 
10. Let d’=d1 +r1, . . . ,dn+ rn,rn+1, . . . ,rn+m be the  new data record generated from d 
consisting of n+ m attributes.  For convenience, we denoted the ith value in d. For each data 
record d that the Bank wishes to outsource, it computes d’ and encrypts it attribute-wise using 
master public key pka. That is, the Bank computes Epka(d1  + r1), . . . , 
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Epka(dn+rn),Epka(rn+1), . . . ,Epka(rn+m). Assume that E (d’) denotes the new encrypted 
data record, that is: 
Epka(d’) = Epka(d’1), . . . ,Epka(d’n+m) 
During the implementation, the Bank needs to compute Epka(d’) only once for each data record 
d. After this, the Bank generates the authorization session key for Epka(d’) verified by the client 
tamper proof device. We consider the following two cases for each data record d depending on 
whether the client is granted access to d or not: 
Case1: If the Bank wishes to grant access to the client for asset of attributes S(⊆d), then they 
generate the authorization tamper proof for the client corresponding to d as below: 
tdb= {Client, rkpka→pkb, Epkb(α1), . . . , Epkb(αn+m)} 
Here rkpka→pkb is the cashing re-encryption key generated using the cashing re-encryption 
method in Stage1. For1≤i≤n+m, we define αi as follows: 
αi={−riif1≤i≤n∧di∈S 
-d’Iotherwise 
 
Note that, d’i=di+ri, for 1≤i≤n, and di=ri, for n≤ i ≤ n + m. In general, N − x is equivalent to 
−x underZN.  
Case2: If the Bank does not wish to grant access to the client for a data record d, then no 
authorization tamper proof is generated or sent; i.e., b =null. We denote T
d as the list of 
authorization tamper proofs, generated as explained above, of all authorized users who can access 
either all or some attributes of d. The Bank exports the data (Td, Epka(d)) to the cloud. Note that 
if T d is null, then it is not included in T 
d. The overall steps performed by the Bank are to 
generate T d using S and d for the Client. The Bank first computes (T 
d , Epka (d’  )) for all data 
records that wish to be outsourced to the cloud. Then the Bank uploads the authorization tamper 
proofs along with the corresponding encrypted data records to the cloud as a single large chunk, 
thereby reducing the communication cost to a large extent. In addition, our approach can be easily 
extended to the scenario where a group of users have the same set of access attributes. Under this 
situation, the bank generates a single public/private key pair for the group and sends it to all users 
of the group. Instead of generating tamper proofs for each user in the group for d, the bank 
generates a single tamper proof for the group by simply including the group ID in the tamper 
proof. For example, consider a group G with two accounts who are authorized to access the same 
set of attributes in d, then the corresponding tamper proof can be given as: 
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{G-ID, rkpka→pkg ,Epkg (α1),…..Epkg(αn +m) } 
Where pkg and prg are the public and private key so if group G (note that private key prg is 
known only to bank, account1, and account2) and G-ID denotes the group ID of G. by this control 
only the group can access the specific account. 
4.5 Testedbed Performance and Evaluation   
Used Network Walk tooles to analyse the bath, the network utilities and bandwidth  
Bank Involved URLs in the process result 
https://212.0.141.164:7777/exec 
https://212.0.141.164:7778/index.jsp 
https://212.0.141.164:7778/runtran.jsp 
https://212.0.141.164:7778/MPI/TransactionProcessing.jsp 
https://212.0.141.164:4444/SUDAPAN 
https://212.0.141.164:7778/MPI/ResponseProcessing.jsp 
https://212.0.141.164:7778/mpirun.jsp?action=mpi 
4.5.1 Evaluation result  
 
Figure 4.4: The real time and delay time  
 
Chapter 4. New financial model and definition  
 
 
 80 
 
Figure 4.5: Offset and all the text encrypted  
Figure 4.6:  Packet size and the distribution between puppy, cloud and the bank 
 Figure 4.4 used wireshark to capture The real time and delay time to compare the performance of 
the application although figure 4.6 give an example of encrypted date to be sure all message 
encrypted from client until reach the bank, in figure .6 used Foglight monitoring tools do display 
the size of the packet from on point to other one.  
Our O.S. measuring framework is utilized to transfer the measurement values from Application to 
Kernel. Several mechanisms were implemented for communicating between application and 
kernel, such as a grant table, ring buffers, an event channel, and Store. We use those mechanisms 
to transfer the measurement values from Application to Kernel. We implement two modules for 
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inter control communication: a front-end module (FE) in an interface and a back-end module (BE) 
in Kernel. To transfer the measurement values, the application first shares the ring buffers at 
operating system management (O.S.M), which transfers measurement values by using a grant 
table. The key function in this process is gnttab_grant_foreign_access. 
To activate network on puppy Linux:  
Select wired or wireless LAN from the menu interface  
When a new screen appears select simple network setup 
In interface tab select wlan0 which appears as an available network then enter key  
After that run file.jar in puppy Linux  
To ensure Java has been installed successfully use the following command java -version 
In order to run file .jar use this command in terminal java -java name of file.jar. Or run the file by 
one click by converting file from .jar to .desktop. In order to do this step, firstly open new edit and 
write the command (xmodulo.com //create-desktop-shortcut-launcher-linux.html) 
Encoding=UTF-8 
Version=1.0                                                        # version of an app. 
Name[en_US]= name of a file                            # name of an app. 
GenericName=GUI Port Scanner                       # longer name of an app. 
Exec=java -jar /path of file/name of file.jar      # command used to launch an app. 
Terminal=false                                                   # whether an app requires to be run in a terminal. 
Icon[en_US]=/path of picture/name of picture .png  # location of icon file. 
Type=Application                                                # type. 
Categories=Application;Network;Security;        # categories in which this app should be listed. 
Comment[en_US]= name of file Graph Editor   # comment which appears as a tooltip 
Save it to name of file.desktop and drag and drop file to desktop 
Change the name of the file by right clicking on file and selecting edit item then enter the name of 
a file to appear in the desktop. 
Optionally, change the icon of a file by right clicking and selecting file'name of a file' and choose 
set icon and simply drag and drop the specified icon,  then just click on the file and it will open in 
the browser.   
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Subsequently, the Application establishes a new event channel for notifying Kernel of a new 
measurement value, using the interpreter call HyperPreter_event_channel_op(). PREStore stores 
Application’s grant reference and event channel port; Kernel fetches this information by invoking 
bus_scanf(). Using a grant reference, Kernel maps the shared ring buffers to its own memory 
address space by invoking HYPERPRI-SOR_ grant _ table _op(). Using an event channel port, 
Kernel invokes bind_interdomain_evtchn_ To _ irqhandler() to bind its own event channel to 
Application and allocate a handler for events. This sequence of actions successfully transfers the 
measurement values from Application to Kernel. 
We also take measurements of the MM and FE to determine their status. Our framework 
leverages the OS kernel file System.map. This file is a symbol table that the kernel uses to 
establish correspondence between the names of functions or variables and their virtual addresses 
in memory. Because the MM and FE are both modules in the Application’s kernel, all the 
functions and variables they use are in the Application’s System. Map file, letting us retrieve their 
virtual addresses. 
To do so, we leverage the fact that the Appliance uses two layers of memory: pseudo-physical, 
and machine. The pseudo-physical memory resides between the machine memories—the memory 
the hardware system actually uses—and application OSs. It appears to the application OS as its 
own machine memory. Puppy/ O.S. assigns a machine frame number (MFN) and a physical frame 
number (PFN) to single pages of machine memory and pseudo-physical memory, respectively. 
Our system application maintains a local table called P2M that converts a PFN to the 
corresponding MFN. 
P2M is a two-level page table. In the shared info page, we find the MFN pointing to the first level 
of the page table in domain −> shared info −>arch.pfn_to_mfn_frame_list_list (domain is the 
domain to which this P2M belongs). We next implement a function to find a given PFN’s 
corresponding MFN. On the basis of this function, we add to HyperPreter_event _map_ by_ addr_ 
op. This HyperPrete takes two arguments: the tamper proof ID and the structure map_request_t 
containing operation parameters. Specifically, we define map_request_t as   
struct_map_request { 
  / * IN parameters * / 
dongid_tdomid;  
unsigned long vaddr; 
int size; 
  / * OUT parameters * / 
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Ver_APP_HANDLE(ulong) start; 
}; 
typedefstruct map_ request map_ 
request_t;  
With this HyperPreter, the Kernel can fetch the memory areas of the Application corresponding to 
physical addresses addr to appdr + size. Kernel then accesses these fetched memory areas in its 
own address space, from addresses start to start + size. Our prototype uses this technique to find 
Application’s System.map (System.map-2.6.28.8-puppyU) in Kernel’s directory/boot. Then, the 
MM maps all functions, read-only data, and initialized data used in the MM and FE to their 
addresses in the Kernel by invoking  HyperPreter _map_by_vaddr_op. The MM measures those  
addresses according to their sequence in System.map. Under a trusted environment, the MM 
extends trusted measurement values into a specified PCR (an unused PCR) in sequence. The 
system then calculates the values for MM and FE during runtime. If the MM and FE are intact, 
the two sets of measurement values should be the same. 
To test our prototype’s ability to detect intrusions, we wrote a simple program in Application, 
compiled the source code into an executable file, and ran it. Here’s the program’s main source 
code: 
fd = open(”welcom.txt”,O CREAT |O RDW R, \ 
          S IRUSR|S IWUSR);  
if(fd){ 
write(fd, “welcome back!”  
strlen(“welcome back!”)); 
close(fd); 
} 
We named the executable /home/biago/code/sys_file; its corresponding measurement value is 
0g772110d4f010he3442f95e827e173789409bbd. Once we determined the measurement value, we 
modified the source code to change “welcome back” to  
  “WELCOME BACK”: 
fd = open(“welcom.txt”,O CREAT |O RDW R, \ 
          S IRUSR|S IWUSR);  if(fd)  
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  {write (fd, “WELCOME BACK!”, \ 
Strlen (“WELCOME BACK!”));   
Close (fd) ;} 
We gave the modified executable the same name. In this case, the corresponding measurement 
value in the MT is 2c0b68af6dbd01gc0ad2cfd035h 541da7e202134. After comparing the two 
values to the corresponding trusted value in the RT, the Kernel discovered a mismatch. So, our 
prototype correctly detected the modification of the executable. 
 The SPEC CPU suite contains a series of long-running computationally-intensive applications 
intended to measure the performance of a system’s processor, memory system, and compiler 
quality. The suite performs little I/O and has little interaction with the OS. With almost all CPU 
time spent executing in user-space code, all O.S.Ms exhibit low overheads. In the case of the O.S., 
this ‘system time’ is expanded to a greater or lesser degree. 
Time Comparison 
Table key: 
Proposed scheme: means full encryption traffic from bank to client goes through cloud provider 
Without Encryption: traffic from bank to client goes through cloud provider but without 
Homomorphic cryptography feature 
Direct: from the bank to client without interference from cloud provider 
Figure 4.7: time Comparison  
From figure 4.7 can see the different of time the session need to contact the bank, from the client 
to the bank through cloud need 10 millisecond (ms) and from cloud to the bank need 5 ms, the 
session from client to the bank need 10 + 5 = 15 ms to complete all the first authentication process 
10/ MS
5/MS
11 /MS
Session Time/Millisecond 
Public Server direct internet link
client to cloud provider
10/21/2014 3:00:00:36 PM
10/21/2014 3:00:00:46 PM
Private especial link between
cloud provider and the bank
10/21/2014 3:00:00:39 PM
10/21/2014 3:00:00:44 PM
Bank direct interface between
client and the bank
10/21/2014 3:00:00:36 PM
10/21/2014 3:00:00:47 PM
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and the last pie portion represent 11 ms need to authenticate direct communicate between client 
and the bank. 
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Table 4.1 Summary Result Table for Sent Analysis: 
Device 
from 
 
TCP 
Decide to TCP Session 
start 
Session 
end 
Session 
time/ ms 
Byte Traffic  Without 
encryption 
B/c encrypt 
packet 
Cloud to 
client 
Public 
Sever  
 
8063 
Cloud 
server 
Private 
2639 10/21/2014 
3:00:36 
pm 
10/21/2
014 
3:00:46 
pm 
10 14900 10 7 4 14900 
Cloud to 
the bank 
private 
 
8063 
Bank 
server 
1647 10/21/2014 
3:00:39 
pm 
10/21/2
014 
3:00:44 
pm 
5 629 5 5 5 629 
Bank 
direct 
connet to 
client 
 
8067 
Internet 
public 
1241 10/21/2014 
3:00:36 
pm 
10/21/2
014 
3:00:47 
pm 
11 10220 11 11 3 10220 
Table key: 
Research: means full encryption traffic from bank to client goes through cloud provider 
Without Encryption: traffic from bank to client goes through cloud provider but without Homomorphic cryptography feature 
B/C : from the bank to client without interference from cloud provider 
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4.6 Summary  
In this chapter, I have compared the two security modelling and testing approaches of simulation 
and formal verification taking their advantages and disadvantages into consideration. The 
simulation-based approach was adopted because of transaction nature, its ability to balance cost 
and complexity in addition to ensuring a higher degree of result accuracy. I also reviewed some 
existing widely used event network simulators and opted for the development of a new simulation 
framework taking certain factors into consideration. Crypto++ Cryptographic Library was adopted 
as the preferred security library and Java the programming language while Linux environment 
was chosen because of the existence of active Crypto++ Users forum. I described the simulation 
framework features with focus on the proposed hierarchical network topology, hierarchical 
channel routing and disruption. I then discussed the simulation framework development process 
supported by screenshots of simulation outputs thus affirming the conformity of the programmed 
model with the defined assumptions of the proposed simulation framework 
The next chapters will present and discuss the design, simulation, verification and analysis as well 
as the documentation and results phases of the proposed access control scheme using the 
developed simulation framework.  
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Chapter 5 Tamper Proof Authentication Solution 
Authentication concept model   
The proposed hierarchical topology in the previous chapter was designed to implement 
the tamper proof party model in a hybrid manner, and the designed implementation is a trust 
management model that facilitates hybrid architecture implementation. However, the previous 
chapter proposed and implemented a lightweight credential framework called Secure Transaction 
Sharing (STS). 
This chapter focuses on 1) the bank authentication server. 2) Integrating the online 
banking security application with a Tamper proof bank device for a strong authentication. 3) 
Interface application at the client PC replacing other authentication methods. 4) By doing so, 
Electronic Signatures can be used inside the interface bank application. This will help to make 
client access more secure. 5) Through its Java-API, the online banking security tamper proof 
design can be integrated into the banking application. 
 This chapter is structured as follows: 
Section 5.1 gives an overview of the client authentication traditional model. Section 5.2 presents 
and describes in detail the online banking securities tamper proof integration phase where 
authentication is implemented. Section 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 discuss the design and security analysis of 
tamper proof and digital signature as well as comparative analysis with existing schemes. Section 
5.6 speaks about operating system architecture overview and 5.7 evaluates the storage domain, 
cryptographic operations, end-to-end delay and disruption as metrics. Section 5.8 is the Advanced 
Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) support. Section 5.9 covers network policy 
enforcement. Section 5.10 analyses the potential attckes bugs in the kernel, in the Store daemon, 
bugs in the GUI daemon and additional potential vectors from driver domains and section 5.11 is 
a summary.   
One of the novelty aspects of the research is to provide hardware (tamper proof) in the transaction 
chain which is under client’s control and is acting on their behalf. This would provide protection 
to the client in the event communicate with their account bank. 
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5.1 Client Authentication Traditionally  
Most traditional applications have a client authentication mechanism built-in [3]. The 
client authentication is typically based upon client-ID and (static) password. This authentication 
method relies upon password verification and needs more sophisticated client management (based 
upon groups/templates) with client rights to be specified (authorization).  
5.1.1   Client Authentication 
Inside the application, a certain module is responsible for checking the client-ID and the password 
given by the client. The verification of the client-ID and other authentication parameters can be 
based upon the comparison of the given parameters with one inside the database, or with a stored 
hash code of the session key. If the parameters match the information found inside the database, 
then the Client Authentication module turns YES/NO, indicating whether Client Authentication 
verification was successful or not. Based upon this return code, the client will be granted access to 
the application or not. The authentication scheme is designed to provide mutual, source and 
message authentication. But the problem is it relies on this authentication method and the channel 
between the two entities being secure, regardless of one way direction channel or mutual one. 
5.1.2 Password Authentication  
If you are using passwords on your web site or application, there is a problem [77, 80, and 97]. 
Password authentication problems include: 
1. Easy to guess – Regardless of complexity requirements, users will find and use the 
simplest pattern allowed, and attackers routinely take advantage.  
2. Everyone reuses them – Even if you tell your users not to, it will still happen.  
3. They are hard to remember – which irritates users, drains their energy, and roots a large 
amount of the above problems as well as writing passwords down on sticky notes for 
random visitors to see or to end up on office photographs.  
4. Social engineering – Some users type their passwords into a webpage that looks like your 
site, but was really just from a spoofed email. Password given to somebody who sounds 
like tech support on the phone.  
5. Steal with MITM attacks – If using SSL for all your traffic, but not client certificates, an 
attacker who can intercept your traffic just needs to get, steal, or crack one certificate from 
any of over 150 certificate authorities to intercept all of your user passwords.  
6. Hash dumps and offline cracking – The hashes of all passwords are stored forever in your 
database. An attacker who finds an SQL injection or database backup or otherwise 
compromises your site at one point in time can brute-force the creds offline at high speed 
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(millions or billions of tries per second) without triggering lockouts or getting logged and 
crack many passwords. Even if you use bcrypt or scrypt or salt and make it slow, many 
users will still get their passwords stolen.  
7. Easy lockouts – With no credentials but a list of usernames, an attacker can cause great 
pain and anguish by locking out everyone’s account.  
8. Online brute force – Especially if lockouts are disabled, but even if not, attackers can brute 
force network logins “online” against all your users and probably find plenty of good 
passwords.  
9. People save their passwords; email them to themselves, etc. – even if you tell them not to.  
10. Compromised server password sniffing – An attacker who compromises the server at one 
point in time can obtain all passwords of all users who log in by saving those passwords as 
they are entered. The attacker can then use those later or on other sites without leaving any 
malicious code or signs of compromise on the server.  
11. Painful post-attack clean up – If an intruder got access to the web server, when cleaning up 
after the intrusion, you must reset every password in addition to all your other tasks. This 
usually causes great anguish and loss of work time, and even can hit other websites. 
Security does not just consist of how to prevent an attack, but also how to limit the damage 
of one and pain of recovering from one. 
The strongest way to handle client authentication would be with hardware like our tamper proof 
with client side certificate or smart cards and dedicated O.S layer that will stop attackers from 
stealing users’ credentials even if their home computers are compromised, but unlike enterprise 
networks, this is way too expensive for most public-facing web applications.  
5.2. Online Banking and Security Integration 
This phase is designed to provide distributed authentication using pre-information 
obtained from the STS trust establishment phase. The client requests delivery of a One Time 
Password through a cloud provider channel; after successful validation of the client’s credentials 
(e.g. client name/static PIN-password and finger print) the banking system takes the initiative to 
generate a One Time Password, which is then provided to the client via a bank channel to check 
and permit access. 
The authentication proposal flow is as follows: 
1. Client requests Connectivity (e.g. through cloud provider)  
2. After validating the client’s credentials against the database, the online banking security 
tamper proof is requested to generate a virtual One Time Password with challenge 
response 
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3. The online banking security tamper proof sends the One Time Password with challenge 
response to the client 
4. The cloud provider provides the One Time Password / challenge response to the bank  
5. The cloud Gateway provides the banking system One Time Password / challenge 
response 
6. The clients receive the One Time Password in the password field of the application 
7. The application passes the One Time Password to the online banking security tamper 
proof which verifies the parameters   
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Figure 5.1: authenticated process in tamper proof device   
Figure 5.1 show authentication process sequence when the client request success to reach bank 
database server  
5.2.1   Online banking and security Data Model Integration 
To verify the online banking security dynamic password inside the bank interface application for 
the request of the above authentication flow, it is required that the online banking security secret 
keys are available at the bank database side and client side and transferred via the cloud server 
side from client to the bank.  
To ensure the security transfer message over cloud provider an additive homomorphic algorithm 
with probabilistic public key encryption is provided when the message transfers to the cloud 
provider before it reaches the bank. The algorithm involves an encryption function Expand (Epk) 
and a decryption function (Dpr), where pk and pr are the public and private keys respectively. 
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Given a ciphertext Epk(x), no one can discover x without pr in polynomial time. In addition, the 
system exhibits the following properties: 
Epk(x+y) =Epk(x) +hEpk(x) mod N2, where x and y are plaintext messages; +h is the additive 
homomorphic operation and N is the group size of the encryption scheme. 
For a given constant c and x ciphertext Epk(x), Epk(c·x) = Epk(x) c mod N2. 
When the bank side receives an authentication parameter, it also receives a Transport Key 
that contains the Online banking security secret keys. This information is encrypted with a 
‘Transport Key’ that is sent to the client after verification at the bank database through cloud 
connection. This Online banking security secret key is extracted from the Online banking security 
file, by using the Tamper proof-import function available in the online banking security tamper 
proof. 
An Online banking security file contains the security information. For each online banking 
security device, parameters such as online banking security unique tamper proof ID, challenge 
length, unlocked information are stored inside the file. 
Every tamper proof is referred to by its unique serial number. For every tamper proof/application 
that is found inside the file, 4 fields are returned (tamper proof ID, finger print, user account and 
password) that must be stored encrypted inside the application database. 
5.3 Framework 
5.3.1 Tamper Proof Overview  
Tamper proof is a hardware component used to enhance the security of online services. Tamper 
proof is designed for extremely high security demands and confidentiality of the online banking 
application using the biometric security technology system. Tamper proof is an on-chop 
authentication system; all the authentications are run inside the USB key without the host OS’s 
help. At the same time, installing the entire software environment on the USB tamper proof flash 
is controlled by the tamper proof key. 
The system is a combination of hardware and software. Based on the USB key and fingerprint 
scanner, the tamper proof device integrates a plug-and-play USB2.0 device without driver 
installation. By rebuilding the puppy Linux boot loader, we have developed and integrated a 
fingerprint based authentication security portable custom-built software environment inside the 
USB device. Tamper proof is a smart flash containing three components, puppy Linux operating 
system, and Linux Dom0 interface and authentication access online banking system application, 
as shown in figure 5.2.  
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Figure: 5.2 Tamper proof hardware used for authentication  
Divide Tamper proof into three stages: 
Transplant the fingerprint encryption module to the USB Key device and develop a suite of 
fingerprint encryption programs on the puppy OS with the USB Key device. The program for the 
puppy OS is named agent, and Class of services (COS) for the USB Key device. The 
communication between agent and COS is based on the USB mass-storage protocol with custom-
defined puppy to Small Computer System Interface, Reduced Block Command (SCSI RBC) set 
command.  
1) Re-custom and rebuild the security software environment: the syslinux boot system and 
the Puppy Linux. To achieve the purpose of identification while the system booting starts, 
we design a call by using the BIOS "INT 13h" interrupt service in syslinux. At the same 
time, we re-build the environment of Puppy Linux [108] to meet the high-level security 
requirements of the client.  
2) The security software environment is stored on the tamper proof USB flash. To protect the 
environment, the tamper proof USB flash is programmable to make its attribute read-only.  
5.3.2 Tamper Proof Architecture 
Tamper proof contains two main parts: hardware and software. The hardware part is made up 
of a USB key device, storage disk and fingerprint scanner; the software part is made up of a 
host agent, system on-chip (SOC), java syllinux and puppy Linux.    
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Figure 5.3: Tamper proof Architecture 
In order to make the Tamper proof support plug-play, the USB flash is a kind of Mass Storage 
device class of the USB On-The-Go (OTG) definition. And the communication between the 
Tamper proof and host computer is under the SCSI protocol with the RBC set. 
In the Tamper proof device as show in figure 5.3, the private files such as the private 
encryption key and fingerprint features are stored on the on-chip flash. The entire 
authentication operations are carried out inside the device without the help of the host 
computer. The security environment and Puppy Linux, is installed on the USB flash partition. 
With the purpose of assisting the users to enroll their fingerprints, we developed the host 
agent in windows. After finishing the enrollment, the device can be used with any computer 
that supports USB2.0 with the BIOS support of booting from a removable device. 
This software environment can be customized according to bank server demand and the 
authentication process is at the application stage. Implemented under the USB mass-storage 
protocol with the SCSI RBC command, the tamper proof is designed to be a plug-and play 
USB2.0 device and can communicate with the host OS that supports the USB device. With 
the help of the tamper proof, the users can work in a movable security environment freely, as 
well as have high-level protection of confidential information. 
5.3.3 Tamper Proof USB Flash Partition  
 
The Tamper proof USB flash is a bootable flash. We make the USB flash partition into three 
types. The first one is the bank application interface, which is the same as the most common disk 
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type that can be used. All the data in this type of partition are public and unprotected. Users can 
use this partition to exchange data with the outside system. The second type is the Tamper proof 
security area (TPSA). All the data in or out of the TPSA partition are well protected by hardware 
encryption. The third type we call system partition, with the READ-ONLY attribute. In order to 
protect the Tamper proof software environment from being modified, we stored the software 
environment in this partition. 
To maintain compatibility, we use the windows FAT l6 files system in the system partition. In 
order to avoid read/write of the client operation system or other applications in the special sector, 
we artificially create a logical special cluster. The logical special cluster is not a real special 
cluster; we make it just by writing the record entry "FFF7" both on the FATl table and FAT2 
table, making the cluster the "special" one. We use the logical bad cluster for the purpose of 
authentication in the system booting stage. 
5.3.4 SCSI RBC Set and BIOS Interrupt Services  
The Reduced Block Command (RBC) set is a subset of the SCSI  command,  and  it  is  designed  
to  provide  efficient initiator-to-target  operation  of  input/output   logical  units (disks,  tapes,  
printers,  etc.)  By an OS, BIOS interrupt services are facility software such as boot loaders, used 
to invoke the BIOS's facilities. Some OSs also uses the BIOS to probe and initialize hardware 
resources during their early stages of booting.  And the RBC READ and WRITE commands 
correspond to the BIOS INT 13h interrupt [101,106].  
5.3.5 Java Syslinux and the BIOS Interrupt Services  
The Tamper proof carried out the authentication in the system start-up stage. We use the Java 
syslinux as the system boot loader. We have customized the Java syslinux and added a new 
system call function named "AUTH CALL" after some necessary initialization. The AUTH 
CALL reads the specific sector in the system partition by using INT 13h BIOS interrupt service 
with "AH = 02h" sub function. The specific sector is a sector that we defined in the logical special 
cluster. 
5.3.6   Advanced Tamper Proof Management 
The online banking security tamper proof also holds a tamper proof reset function that will allow 
the client to reset a number of tamper proof specific parameters. 
•    Identification/Signature error counters 
 •    Tamper proof time drift 
The online banking security tamper proof has an Identification/Signature threshold that will be 
triggered after a number of successive wrong Identification or Signature codes. By calling the 
Reset function, these error counters are reset. 
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The online banking security tamper proof has automatic clock drift tracking functionality for 
every individual tamper proof. This allows the client to track the time drift of the tamper proof 
internal clock. By calling the Reset function, one can reset the previously measured tamper proof 
time drift, allowing for automatic time drift synchronization at the next password verification. 
Tamper Proof Digital Signature 
The online banking security tamper proof offers support for tamper proof digital signature. The 
tamper proof has the ability to generate a Digital Signature on a number of data fields, e.g. 
transaction data. Whenever someone performs a transaction, a certain number of data fields are 
critical in the transaction. Typically these are debit account number, credit account number and 
the amount of money. 
5.4 Tamper Proof Enforces a High Level of Security 
This section discusses the design and security analysis of our tamper proof authentication scheme 
as well as its comparative analysis schemes. 
Integrating the online banking security tamper proof inside the bank application allows the client 
to enforce a high level of security by adding the security flaw related to static passwords (PIN). 
The static passwords will be supported with dynamic passwords (Time-based, 
Challenge/Response) giving the client higher security and relieving the client from the burden of 
managing the static passwords. Also the client uses the tamper proof Digital Signature 
functionality inside the bank application. 
The online banking security tamper proof provides the client with strong encryption and integrity 
control on the tamper proof information stored inside the application database.  Our scheme of 
online banking security tamper proof used a triple DES encryption algorithm for the data based 
upon keys that are managed by the integrator or customer. As such, the online bank security 
tamper proof guarantees a complete security chain from the moment the tamper proof is 
programmed until it is activated and used in the application. 
5.4.1 Technical Descriptions 
This section discusses the simulation results of the proposed scheme with focus on tamper proof 
data model and data structure. 
5.4.1.1   Tamper Proof Data Structure 
The online banking security tamper proof is designed in a way that a number of data fields are 
stored inside the application database. These fields are required for dynamic password 
verification. For our tamper proof application the following 4 fields are used. 
•   Serial number + client name and fingerprint  
•   Tamper proof type – 5 characters 
•   Mode – 2 characters 
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•   Tamper proof data – 248 base 64 encoded data 
This field contains the unique tamper proof serial number, concatenated with the name and 
fingerprint of the client for how it is referred inside the SDK (software Developer kits), FSDK 
(fingerprint software Developer kits), and CFSDK (characteristic fingerprint software Developer 
kits) files. Other fields contain tamper proof type and mode plus hash of tamper proof data.  
5.4.1.2   Tamper Proof Data Import 
The online banking security tamper proof provides the client with import functionality for the 
tamper proof, based upon the SDK file that is corresponding to the programmed tamper proof. 
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Figure 5.4 –Import tamper proof data flow chart 
The tamper proof show in figure 5.4 import procedures as follows:   
1. open  the  SDK  file  by  calling  the  ‘open  SDK’  function  from  the  online banking 
security tamper proof. This function requires the SDK filename and the database key as 
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input parameters. The employee of the bank will enter these parameters into the system 
when setting up a new tamper proof. 
2. Call the function from the online banking security tamper proof. This function returns the 4 
fields mentioned above.  
3. Send the 4 fields to cloud provider to check just tamper proof ID and finger print, if yes 
send to the bank 
4. Check whether the retrieved is the right one inside the SDK file 
5. If YES, call the ‘Close SDK’ function from the online banking security tamper proof 
6. If NO, go back to step 2 
The tamper proof import functionality is an administrative task in the application. For every batch 
of tamper proofs, one will receive an SDK file, with the corresponding database 
encryption/decryption key. Every SDK file needs to be uploaded only once into the system. 
5.5 Online Banking Security Tamper Proof Features 
5.5.1 Transporting the Tamper Proof Information  
To guarantee the secure transport of the tamper proof keys a highly secured SDK file is used. The 
SDK file contains all the tamper proof specific data profile, application information, and the keys 
allowing the verification of the tamper proof OTP (random key) on the system. The security 
sensitive information in this SDK file is encrypted using a 3DES key as shown in figure 5.5, 
which is derived from a 3DES transport key. The transport key is shipped via a cloud provider to 
the bank.   
                   
Figure 5.5:  snapshot of the code to encrypt the SDK file 
5.5.1.1 Tamper proof data encryption  
Through the SDK file, the tamper proof information is transported in a secure way from the 
programming station to the application system where the validation takes place. On the 
application system, the confidentiality of the tamper proof data must be ensured as well. For this 
purpose, figure 5.6 shows the online banking security tamper proof 3 DES storage key to encrypt 
the tamper proof data. The storage key is different for each tamper proof data record and is 
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generated based upon a 3DES key inside the online banking security tamper proof, which can be 
provided by the client through the serial number of the tamper proof and user name plus 
fingerprint. Only by combining these different elements will one be able to successfully access the 
tamper proof information. Additionally, the tamper proof data records also contain a checksum 
value, which ensures the integrity of the tamper proof data. The check sum incorporates all critical 
tamper proof data such as keys, serial number, and error counter. Anybody tampering with the 
tamper proof data block directly will not benefit from this since all subsequent verification calls 
will fail with a check sum error. 
                  
 
Figure 5.6: represents 3 DES storage keys to encrypt the tamper proof data 
5.5.1.2 Tamper proof key 
The tamper proof key is a plug-and-play USB interface hardware device for data encryption. It is 
built to work on a CPU, on-chip memory units and uses system on chip operation (SOC); the on-
chip memory unit is usually used for the storage of private information. My tamper proof key 
supports many kinds of algorithms such as DES, ECC, RSA, MD5, and SHA-1. All the 
algorithms are carried out within the tamper proof key and ensure that the private key or 
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information does not appear in the computer memory, eliminating the possibility of interception 
by hackers. 
5.5.2 Password Verification 
After integrating the basic administrative tasks such as tamper proof import and tamper proof 
assignment, it is necessary to integrate the password verification routines. The online banking 
security tamper proof needs to be integrated in the module where the client is verified. 
Retrieve users’
T.P. Data
Generate 
Challenge 
Update users’ 
T.P data
End of file
Verify 
password 
CR: 
Challenge 
Response
Update users’ T.P 
data
Send challenge 
wait for input
Accept or reject 
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Figure 5.7 -Password verification routine 
From figure 5.7 we can know the routing process used to verify the password. The password 
verification procedure is: 
1. As mentioned in the previous paragraph we check the link database to find the serial number 
and fingerprint of the tamper proof assigned to the client and retrieve the corresponding tamper 
proof data 
2. Check the Authentication mode used. 
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a. When using Challenge Response (CR), calls the ‘Generate Challenge’ function from 
the online banking security tamper proof server. 
B. updates the tamper proof data to allocate the generated challenge to this tamper proof 
C. sends challenge to client and waits for response on the challenge 
3. With the client’s responses call the ‘Verify Password’ functions from the online banking 
security tamper proof 
4. Update the tamper proof data in the application to store date/time; tamper proof uses time 
synchronization  
5. Based upon the return code of the online banking security tamper proof verify password 
function, the client will be accepted or rejected to complete the authentication; it is required that 
changes are made to the module where the password verification is performed to a one time 
password. At this point in the online banking the following steps are required: 
1. Check the client via cloud provider to find the tamper proof that is assigned to the client and 
retrieve the corresponding tamper proof data. 
2. Check in the tamper proof data whether challenge/response is used. If yes, generate the 
challenge, update the tamper proof data and send the challenge to the client. If Tamper 
proof ID is wrong then a message ‘Tamper proof ID is wrong’ is displayed and the 
application stops here as shown in figure 5.8.    
 
       Figure 5.8 message appears to client if the tamper proof ID is wrong  
3. Request online banking security tamper proof to verify the client’s dynamic password 
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4. Update tampers proof data 
5. Accept or Reject client based upon response from the online banking security tamper proof 
(tamper proof) 
5.5.3 Digital Signature Verification  
Integrating the online banking security tamper proof inside a bank application allows the client to 
use the tamper proof digital signature capabilities. The digital signature creates a higher level of 
security inside bank applications, by proving the identity of the client that has generated the 
signature and protected the content of the transaction. The online banking security tamper proof 
has the functionality to verify such a digital signature inside the application.  
The digital signature verification procedure is 
1- Client asks for transaction  
2- Checks the database to find the tamper proof parameters mentioned above, if correct go to 
next step.  
3- The tamper proof was assigned to the client and retrieves the corresponding tamper proof 
data.   
4-  Call the ‘verify signature’ function from the online banking security tamper proof. 
5- Based upon the return code of the verify signature function, the transaction will be 
accepted or rejected. 
6- Update the tamper proof data. 
7- Session ends. 
5.5.4 Automatic Time Drift Management  
Online banking security tamper proof server automatically manages the clock drift for every 
individual tamper proof. The usage of time-based algorithms has a number of major benefits: the 
generated one time password can be used more than once and they have a very limited life span 
thereby requiring the fraudster to immediately consume a captured one time password, 
discouraging phishing attacks.   
The tamper proof real time clock is quite accurate, however time-drift to the tamper proof cannot 
be predicted, since this is influenced by environmental conditions such as temperature, humidity, 
battery level etc.  
Online banking security tamper proof works with two different time windows: a synchronization 
time window and an identification /signature time window. The time windows indicate the 
number of valid one time passwords at a given time. The size of each of these time windows is 
configured through the online banking security tamper proof kernel parameters. 
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The synchronization time window is used in the following situations: 
- Tamper proof OTP validation, to ensure both clocks are aligned 
- When calling the function sync tamper proof and application – where the client is 
prompted to enter two consecutive one time passwords  
When the tamper proof OTP verification takes place and the synchronization window is used, the 
synchronization window will be positioned centrally at the current time and the tamper proof time 
deviation information will be updated to reflect the measured time drift.  
The identification/signature time windows are used for the normal / operational OTP verification. 
When the tamper proof OTP verification takes place and the identification / signature window is 
positioned centrally at the current time corrected with the previously measured time deviation and 
the tamper proof time deviation, information will be updated to reflect the measured time drift. 
Online banking security tamper proof is built into a mechanism to avoid the introduction of 
fake/false time-drifts e.g. when a client explicitly waits longer to enter the OTP. 
The sizes of the synchronization and identification / signature time windows are determined by 
integrating the online banking security tamper proof – typical values are provided for reaching 
different algorithms supported by the tamper proof. 
 Dynamic time window 
The dynamic time-window allows clients to work with extremely narrow windows; however, it 
will automatically enlarge the identification/ signature time window, depending on the number of 
days since the previous OTP validation occurred. 
OTP techniques implemented for authentication [63, 64] 
OTP techniques used Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-SHA1 (OATH) as an 
authentication factor between the client and the bank. OATH time supports a secret character 
sequence only known to the two parties.  
In both event-based and time-based it is possible for the server to auto-correct for synchronization 
problems, within certain limits. For event based tamper proofs, the server always knows a lower 
bound on the current counter value (the counter value used in the previous successful 
authentication attempt) but not an upper bound. Therefore, if an unrecognized one-time password 
is seen, the server can try several counter values beyond its expected counter value to see if any of 
them match. If one happens to work, then the server knows that the intervening counter values 
have been "lost" and it should skip over them. For time-based tamper proofs, a similar strategy of 
trying out a few time intervals in the past and the future works to auto synchronize with clock 
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drift. Of course, regular use of the tamper proof is necessary to keep the drift within the 
recognized range. 
Authorize unlock 
As mentioned, the online banking security tamper proof built in authorization mechanism allows 
the splitting-up of unlock responsibilities at the bank help desk, requesting for an unlock 
authorization code, which is generated by the online banking security tamper proof. The client 
will connect to a self-help center web; the tamper proof serial number and the tamper proof 
unlock challenge. The online banking security tamper proof will then verify whether the unlock 
authorization code matches the previously generated code and then generates the unlock response 
for the locked tamper proof. With this unlock response, the client will be able to successfully 
unlock the tamper proof and choose and confirm a new code to open his/her tamper proof.  
5.6 Operating System Architecture Overview 
This section presents the operating system model, design assumptions and the security/design 
goals for the online banking application scenario. 
5.6.1 Puppy Security Model  
Puppy Linux is the primary building blocks in the OS security model [104, 105]. Puppy OS 
isolates each operating system, so that if operating systems get compromised the rest are still safe 
to use.  
The goal from this operating system is to provide a secure portable working environment. Puppy 
Linux is a portable OS and can be installed on the USB flash or CD or hard disk; puppy Linux is a 
lightweight OS bundled with our online application which can be used productively by the bank’s 
clients. The entire system is installed on the bootable USB flash and run from RAM. 
5.6.2The Process of Dealing with Command  
All the authentication commands and data received from the online application system are 
processed by system on chip (SOC). There are two kinds of commands one is under the standard 
Small Computer System Interface, Reduced Block Command (SCSI RBC) command, strictly in 
accordance with the SCSI protocol, called the disk type commands; the other is under client-
defined SCSI RBC command with the purpose of secure personalized operations, particularly for 
the fingerprint encryption and decryption operations, called key type commands. The processes of 
disk type command and key command are independent; however, in order to make the fingerprint 
operation while the puppy system is booting, we designed a special process with the standard 
puppy SCSI RBC “READ” command.  
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Operating System Performance Test Comparisons on the Same Machine show in table 5.1 
Time Windows Ubuntu Puppy Linux 
Boot 02:13:88 02:08:00 01:08:37 
Website Loading 00:16:35 00:13:29 00:10:01 
 
Table 5.1:  comparison of O.S. Performance test  
We choose boot time in millisecond’s to distinguish the fraction of time between puppy Linux and 
other operating system which is appear clearly in millisecond. Also i's not just to keep things 
simple, it's to keep things consistent and used this to justify a lot of questionable decisions that 
affected consistency and durability. If a system considers moderate latency it would need to 
enhance the performance.  
 
  
Figure 5.9: boot time in Milliseconds 
From figure 5.9 can recognized that puppy Linux is faster operating system used to boot and loud 
our application.   
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5.6.3 Module Loading at Boot up 
Puppy boots first in an “initial ramdisk” (now more correctly called an initramfs) and the ‘init’ 
script executes. Puppy can be built in various ways, one of which is that all modules are present in 
the initramfs and then moved over to the main filesystem just before the ‘switch_root’. 
The following picture in figure 5.10 gives an idea of the boot up sequence: 
 main unionfs layered filesystem 
     /lib
     Boot
    script
   /ect/rc.d
Initramfs (initial ramdisk)
          init
                   Booting
  all- firmware                   modules
“firmware tarballs”         2.6.x.x
Puppy has all modules in the initramfs. The 
modules are moved to main f.s. just prior to 
the switch root from the initramfs. 
 
Figure 5.10:  Puppy boot up: 
There is a fundamental difference with how the puppy loads modules compared with other distro. 
After the ‘switch_root’ the first script that executes is /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit, and this is a key script to 
understand what is going on. Essentially, rc.sysintit starts the ‘udevd’ daemon program and then 
proceeds to manage loading of modules. The module load, but before they execute ‘modprobe’ to 
actually load a module that is where something different happens. 
The first time a module is loaded, a check is made where it has an associated “firmware tarball”. 
If so, it is installed prior to the module actually loading and there is no file to edit to enter secret 
udev rules (104). Also, the file that the module needs to work properly I kept out of the way in a 
tarball until actually needed. So no scripts are cluttering up/etc/init.d for example. A module 
might need the tarball. Edit one small file, /etc/modules/modules.firmware.<kernel version> that 
associates a module name with a tarball name.   
5.6.4 Pup_event_backend  
Module loading at bootup is managed in puppy by a collection of executable and configuration 
files called the pup_event_backend. The picture outlines the files involved: 
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Booting
 /ect/rc.d/rc.sysinit
 Start udevd 
 Replay uevents
kernel
/sbin/udevdv
  /ect/unev/rules.d
 /sbin/pup_event_backend_modprobe
 /sbin/pup_event_backend_firmware 
 /etc/rc.d/modulesconfig 
Udevd daemon 
read uevents
Udevd reads 
rules on how to 
process uevent
Udevd calls client 
puppy script to 
process uevents
Backend scripts read 
user-configuration file, 
management by the 
boot manager
Tell the kernel to 
replay unevents 
from /sys
Hotplug events 
kernel will create 
uevents
 
Figure 5.11: puppy _event backend functionary   
In figure 5.11 the green space outlines the files associated with pup_event_backend. 
/etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit is the first and main script that executes at bootup, and this starts /sbin/udevd 
which is a “daemon”, that is, a program that once started will run continuously in the background. 
This daemon receives information about the computer hardware. At bootup this information is 
generated by the rc.sysinit script, and later on by “hotplug” events (104). The udevd daemon 
receives information called uevents from the kernel, about hardware as it is discovered. The 
daemon processes these uevents and that may result in modules getting loaded. This processing is 
named “pup_event_backend_modprobe, pup_event_backend_firmware” (105). The sequence of 
events is that when udev receives a uevent from the kernel, it looks at its rules in /etc/udev/rules.d 
directory to find out if there are any special handling instructions for that uevent. If the uevent is 
of the type that is going to require a module to be loaded, then the rules tell udevd to execute the 
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puppy script pup_event_backend_modprobe; it is pup_event_backend_modprobe installing the 
firmware (104).  
5.6.5 Pup_event 
This picture gives an overview of how pup_event_backend and pup_event_fontend work together 
 kernel     pup_event _ backend
         Detects and respond
        to any hotplug event,
       including these:
Block device  added
Block device removed
Load module request
Firmware request
  Pup _event _ frontend
Create desktop icon,
maybe kill or refresh
pmount drive app
Remove icon from
desktop, maybe kill
or refresh pmount
Idle time:
Monitor free memory
update free-memory
applet in try, warn if 
memory low
 save tmfs to flash
save working RAM
uevents
Load firmware that 
matches new 
hardware
Load firmware that 
matches new 
module
Message
 
Figure 5.12 link between bank –end and front-end in Puppy Linux 
From figure 5.12 declare an overview of pup_event_backend and pup_event_fontend, generally 
the Linux kernel is aware of certain hardware events, such as plugging in or removing a USB 
drive. This is called “hotplugging”. The kernel sends a ‘uevent’ message to pup_event_backend 
that a hotplug event has occurred, and the script responds according to the message. 
Pup_event_frontend is essentially a signal script, /sbin/pup_event_fronend_d, which is a daemon 
that starts when X starts and quits when X quits; the backend sends messages to the frontend 
when anything happens that the user should know about. For example, with pup in a USB pen 
drive, a pen-drive-icon appears on the desktop—it is this latter option that is performed by the 
frontend. 
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Figure 5.13: puppy display 
In figure 5.13 Puppy has a display in those trays that shows how much memory is available for 
use. This will start to flash when it gets low. A warning message will also appear at the top of the 
screen when free memory gets very low. When puppy has booted off a flash drive, puppy works 
as much as possible in RAM only, saving to the flash drive periodically. This is done to conserve 
the life of the flash drive. 
Web Site Loading Time in Milliseconds 
Windows 995.00 
Ubuntu 809.00 
Puppy Linux 601.00 
 
  Table 5.2: Web Site Loading Time in Milliseconds 
As mention above and show in table 5.2 the time counts in millisecond to know how the system is 
fast and to countermeasure the performance. 
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Figure 5.14: loading time in Milliseconds 
In figure 5.14 can show the loading time for three must common operating system and from this 
figure can recognize that puppy Linux is the faster one loading process.   
5.6.6 Slacko 
Slacko puppy variant derived from puppy as shown below is built from Slackware-14.0 binary 
TXZ packages, hence has binary compatibility with Slackware and access to the Slackware, Slaix 
and Slacky package repositories. Slacko figure 5.15 is the first puppy built from the Woof –CE 
build system, forked from Barry Kauler’sWoof after he announced his retirement from puppy 
development. It is the natural progression of Slacko 5.6 with the added features introduced by 
Woof-CE.  
 
Figure 5.15: puppy Slack view 
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Slacko is a series of puppy releases (5.3 + with the code name Slacko) that uses the latest puppy 
Woof to build code, programs and scripts. It has high slackware binary software packages 
compatibility.  
5.6.7 Puppy security  
Puppy Linux is the only known Linux which allows the frequent browser security updates to be 
burned to new sessions on the existing boot. Linux security modules (LSM) are run to provide a 
general kernel framework to support security modules. The LSM framework adds security fields 
to kernel data structure and inserts calls to hook functions at critical points in the code to manage 
the security field and to perform access control. Extended attribute handlers for new security 
namespace were added to the filesystem to support new file security attributes, and a/ proc/pid/attr 
subdirectory was introduced to provide user space access to new process security attributes (133).  
Figure 5.16 shows the progress success sequence to install puppy linux.  
 
Figure 5.16:  puppy Linux installs new process security attributes.    
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For process and program execution security information, security fields are added to 
structtask_struct and structlinux_binprm. For filesystem security information, a security field is 
added to structsuper_block. UNIX domain sockets may also use a security field added to the 
struct sock. Each LSM hook is a function pointer in a global table, security_ops. This table is a 
security _ operations structure defined by including /Linux/ security.h. The hooks are grouped 
into logical sets based on the kernel object (e.g. task, node, file, etc) as well as miscellaneous 
hooks for system operation. LSM also provides a mechanism for stacking additional security 
modules with the primary security module. I define register_security and unregister_ security 
hooks in the security _ operation structure and provides mod _ reg _ security and mod _ unreg _ 
security functions that invoke these hooks after performing sanity checking. A security module 
can call all these functions in order to stack with other modules. However, in this manner, LSM 
defers the problem of composition to the module. Although the LSM hooks are organized based 
on kernel object, all of the hooks can be viewed as falling into two major categories: 
 Hooks that are used to manage the security fields  
 Hooks that are used to perform access control.  
For design, the first category of hooks includes the appliance_security and free_ security hooks 
defined for each kernel data structure that contain a security field. These hooks are used to 
allocate and free the security structure for kernel objects. The first category of hooks also includes 
hooks that set information in the security field after allocation, such as the d _ instantiate hook. I 
set security information for inodes, e.g. by calling getxattr to obtain an attribute value, when all 
the necessary object information is available. Hence the second category of hooks is the inode _ 
permission hook used to check permission for accessing control.  
5.7 The Storage Domain 
The sophisticated mechanisms of filesystem require complex code on the backend side. Having 
such a code would increase the attack surface on the application system. To mitigate this risk, 
the filesystem code is moved to a dedicated un- privileged storage domain. The storage domain 
has direct access to the disk tamper proof, as the network domain has access to the networking 
hardware. Additionally, the storage domain has access to USB tamper proofs to allow it to 
handle all the re- movable storage devices, such as USB flash drivers as show in figure 5.17. 
This also allows mitigating attacks originating from removable devices, e.g. a specially 
formatted USB drive that tries to exploit a potential bug in the USB driver. 
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Figure 5.17: USB drive that tries to exploit a potential bug in the USB driver 
The biggest challenge with storage domain is how to make its security non-critical. In our 
puppy architecture we solve this problem by using cryptography to protect the filesystem, so 
that the storage domain cannot read confidential data, or modify (in a meaningful way) the 
shared root filesystem. Additionally we make use of Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) 
in order to prevent modification of the system boot code.  This means that the storage domain, 
if compromised by the attacker, can, in the worst-case, make the system unbootable but cannot 
compromise this system, e.g. by installing  back doors or rootkits and steal the user data. 
5.7.1 The GUI/administrative domain  
The GUI domain is the direct access to the graphics device, as well as input devices, such as 
keyboard and mouse. The GUI domain displays the user desktop, and the Windows Manager 
that allows the starting and stopping of the applications and manipulating their windows. The 
most common application that runs in the GUI domain is the Application Viewer, a little stub 
Chapter 5. Authentication concept model 
 
 
 114 
application that is used to launch and then display the content of the actual banking application 
interface.  
The GUI domain is security critical, because if one controls this domain, one can mimic any 
action that the legitimate user could also perform, including starting and operating the 
applications. 
Because the GUI domain is security-sensitive, there is no facing code running in this domain, 
e.g. there is no networking code in the GUI domain. Also, it has a very simple and slim 
interface used to communicate with the banking application system to minimize the possibility 
of an attack originating from the web. 
5.8 Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) Support 
Every modern operating system contains support for power management – this includes putting 
and resuming the system to and from various sleep states, e.g. the CPU frequency, or various fan 
speeds, in order to maintain proper power consumption and to prevent over-heating of the 
system. 
We implement Enhanced ACPI standard for the power management interface on the tamper 
proof device platform. However, ACPI, due to its complexity and design, might also cause 
potential security problems for the platform. 
Particularly dangerous is the ACPIʼs interpreted language, ACPI Machine Language, or AML, 
that is used to describe how certain power-management operations should be accomplished by 
the underlying OS. 
This was demonstrated first by John Heasman, and later by Loic Duflarge amount. Malware that 
is capable of re- flashing the BIOS, or gaining control early in the boot process, e.g. as a result of 
MBR infection, can replace the original ACPI tables in memory with malicious ones, so that 
when later the OS will be interpreting (executing) the AML methods, the attacker’s code will 
compromise the OS. 
Such an attack could thus theoretically be used by an attacker who gained control over the 
storage domain. The attacker could then modify the boot loader, e.g. the MBR or GRUB, so that 
the codes modify the ACPI tables that are later passed on to the kernel. Puppy does not interpret 
ACPI AML methods. 
5.8.1 Preventing ACPI abusing attacks 
Even though the attacker would need to first gain control over the storage domain in order to 
proceed with this attack, in puppy architecture we would like to assume that the storage domain 
compromise is security non-critical, so it is important to consider my workarounds to prevent this 
attack. 
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1. Disable ACPI processing. This is the most straightforward solution, but might not be suitable 
for most users, especially for laptop users. After all power management is an important feature 
of modern platforms. 
2.   The second option is verifying ACPI methods. Theoretically it might be possible to 
somehow verify if the particular ACPI method is not malicious before executing it  e.g. if it 
only accesses the power-management related I/O registers.  
3. My third option I measure ACPI methods as part of the TXT launch. The TXT loader (e.g. 
tboot.gz) can be modified so that it first copies the platform ACPI tables on to the TXT heap 16, 
and later measures them (with the results placed in e.g. PCR18 register). This would prevent 
any modifications of the ACPI tables after the system’s initial installation. However, as pointed 
out by Loic Duflarge amount, effective measuring of ACPI tables might be non-trivial, because 
of their highly nested nature (one table pointed out by a pointer in another table, etc). 
4. Eventually provide good known ACPI tables. Instead of measuring the ACPI tables, we 
might copy the original ACPI tables (that we observed during the installation of the system, 
again we assume the system is not- compromised at this stage), and then use this “known good 
copy” of the ACPI table on each system boot. This would require slight modifications to the 
kernel, but seems rather straightforward. 
5.9 Network Policy Enforcement 
5.9.1 Rationale for per- network policy enforcement 
Our Application as signed for internet banking allowed only HTTPS connections to the client’s 
banking web server. The network policy enforcement is in fact essential, as it is designed to 
protect against accidental mistakes by the user. Hence our application also protects against other 
applications that would like to make internet connections without getting clear user consent.  
 Obviously technical behaviour can easily break any security policy that the user would like to 
implement with the help of puppy OS.  
Such an attack would clearly never be possible if the system properly enforced the network 
policy and did not allow the help browser to initiate this unsecure connection. 
5.10. Analysis of Potential Attack Vectors 
There is no such thing as a 100% secure OS, at least on x86 COTS hardware. The software and 
hardware is simply too complex to analyse for all potential errors in the case of x86 platforms.  
We can divide potential attacks on puppy OS into two groups: 
1.  one-stage attacks that require the attacker to find only one bug and exploit it in order to 
compromise the system. 
2.  two-(or more)-stage attacks, where the attacker would have to chain two different exploits 
targeting two different bugs, in two different system components; for example, one exploit to 
Chapter 5. Authentication concept model 
 
 
 116 
“get to” the storage domain, and another attack to compromise Dom0 out of the storage 
domain. 
It should be intuitively obvious that the likelihood of a 2-stage attack is significantly smaller than 
the probability of a successful1-stage attack; nevertheless, we include them in the attack surface 
analysis as well. 
5.10.1 Potential Bugs in the Kernel 
The kernel is the most privileged element of the system. Any attack (e.g. exploiting a buffer 
overflow) allows full compromising of the system. We expect the kernel code footprint to be 
between 50,000-200,000 LOC. 
Potential bugs in the Store Daemon  
Potential compromise can be fatal, as the attacker can later gain full control over Dom. It should 
be determined if Store Daemon can be run under a restricted user account, rather than using the 
root account, which might provide a minor level of additional security. 
 
Potential bugs in the GUI Daemon  
Potential CPU bugs 
Modern processors are one of the most complex creations made by humans. It is hard not to think 
that there might be a bug in a CPU that could e.g. allow for unauthorized ring3 to ring0 privilege 
escalation. Interestingly, no such bugs have ever been publicly disclosed. The closest we can 
think of here would be the SMM caching attack. 
One should, however, note that a CPU bug would not only be fatal to puppy OS—it would be 
fatal also to any PC-based OS; there is not much we can do about potential CPU bugs, besides 
hoping that the CPU vendor did its job well. It is not possible to “audit” the CPU, for obvious 
reasons. 
5.10.2 Additional Potential Vectors from Driver Domains (2-stage attacks) 
All the theoretical attacks considered are 2-stage attacks, which means the following attacks 
require two different exploitable bugs, in two different system components, at the same time, in 
order to succeed. 
5.10.3 Potential TXT Bypass 
If the attacker was able to initiate an arbitrary DMA transaction by programing advice assigned to 
one of the driver domains (e.g. the network card), the attacker would be able to compromise the 
system. Puppy architecture relies on Intel TXT to prevent devices assigned to driver domains 
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from performing DMA to memory not belonging to their domain. An attacker that could bypass 
Intel TXT technology, e.g. by compromising the Memory Tamper proof Hub, could compromise 
the system. 
So far, no attack against Intel TXT has been publicly presented. We anticipate such an attack 
would be very non trivial to come up with. Also one should note that in order to use it against 
puppy OS, the attacker would first need to compromise one of the driver domains, by exploiting 
a bug in the software running there (e.g. a bug in the network driver, or network backend, or disk 
backend). 
5.10.4 Driver Domain to MBR Attacks 
An attacker that controls one of the driver domains can theoretically find a way to re-flash the 
firmware in the device being assigned to the domain, e.g. the network card. The attacker can then 
attempt to program the device in such a way that it waits for the system reboot and then, using a 
malicious DMA, infects the system boot loader or MBR.  This, of course, is not enough to 
subvert the system, as puppy uses a secure boot process implemented with the help of Intel TXT. 
Nevertheless, the attacker can now attempt to perform most of the attacks that are otherwise 
attributed below to storage domain only (except for the attacks on VM storage frontends, 
possible only from the storage domain). 
5.10.5 Potential Delayed DMA Attack on Dom (attack mostly from storage domain) 
If the attacker controls the storage domain, he or she can infect the MBR or boot loader. The 
infected boot loader can, in turn access the graphics card or the audio card device (because early 
in the boot, before executing SENTER, there is no TXT protection in place), and program it in 
such a way (perhaps by re-flashing its firmware) that it will wait until Dom starts and then 
perform a malicious DMA attack that e.g. installs a backdoor in Dom. 
Such an attack would work because the devices assigned to Dom, i.e. the graphics card and the 
audio card, are allowed DMA access to the whole Dom memory. 
In order to prevent such hypothetical attacks, the kernel allows domains (via an additional hyper- 
call) to set additional per-TXT protection. Obviously, the hypervisor should make sure that the 
domain can only set more restrictive TXT protection, rather than the other way round. 
5.10.6 Potential TXT Bypasses (attack mostly from storage domain) 
Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) allows an unprivileged security non-critical storage 
domain. If the attacker was able to bypass Intel TXT, the attacker, if already compromising the 
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storage domain, could compromise the whole system e.g. by modifying the hypervisor or Dom0 
image on disk and rebooting the system. 
So far two attacks on Intel TXT have been publicly disclosed. Incidentally, both of the attacks 
have been discovered (31).  
System hypervisor and Dom0 kernel process several BIOS-provided inputs during boot. These 
include e.g. the BIOS e820 memory map, as well as the BIOS-provided ACPI tables. All the 
BIOS-provided input should be treated as untrusted and handled with great care. One example of 
an attack exploiting this vector is executed by Dom0 kernel as part of power management 
activities. The attacker can subvert the original ACPI tables and provide malicious AML 
methods for Dom0 to execute, which can lead to Dom0 compromise. 
More subtle scenarios include exploiting potential input processing errors in the Dom kernel, e.g. 
buffer overflows resulting in the BIOS-provided data being intentionally misformatted (e.g. too 
long fields in the e820 map). 
All the kernel codes that process BIOS-provided input should be thoroughly reviewed. 
All those attacks assume that the attacker is controlling the execution early in the boot process. 
This can be a result of the attacker gaining control over the storage domain earlier. To solve this 
problem the behaviour of memory consumption should be carefully monitored.  
 
Potential encryption scheme bypass (attack from storage domain) 
For the storage domain to be security non-critical it is important to trust the crypto scheme used 
for private block device encryption and that the shared root filesystem signalling it is correctly 
implemented. Otherwise, the attacker who gained control over the storage domain could either 
steal the private data or inject malicious code. 
 
Potential attacks on storage front ends (attack from the storage domain) 
An attacker that controls the storage domain might attempt to exploit hypothetical bugs in the 
block frontends that communicate with the block backend hosted in the storage domain. 
The block frontend drivers are very simple and thus the likelihood of a potential bug there is 
rather small. 
Potential attacks on networking code (attack from the network domain) 
An attacker that controls the network domain might attempt to exploit hypothetical bugs in the 
network frontends, or their regular TCP/IP stack. The network frontends are very simple and thus 
the likelihood of a bug there is rather small. The regular TCP/IP stack (in contrast to e.g. Wi-Fi 
stack or Wi-Fi driver) is usually a very well tested code, and thus it should be hard to find and 
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successfully exploit a bug in this stack (although more likely than a bug in the frontend). The 
solution is relying upon encryption and secure channel.  
Resistance to attacks from the (local) network 
Because all the world-facing networking code executes in the unprivileged network domain, 
there is no direct attack surface from the local network on the system. 
There is, however, a possibility, that the attacker, who has already compromised the network 
domain, e.g. by exploiting a bug in the Wi-Fi driver, can now try to exploit (another) bug in the 
networking stack of the application. That would however require a 2-stage attack. The solution is 
relying upon encryption and a secure channel.  
5.10.7 Resistance to Physical Attacks 
Below we analyze the low-cost physical attacks that could be performed in a matter of minutes 
against a lap- top left e.g. in a conference or hotel room, and how puppy OS can resist them. 
Resistance to keystroke sniffing attacks (e.g. hidden camera) 
Puppy OS can also resist simple key sniffing attacks that are targeted toward capturing the 
passphrase used to boot the system. This can be achieved by the already mentioned trusted boot 
process that uses a smartcard to obtain the user secret, rather than the keyboard. 
Relying on OTP passwords to avoid keystroke sniffing attacks can be tricky. We can imagine a 
naive implementation, where the disk master encryption key is re-encrypted with the next OTP 
password after each successful login. Thus, in order to unlock the system, the attacker must enter 
the next OTP password from the list, and the previous OTP password(s) would not allow 
decrypting of the filesystem. 
The solution depends on the use of a remote server that would unlock the master encryption 
password and that would take care to increment the OTP password’s counter.  
Resistance to DMA attacks (e.g. malicious PCMCIA) 
Due to the extensive use of puppy, the OS should be resistant to many runtime DMA attacks, e.g. 
when the attacker inserts a specially crafted PC Card (also known as PCMCIA) that is supposed 
to use DMA in order to compromise e.g. Dom and unlock the computer, or just steal some 
secrets from the memory. 
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5.11 Summary  
The focus of this chapter was to present and discuss in detail 1) Banking security tamper proof 
communication sequence during access control.2) Decision making process when client tries to 
access their account. 3) Operating system used in this proposal.  
I have reviewed existing authentication management models with support for hierarchical 
implementation and identified classic password factor as used in online banking for 
authentication. I have presented and discussed in detail the proposed authentication scheme for 
online banking that employs the implementation option of secure transaction sharing. The 
implemented STS were designed with security mechanisms for hop-by-hop authentication and 
integrity as well as end-to-end confidentiality. For comparative analysis, a protocol that combines 
homomorphic cryptography and proxy re-authenticate that is fully asymmetric cryptography 
based were considered. These protocols were modified, modelled and implemented for transaction 
over a cloud environment. The performance of the proposed scheme and the reference schemes 
were evaluated in a simulation environment using the Network Miner and Foglight software 
framework. Considered performance metrics were contact, communication exchanges, 
cryptographic operations, end-to-end delay and disruption with the proposed scheme having a 
better performance.  
In addition to the proposed scheme having better communication efficiency and less 
computational on individual network entities, I was able to establish the independence security 
tamper proof designed in a way that uses a number of data fields to store inside the application 
database.  
I have also illustrated using puppy OS in our scheme to provide seamless integration of the 
banking application hosted in USB, so that it is easy for the non-technical user to work with the 
application. I simulate a near- native performance, especially for displaying banking applications 
that use rich graphics and multimedia, like web browsers.  
The chapter investigated the designs of the operating system that depend upon puppy Linux with 
added security fields structtask_struct and structlinux_binprm. Filesystem security information 
was discussed in detail in this chapter, and a security field added to structsuper_block. UNIX 
domain sockets.  
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Chapter 6 Cloud model and tamper Proof experiment result 
  
This chapter will try to describe and discuss the cloud computing architecture and how the 
authentication is being used by a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) and different entities. Conversely 
the legal implications of the data and application authentication being verified by a third party are 
complex and not well understood [88]. Assume there is a potential lack of control and 
transparency when a CSP holds the data. However my resulting security concerns due diligence, 
audit ability, contractual obligations, cloud provider espionage, data lock-in, and the transitive 
nature of the data control. My scheme in general depends on trusted computing and applied 
cryptographic techniques [91]. 
The previous chapter discussed security from the general network perspective, security issues of 
the online bank as well as access control and its implementation in different environments. 
Security modelling and testing is defined as the process of ensuring that the proposed security 
solution meets defined specification in addition to realizing its intended purpose with minimal 
effect.  Security modelling and testing is associated with verification (compliance of the proposed 
solution with the initial specification), validation (correctness of the overall output of the 
proposed solution) and evaluation (ascertaining the effect of the proposed solution on the system).  
The focus of this chapter is to: (1) Review the cloud modelling and testing approaches of our 
servers and formal verification; (2) Justify the preference of this work for the real server based 
approach; (3) Establish connection between cloud providers and client and (4) Discuss the models 
framework development process. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.1 carries out a 
cloud computing definition 6.2 general Security issues related to the cloud and in this section our 
data security issues are reviewed and analysis incoming and out comming network session 
established. Section 6.3 3 proposes schemes and data security issues and introduces my testbed 
simulation programming environment/language and access control to path encrypted data over the 
cloud provider. Section 6.4 presents and describes cloud computing as third parties. Section 6.5 
represents the Test bed connectivity link between cloud provider and the bank. Section 6.6 
discusses the relation between bank and cloud provider.  While 6.7 discusses tamper proof 
security overview and the experiment results. Section 6.8 scalabity issues Section 6.9 makes an 
overview test analysis and result against the attacks mentioned in chapter three and the summary 
is section 6.10. 
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6.1 Cloud Scheme to Communicate with the Bank  
Generally, this experiment used Private Cloud to communicate between the bank and cloud 
provider, hence the cloud infrastructure is operated solely for the bank and managed by the bank. 
It will be secure by the bank security policy and equipment.  
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
                         A                                                                    B 
Figure 6.1: cloud bank infrastructure  
 
From figure 6.1 there are two portions, the first one a link between the cloud provider and the 
bank, the second one is a B link bank client with cloud provider. 
 
The communication between the bank client and the cloud go through a public cloud and is 
secured by many security parameters used like SSL client, fingerprint authentication factor and 
session key.  
  The cloud is used to transfer data from client to the bank [2, 8 and 26]; well-established 
cryptographic algorithms allow a cloud storage consumer to encrypt the data prior to insertion in 
the cloud, and decrypt it after moving it back to the bank or client.  It should be noted, however, 
that such general purpose cryptographic algorithms are not effective if the data is intended for use 
within the cloud.  Of course, merely encrypting the data does not mean that information cannot be 
inferred from careful observation of the data stream, or of the storage devices under the cloud 
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provider’s control.  In some cases it may be possible for a computational engine (such as a virtual 
machine in a cloud environment) to get information, for that reason operations can be performed 
entirely on encrypted data, producing results without exposing the homomorphic encryption. 
Input data or the result in plaintext form using schemes known as  
6.2 General Security Test and Result  
This section investigates efficient methods for handling user access rights, revoking, hence rights 
efficiently, and issuing either the same or different access rights to a returning user through cloud 
provider. It addresses the issues of security from a “curious” cloud, collusion among users, and 
collusion between a user and the Cloud Service Provider. Given the nature of cloud computing, 
there are a number of new security risks as well as the same traditional risks [36, 54, 56. 59, 79, 
and 81].  
6.2.1 Simulations and Performance Evaluation 
Using the Network Miner to parse libpcap files to do a live packet capture of the network 
traffic between cloud provider and the client is shown in the capture photo below  
 
Figure 6.2: packet capture of the network traffic between cloud provider and the client  
From the figure 6.2 we can see that 42 packets sent (15,278 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 
Bytes) 
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192.168.1.199 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.197 (Windows) : 18 packets (3,190 Bytes), 0.00 
% cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 2639 -> 8063 : 12 packets (2,309 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 2647 -> 8063 : 4 packets (172 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 8055 -> 7003 : 2 packets (709 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.199 (Windows) : 14 packets (11,420 Bytes), 0.00 
% cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 2641 -> 8067 : 4 packets (776 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 8067 -> 2641 : 10 packets (10,644 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
From the screenshot above we can recognize that there are 42 packets of data sent and all these 
packets are completely encrypted as the clear text is 0%.  
The analyzing of Public Server link between cloud provider and client can be explained as 
follows: 
 IP: 192.168.1.197 
 MAC: Unknown 
 Hostname: N/A 
 6.2.2 Simulation Setup 
OS: Windows 
TTL: 128 (distance: 31) 
Open TCP Ports: 8063 
TCP 7003 - Entropy (in \ out): 69.20 \ 69.01 Typical data (in \ out): HTTP/1.1 
000 Cootaeeee/ 
ontrol:  \ tose /testaoot te/seeoeotioe/ se 
Sent: 20 packets (16,529 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.197 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.199 (Windows) : 19 packets (16,419 Bytes), 
0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 8063 -> 2639 : 13 packets (15,432 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 8063 -> 2647 : 3 packets (132 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
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TCP: 7003 -> 8055 : 3 packets (855 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.197 (Windows) -> 255.255.255.255 : 1 packets (110 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext 
(0 of 0 Bytes) 
UDP: 50414 -> 1211 : 1 packets (110 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
Received: 18 packets (3,190 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.197 (Windows) : 18 packets (3,190 Bytes), 0.00 
% cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
 TCP: 2639 -> 8063 : 12 packets (2,309 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
 TCP: 2647 -> 8063 : 4 packets (172 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
 TCP: 8055 -> 7003 : 2 packets (709 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
As we can see from the analyses of port: 8063, the port opens with TCP protocol and the port sent 
20 packets = 16.529 with 0.00% clear text. Also they received 18 packets = 3.190 bytes with 
0.00% clear text 
As can show from capture above there are 10 packets send from IP: 192.168.1.197 which carries 
16,529 Bytes but the actual size packet received to 192.168.1.199 (bank side) is 3,190 Bytes 
which is mean that the cloud provider operate with of 13,339 bytes and sends the rest to the bank.  
 
Incoming sessions: 2 
 Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 7003  
Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 7003 (735 data bytes sent), Client: 192.168.1.199 
(Windows) TCP 8055 (629 data bytes sent), Session start: 10/21/2014 3:00:46 PM, Session end: 
10/21/2014 3:00:46 PM 
 Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 7003 
Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 8063 (0 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2647 (0 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:39 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:44 PM 
Outgoing sessions: 1 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2639 
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Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2639 (1829 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 8063 (14900 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:36 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:46 PM 
 
6.2.3 Simulation Result: 
Device 
from 
TCP Decide 
to 
TCP Session 
start 
Session end Session 
time 
Byte encrypt Without 
encryption 
B/C Proposal 
scheme 
packet 
Public 
Sever 
8063 Private 2639 10/21/2
014 
3:00:36 
pm 
10/21/2014 
3:00:46 pm 
10 1490
0 
10 7 4 14900 
private 8063 bank 1647 10/21/2
014 
3:00:39 
pm 
10/21/2014 
3:00:44 pm 
5 629 5 5 5 629 
bank 8067 public 1241 10/21/2
014 
3:00:36 
pm 
10/21/2014 
3:00:47 pm 
11 1022
0 
11 11 3 10220 
 
encrypt: Network encrypted traffic from the current analysis 
Without Encryption Network traffic without encryption 
B/C Direct Network traffic from client to Internet Banking Server 
                             Table 6.1: simulation result  
Table 6.1 show the three server communication: public server which placed at cloud provider 
datacentre and link the client to the bank through cloud server, private one which place in cloud 
provider datacentre and link cloud provider with the bank datacentre through lease line dedicate 
for bank services only, bank server link between client and the bank directly without any 
interfering from cloud provider. The table show the port in used and the session started/ end time 
by millisecond and the byte size of each packet this packet encrypted by homographic encryption 
algorithm and in other case not used homomorphic algorithm. And the result of this table can be 
represent in figure 6.3 and 3.4. 
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Time Comparison 
 
Figure 6.3: time comparison/MS                                            
Table key: 
Proposed scheme: means full encryption traffic from bank to client goes through cloud provider 
Without Encryption: traffic from bank to client goes through cloud provider but without 
Homomorphic cryptography feature 
Direct: from the bank to client without interference from cloud provider 
 
From figure 6.3 above, can display the time comparison between three different entities, public to 
private means network link between bank client and cloud provider, private to bank means 
network link between cloud provider and the bank, bank to public means network link between 
client bank and the bank.   Time consumption to link bank to client through proposed scheme is 
less than 10 MS  while time need to link cloud to the bank when using proposed scheme is 4 MS 
and the communication between bank client and the bank via proposed scheme is less than 12 
MS; the chart declares that the highest time is above 10 MSc at the link between bank and client 
when using the proposed scheme while the same link  if not used proposed scheme take 7 MSc 
and that is indicate there is slight different in time although there is huge benefit when used 
proposed scheme because the data is encrypt.  
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Bytes Comparison 
 
Figure 6.4: bytes comparison  
From figure 6.4 the bytes comparison can be observed and when tracing the proposal scheme 
packet can observed the number of byt in a public to private is 14900 bytes while 629 /b between 
private and the bank and in the link between bank and the public 1022 bytes.  
6.3 Proposed Schemes and Data Security Issues.  
Data Security presents a number of general issues as well as issues specific to data in the cloud. 
Some proposed schemes rely upon the published SLA of the provider [46, 48]. My scheme test 
bed of data security depends on trust enforcement phase (discussed later in section 6.6), facilitated 
using trust information (shared key(s) is in the next data outsource section, to obtain the secure 
session.   
6.3.1 Access Control to Encrypted Data in the Cloud. 
 Our approach relies heavily upon encrypted data in the cloud. This approach has been studied in 
a number of different models [20, 73, and 87]. My models use encrypted data in the cloud to 
protecting the data from the cloud itself. The problem with encrypted data in the cloud is the 
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probability of limitations placed upon data searches [70, 72]. Our solution is to fix this problem 
and to access control to make couple access control with re-encryption and guard data from the 
cloud for unauthorized access without influencing the utilisation or performance of the 
application. Figure 6.5 represents IP access to cloud provider server simultaneously. Bank 
interface represents 16.44% of the server capacity in the time diagram capture, cloud provider 
interface linking bank client to the cloud provider represents 13.27% and the bank DB link to the 
cloud server to the bank server represents 22.73%. From this diagram there is a limit to the server 
queue to hand each IP packet without impacting on the performance. 
  
Figure 6.5: top IP host 
 Netwalk tools in our system function to represent the percentage of IP usage for communicating 
the client to the bank using puppy Linux through cloud provider.  
From the diagram in figure 6.6, although access control and re-encryption are applied still the 
cloud provider to client interface (public) percentage is 13.27% with carry of 2.725 packets 
representing 543.63 KB and this volume is less than the performance of the transaction.   
6.3.2 Data Outsourcing – 
This section presents the proposed authentication scheme as well as compares schemes in a real 
server environment using contact, communication exchanges, cryptographic operations, end-to-
end authentication and disruption as metrics. The primary aim of this study is to: (1) Investigate if 
the proposed scheme meets the set objectives, depending on server availability as well as placing 
no load on the server during post trust establishment network communication; (2) Establish the 
Chapter 6. Cloud model  & Tamper proof security overview and experiments result  
 
 
 
 
 130 
comparative advantage of the proposed scheme over the reference existing schemes.  Common to 
the proposed and the reference schemes is the sender’s contact with the STS framework to obtain 
authentication share key used to encrypt/decrypt the message which is assumed to take place prior 
to the process of forwarding the message to the destination [40,62,65].  
6.4 Cloud Computing as Third Parties (enforcement phase):  
This section discusses Entities that can create an established trusted party among themselves. A 
trusted party can solve many problems concerning security services and key exchange. 
 A solution is to use a trusted cloud provider, and conceder as a key-distribution center (KDC) and 
transit point. A secret private link communicates the cloud provider with the bank. 
 A secret key is established between the KDC and each client with an SSL client authentication 
session. Any client has a secret key with the KDC, referred to as K client account + tamper proof id. The 
bank has a secret key with the KDC, referred to as K Bank, The process for the client to establish a 
connection is as follows: 
1- Client sends a request to the cloud (KDC) stating the need for a session secret key 
between client and the bank  
2- The KDC informs the bank about the client request after checking tamper proof ID and 
session key between them. 
3- If bank agrees a session key is created between the two. 
The secret key between client and the bank established with KDS is used to authenticate the client 
to the bank and to prevent any eavesdropping.   
Cloud provider creates a session key KCB between the client and bank by the following steps:  
1- Client sends a message to the cloud provider (KDC) to obtain a symmetric session key. 
The message contains client account, tamper proof ID, user identity and client fingerprint. 
2- The KDC receives the message and creates what is called a ticket (ssl session key). 
3- The cloud provider (KDC) verifies the tamper proof ID is correct first then sends a client 
request to the bank  
4- The bank sends a challenge to the client (RB) and one time password, encrypted with the 
session key to KDC 
5-  KDC sends an encrypted message to the client that includes client and bank information 
and session key and encrypted ticket for the bank. The whole message is encrypted with a 
client tamper proof ID key. 
6- Client sends the bank’s ticket (session key) to the bank  
7- Client responds to the bank’s challenge, Note that the response carries RB-1 instead of RB 
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Figure 6.6: network traffic between cloud provider and client  
Figure 6.8 used wireshark to gives an overview of all traffic inbound or outbound from the bank 
to cloud provider and from this figure we can understand the huge number of IP passes to the 
cloud provider. In this figure used wireshark to let bank server analysis all the traffic inbound and 
outbound the bank web application to utilize the performance of rel. time and date time. 
6.4.1 Test Key Generation and Distribution  
This stage acts as an initialization step when the Bank generates two kinds of key pairs based on 
the additive homomorphic encryption as follows: 
First, the Bank creates a master key pair, (pka, pra). The Bank keeps the private key (pra) as their 
secret. 
Second, for each authorized account, the bank creates a public/private key pair (pkb, prb) and 
gives it to the client when initializing their account with a tamper proof device, In addition, the 
Bank’s public key pka and client’s public key pkb are treated as public and sent to the cloud 
provider.  
Furthermore, the Bank generates rkpka→pkb (cashing re-encryption key) for each authorized 
client tamper proof (which will be used during the Data Outsourcing Stage) using pra and pkb. 
In this proposal we deal with three entities which are bank side, client and cloud provider used as 
a middle body for out of band authentication processes and to update the banking system 
application at the client side. 
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 We have three different components; public cloud (cloud provider), private cloud (relation 
sbetween bank and cloud provider) and Internet Banking (the Bank). 
For security transactions, at first the client inserts a USB device (tamper proof); this device 
contains a bank application run on a different OS and completely run in an isolated environment 
on the client P.C. The USB is capable of running automatically and requires the client to enter his 
/her fingerprint, user name and password, pin number. 
When the client presses the button to confirm (after entering user name, password, pin and his/her 
fingerprint) these values pulse the unique tamper proof ID register, sent to the public cloud, and 
we check only tamper proof ID and password plus session key created between the cloud provider 
and client; if it matched then these four values are sent through the private cloud connection to the 
bank, In this step we checked all values and if they matched then the client can access their 
account. The bandwidth and the packet size can be light as shown from the snapshot taken from 
my real test bed scenario.  
6.4.2 Cashing Re-Encryption 
Cashing re-encryption (CRE) [76, 79] allows a semi-trusted intermediary to re-encrypt data for 
delivery to a specific user without requiring the data to be decrypted and re-encrypted with a trust 
certificate embedded on a cashing server to avoid any untrusted message. Furthermore, a key pair 
can be generated to allow the encrypted data to be delivered in a re-encrypted form such that the 
Client can decrypt the data while the cloud cannot.  
Definition1. Let x be the account owned by the Bank with public key pka. Without loss of 
generality, assume that T (the cloud provider) knows the cashing re-encryption key certificate 
denoted as rkpka→pkb, where pkb is the client’s public key. If the bank computes Epka(x) 
and hands it to T, then T re-encrypts it for the client: 
PRE.ReEnc (Epka(x), rkpka→pkb) →Epkb(x) (1) 
Where PRE. ReEnc is the cashing re-encryption function. After this, T sends the output Epkb(x) 
to the client who can decrypt it to retrieve x using his private key prb. 
The observation is that T can first operate on the encrypted data sent by the Bank, i.e., Epka(x), 
using additive homomorphic properties and apply the PRE certificate to the updated data.  
Therefore, the combination of additive homomorphic properties with the PRE certificate will 
benefit the data owners to shift the work load to T (i.e., the cloud that is computationally 
unbounded) and will provide a medium for T to operate on the encrypted data. 
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Device from % Session 
start 
Session end Session colour Byte 
Public Sever 
(Cloud – client ) 
25.20% 10/21/2014 
3:00:36 pm 
10/21/2014 
3:00:46 pm 
 14900 
Private 
(Cloud – Bank) 
20.55 10/21/2014 
3:00:39 pm 
  629 
Bank 
(Bank – Client) 
36.67% 10/21/2014 
3:00:36 pm 
10/21/2014 
3:00:47 pm 
 10220 
Puppy 
(Client –cloud ) 
12.42%    154 
Table 6.2: overall packet size distribute  
 
Figure 6.7:  Packet size distribution after applying the cashing re-encryption algorithm.  
From table 6.3 and figure 6.10 we can show the package percentage usage for each server and the 
capacity size consumed for the request coming from the client represented by puppy through 
public server (cloud –client) then to bank from cloud via private (cloud -bank), and finally the 
connection between bank and client. 
6.5 Testbed Connectivity Link Between Cloud Provider and the Bank   
The result of my test bed is as follows:  
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2641 
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Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2641 (615 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 8067 (10220 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:36 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:47 PM 
 
Figure 6.8: snap shot from client PC 
From this result in figure 6.8 we can say data outsourcing is proof of this formula and the 
functionality is accurate.   
Data Access- Consider account1, who sends a data request to the cloud. Upon receiving the data 
request from account1, the cloud first checks whether account1 is authorized to access any of the 
data records. For simplicity, we consider the case of a single data record. 
Algorithm1Data_sharing key (d,S) 
Require: The Bank wishes to share data record d=d1, . . . ,dn (Note: The master private key pra 
is known only to the Bank; prb is known to both bank and client; pka and pkb are public) 
{Steps1-13 performed by the Bank} 
1- Pick sn+m random numbers r1, . . . ,rn+m(ri∈ZN,for 1≤i≤n+m) 
2- Generate d=d1+r1, . . . , dn +rn , rn+1, …., rn + m ) 
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3- Epka(d)←Epka(d1), . . . ,Epka(dn+m) 
4- if S = ∅ then 
5- for i:=1ton+mdo 
6- Compute Epkb(αi) 
7- End for 
8- Epkb(α)←Epkb(α1), . . . ,Epkb(αn+m) 
9- Tbd={Client,rkpka→pk,Epkb(α)} 
10- AddTdtoTd 
11- Else 
12- T d = null 
13- End if  
Algorithm2 Data_Access(d) 
Require: the client sends a data request to the cloud (Note: The private key prb is only known 
to bank and client.) 
{Steps1-10performed by the cloud} 
1- Receive data request from client 
2- If No entry for client in Tdthen 
3- Abort 
4- Else 
5- For i:=1to n+m do 
6- Epkb(di)←PRE.ReEnc(Epka(di),rkpka→pkb) 
7- Epkb(di+αi)←Epkb(di)+hEpkb(αi) mod N
2
 
8- End for 
9- Sends E    (d+α) to Client,for1≤i≤n+m 
10- End if 
{Steps11-14 performed by Client} 
11- if client is authorized to access d then 
12- Receive data from the cloud 
13- D’i   + αi← D     (Epkb(d’i    + αi )), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + m 
14- End if  
Chapter 6. Cloud model  & Tamper proof security overview and experiments result  
 
 
 
 
 136 
 However, similar steps can be used for all data records in the cloud. For a data record d, the cloud 
checks whether the client is authorized to access d by using the authorization tamper proof list Td 
associated with d (as discussed in Stage2). If there is no entry related to the client in Td, then the 
cloud simply aborts the client’s request. On the other hand, if there exists an entry for the client, 
i.e., Td, then the cloud proceeds as follows:  
Uses the cashing re-encryption key rkpk  →pk   in T d and converts  Epka (d )  to  Epkb (d’ )  by  
computing   Epkb (d’1)…., Epka (d’) by computing ( Epkb (d’1), …., Epkb (d’n+m)). 
Computes Epkb(di+αi)←Epkb(di)+h Epkb(αi)modN 2 , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + m.  Where 
+h is the additive homomorphic property and N is the group size which is also part of pkb  i.e., the 
public key of the client. 
Sends Epkb(d1 +α1), . . . ,Epkb(dn+m+αn+m) to the client. 
6.6 Relation Between Bank and Cloud Provider  
6.6.1 Enterprise Architectures:  
 Focusing on the technological components of enterprise architecture [27, 47, 49, and 50], we 
have categorized them into three logical tiers: 
 Top Tier (Front-End) – Represents the technologies that support end-user interactions 
(data access, analysis, visualization, collaboration, input, personalization, etc) with 
information/data and other stakeholders. 
 Middle Tier – Represents the middleware utilities, services, and support components that 
optimize system interactions amongst all people and information. 
 Bottom Tier (Back-End) – Represents the core information architecture, system security, 
and access / identity management components to support a secure, efficient, and effective 
operation. 
Defining building blocks and outlining foundations is a critical first step to support coordination 
and comprehension. Particularly in the world of enterprise architectures, this process is critical to 
align stakeholders up front and to put development efforts into perspective. Whether it is boxes, 
lines, definitions, or discussions, sometimes a little language goes a long way. 
Financial institutions have developed different levels of maturity – functional, technology, 
operational as well as service delivery – across these components. Some of these components are 
already being delivered as a service from external service providers as shown in the figure below 
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Figure 6.9: financial institution architecture [4] 
In the figure 6.9 the generic financial architecture is shown and my focusing area in a red color.  
Financial institutions demonstrate significant maturity in terms of business architecture, process 
deployment, standard operating procedures to drive operations, technology adoption as well as 
service delivery. Financial institutions are forced to drive efficiency and agility results within the 
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organization; this has become imperative today with the after-effects of the economic impact as 
well as the mindset changes within the ecosystem.  
The reference architecture model for cloud computing as show in figure 6.10 might be changed to 
obtain what the financial sector is looking for.  
From my view, the Bank sector looking at Cloud based solutions with distinct expectations is like 
a Dynamic and flexible Technology model, highly optimized with virtualized Infrastructure 
leveraging the right hardware components and managing computing needs as a function of real 
time usage, redundancy and resiliency upfront, fully automated Service provision, shared Services 
delivered across trusted domains delivering Security of data, transaction & operations. 
Enabling integrated treatment of security across all the operating platforms enables businesses to 
deliver business applications to their customers and is associated with multiple devices around-
the-clock. 
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Figure 6.10: cloud architecture domain [49] 
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There is a clear relationship between cloud computing and federated Identity management 
(FIDM). This can be considered as a superset of all the corresponding issues from these 
paradigms and many more [88].  
6.6.2 The New Financial Cloud Reference Model 
All these architectures need a new model design. The design is formulated as a consequence of 
constrains that a financial institution must respect and the attributes that would give it an 
advantage over competitors in the market today. Some of these design principles are: 
1. The solutions must be based on novelty and flexibility. 
2. Cloud computing is a master component of the future system. 
3. Sensitive data must not be outsourced to third party providers. 
4. Access to the secure part of the website requires a combination of knowledge and control.  
5. The primary channels of Internet banking are the Internet and Call center, Smart phone 
and any new communication device cloud to appear later.  
 
The development base for a new IT strategy includes areas that could benefit from Cloud 
computing. These have been identified based on their use of sensitive information that could not 
be outsourced and are depicted in the Strategy Scope. 
 
The reference architecture is designed according to the target operating model requirements. 
Consequently, they are represented within different structures of the architecture. Also while 
designing this reference architecture non-core domains have been outsourced and flexibility has 
been added to allow for a plug-and-play approach towards new distribution channels and products 
through Cloud integrated solutions. 
 
The Bank in the Cloud can focus on primary banking activities and worry less about non-core 
banking software and hardware provisioning. This way the Operations and IT can handle larger 
customer demand and focus on delivering quality to the clients. The key activities of the bank 
mainly do not change, but from a business point of view it is back to basics, without great 
concerns regarding IT infrastructure as can show in figure 6.11. Cloud provides flexibility and 
scalability in order to put into practice various needs and because of its model, it is pay per use. 
This represents a large investment difference in comparison to dedicated on-premises software 
and hardware. 
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Figure 6.11: financial cloud reference model [27] 
In order to represent this proposed reference architecture, Financial IT components are mapped to 
the immediate model according to the requirements. Figure 6.15 shows the integration model 
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between cloud and financial architecture mode, and the red represents the area which this thesis 
focuses on.  
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Figure 6.12: proposal for financial cloud reference model area 
The figure 6.12 shows the new cloud finance model with red lines on the focused areas.  
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To be more explicit, the Reference Architecture is composed of: 
 
• Customer Interaction Cloud, an Open Public SaaS solution package that handles all 
customer interaction integrating mobile accessibility, Internet portal and Call Center 
solutions. This solution package should also provide self-service via the Internet, single 
point of contact for all customers, multi-device interaction and communication via social 
media. Also Marketing and Financial Advice software solutions should be part of this 
Cloud, thus improving client-oriented services and increasing communication capabilities 
amongst software components. 
• Financial Cloud, a Community Public SaaS solution package that connects messaging, 
ATM and market feed from the whole banking community (Central Banks and other 
financial institutions) in order to provide precise and steady communication.  
• HR Enterprise Public Cloud integrating HR data, HR performance management and 
software solutions. 
• Banking Product Development and Management Cloud which is an Enterprise Public 
SaaS and requires Data storage in order to perform risk calculations and predictions. 
• Bank Regulatory Enterprise Public SaaS that should allow automated reports to regulators 
and integrate seamlessly with the general ledger application.  
• IT management, development and test Cloud provided via an Enterprise Public IaaS in 
order to allow scalability and instant provisioning of resources. 
• An Enterprise Private PaaS for security management solution that allows data protection 
and integrity. 
 Financial institution. Also it is the layer that facilitates Cloud brokerage. 
• An on-premises Data Warehouse for all the sensitive information. 
• Multiple packages of on-premises banking software solutions specialized for different 
business units. 
 
The proposal of financial organization architectures and their business operations models can 
indicate that there is no single cloud solution model that can meet all the requirements. I think 
financial institutions will create and manage a federated service ecosystem of cloud-based 
solutions along with non-cloud based cases, leveraging the abstraction control provided by public, 
private and community cloud deployments. A federated ecosystem can leverage multiple 
archetype implementations, deliver elastic capacity to match business requirements and provide 
an incremental adoption path building for the success of each increment. This will also enable 
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external business service providers, who themselves would start offering their product solutions 
on the cloud, to seamlessly integrate with this ecosystem. 
The key resources are converted from technology to knowledge. Technology exists, but putting it 
to good use, in accordance with regulations, and managing it for best performance is the main 
focus for any institution adopting Cloud computing. Also valuable resources are the lessons 
learned in the past, from the process of maturity within the on-premises software. This is the 
starting point of any SLA and therefore is the main guideline regarding what expectations a 
financial institution can have from a Cloud provider. Regarding physical resources, the accent 
shifts towards networking and connectivity. Cloud computing is purposeless in an environment 
where the networking infrastructure cannot allow access to the applications, processing capacity 
and storage space. Because a financial institution is taken into consideration, it is worth 
mentioning that the existing resources are not lost, but just reused in a different scope, for instance 
to increase the number of customers that can be stored or processed at one time.  
6.7 Tamper Proof Security Overview and Experiment Results  
We have performed an experiment in order to evaluate the overhead of the techniques relative to 
running the puppy Linux operating system on the ‘bare metal’. Complex application-level 
benchmarks that exercise the whole system have been employed to characterize performance 
under a range of server-type workloads. The test machine was conﬁgured with one CPU for these 
experiments.  
Online banking application is implemented based on the puppy Linux platform, which needs a 
management purview called Kernel. Considering the diversity of the user’s OS, such as different 
architecture and different version, and the modification to an OS to fit for our application, the 
user’s OS is not the privileged Kernel. Instead, we build a new-compiled OS kernel as the 
privileged controllers and make the banking application run as user privileged side by side with 
the OS as figure 6.16 demonstrates.    
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Figure 6.13: kernel and interface link  
Figure 6.13 show the main hierarchical concept link between hardware layer and other layers 
Test Analysis Report 
Experiments were performed using the Postgre SQL 7.1.3 database, exercised by the Open Source 
Database Benchmark suite (OSDB) in its default conﬁguration. We present results for the multi-
user Information Retrieval (IR) and On-Line Transaction Processing (OLTP) workloads, both 
measured in tuples per second. The benchmark drives the database via Foglight which is a quest 
software monitoring application used over a Linux storage socket. Foglight places considerable 
load on the operating system, and this is reﬂected in the substantial linux overheads experienced 
by O.S. In particular, the OLTP benchmark requires many synchronous disk operations, resulting 
in many protection domain transitions. 
A number of client machines are used to generate load for the server under test, with each 
machine simulating a collection of users concurrently accessing the web site. In order to 
demonstrate the performance isolation provided by puppy Linux, we perform a “bake-off” 
between puppy and other OS- based implementations of performance isolation techniques such as 
resource containers. I present results showing that Puppy performance isolation works as 
expected, even in the presence of a malicious workload. We ran two operating system companies 
with Linux operating system with domains configured with equal resource allocations, two O.S. 
each running a pair of extremely antisocial processes. The third domain concurrently ran a disk 
bandwidth hog (sustained dd) together with a file system intensive workload targeting huge 
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numbers of small file creations within large directories and intensive application, which attempted 
to allocate and touch 3MB of memory, on failure, free every page and then restart. 
 
   
                          Figure 6.14: Concurrent Processes/ O.S, Domains 
Figure 6.14 gave complete monitoring view to network, memory, and CPU and storage utilization 
and from that snapshot we can measure the capacity and performance of the system. As seen from 
figure 619 CPU utilization is less than 3.4% of the general CPU and the memory in use is 58% 
from total memory 12GB; also the network is 1.5 Mb/s with no indication of send rate while 
receive rate is less than 10 Mb/s. 
I use Burpsuite (Burp Suite is a Java application that can be used to secure or penetrate web 
applications) and NetworkMiner which is a Network Forensic Analysis Tool (NFAT) for 
Windows that can detect the OS, hostname and open ports of network hosts through packet 
sniffing or by parsing a PCAP file. NetworkMiner can also extract transmitted files from network 
traffic. For analyzing the requests sent through. Burpsuite is available by default in Backtrack and 
Loki. In order to intercept the requests and manipulate them, I must configure our browser to use 
Burp’s proxy, which is 127.0.0.1:8080 by default. We will also be using Wireshark a bit. 
6.8   Scalablity Issues  
Scalability can help increase performance by providing an application server with horizontal 
scaling. To eliminate all scalability bottlenecks, explore the model on  an approach that replicates 
all three tiers used in the proposal (web server, application server, back-end database). Web 
application code is executed application server shown by the code embedded in a tamper proof 
device which provides the functionality of a web application server. The database tier is a bank 
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Database server. The web tier is made of the Apache Web Server along with the Apache Tomcat 
SP/servlet containers provided by the cloud provider. The application tier is a J2EE compliant 
application server. The Apache Web Server communicates with the Apache Tomcat servlet 
container using the Apache mod_jk connector. The Tomcat servlet container communicates with 
the application server using JNDI and RMI calls. The application server communicates with the 
bank Database using JDBC. The Apache Tomcat servlet container and the J2EE compliant 
application server both require a JVM to run.  
6.9 Overview of Attacks  
Although Appendix B can provide details, here is an overview of some attacks and how new 
models prevent vulnerability as mentioned in chapter 3 
6.9.1 Malware or Malicious (and Other Malicious Code-Based Redirection Schemes) 
Referring to an attacker in chapter 3 section 3.4, the new model can prevent such an attack 
like this. Obviously any intruder needs to gather some information before attacking their 
victim; to mitigate the information obtain by reconnaissance method, application server 
rejects the request information applied by default at the setup page of the browser option 
service and this means from the beginning the request will not go further.  
This page is not available, sensitive metafile information to be exposed, Google cache check 
removes unnecessary information 
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Figure 6.15: Server Response / Error 
From the figure 6.15 above they prevent any chance to create or inject any malware because from 
the first step they can’t go farther, or capture the information needed to get or post the code. 
6.9.2 Recording Software Keyboard Buttons 
Referring to the attacker mentioned in chapter 3 section 3.7.1 smart card reader and 
fingerprint method controls this type of attack, and the control is done over two 
commands.  
 Perform Web Application Fingerprinting:  
Use secure channel with pattern encrypted. 
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Figure 6.16: figure print mechanise  
Figure 6.16 show mechanise used to analyses the fingerprint is pattern mechanism.  
 Identify user roles over linux mode: 
  User right for any clients and admin from local network inside the bank only. 
 
By this setup be sure no one can record software keyboard buttons or manipulate the 
hardware. 
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6.9.3 Scams. Phishing Websites/Emails 
Referring to chapter 3 sections 3.4.2, there is no valuable information that can be obtained when 
using a spider/ crawl script in programs.  As shown from the figure 6.17 below there is no way to 
inject a phish command.  
 
 
Figure 6.17 snapshot source code  
6.9.4 Test for Web Storage SQL Injection 
Referring to chapter 3 section 3.4.3 malicious software installation can control this 
vulnerability by Check Cross Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) implementation:  
Validate URLs passed to XMLHttpRequest.open. Current browsers allow these URLs to be cross 
domain; this behavior can lead to code injection by a remote attacker.Extra attention to absolute 
URLs will be paid. Use the Access-Control-Allow function to ensure that URLs are responding 
with Access-Control-Allow-Origin:  
No sensitive content t includes information that might aid the attacker in further attacks.  Use the 
Access-Control-Allow-Origin header only on chosen URLs that need to be accessed cross-
domain. Don't use the header for the whole domain.  
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Allow only selected, trusted domains in the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header.   
Current implementations might not perform this request, so it's important that "ordinary" (GET 
and POST) requests perform any access control necessary.  
The online bank system proposed discards requests received over plain HTTP with HTTPS 
origins to prevent mixed content bugs.  
6.9.5 Man In The Middle (MITM) Hacking Online Banking and Credit Card Transactions  
This is the process of verification that an individual or an entity is who they claim to be. 
Authentication is performed by submitting a user name or ID and items of private information 
(finger print) that only a given user should know. Wireshark provides support for Lua. Lua is a 
lightweight yet powerful programming language. It is used for dissectors and taps. It also allows 
saving the captured packets into various formats which can be utilized for later analysis by 
Wireshark packet analysis applications. Similarly, for reading packets from various different 
format packets. 
 
Figure 6.18: traceroup process  
The figure 6.18 above represents tracerout command used to communicate and trace the IP traffic.  
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6.9.6 Test for Brute Force Protection:  
If an attacker is able to guess passwords without the account becoming disabled due to failed 
authentication attempts, the attacker has an opportunity to continue with a brute force attack until 
the account is compromised. Automating brute-force/password for guessing attacks on the web 
applications is a trivial challenge. To mitigate this risk use Password lockout mechanisms, lock 
out an account if more than three unsuccessful login attempts are made. An attacker that 
undertakes a large number of authentication attempts on known account names can produce a 
result that locks out entire blocks of user accounts. Given that the intent of a password lockout 
system is to protect from brute-force attacks, a sensible strategy is to lockout accounts for a period 
of time (20 minutes). This significantly slows down attackers, while allowing the accounts to 
reopen automatically for legitimate users. The solution in this proposal is multi-factor 
authentication, a very powerful deterrent when trying to prevent brute force attacks since the 
credentials is a moving target.  
6.9.7 Test for Authentication  
Use security authentication and security layer (SASL) for application and SMTP AUTH.  
 
First edit /etc/default/saslauthd in order to activate saslauthd. Remove  
# in front of START=yes, add the PWDIR, PARAMS, and PIDFILE lines and edit the OPTIONS 
line at the end: 
# This needs to be uncommented before saslauthd will be run automatically 
START=yes 
 
PWDIR="/var/spool/postfix/var/run/saslauthd" 
PARAMS="-m ${PWDIR}" 
PIDFILE="${PWDIR}/saslauthd.pid" 
 
# You must specify the authentication mechanisms you wish to use. 
# This defaults to "pam" for PAM support, but may also include 
# "shadow" or "sasldb", like this: 
# MECHANISMS="pam shadow" 
 
MECHANISMS="pam" 
 
# Other options (default: -c) 
# See the saslauthd man page for information about these options. 
# 
# Example for postfix users: "-c -m /var/spool/postfix/var/run/saslauthd" 
# Note: See /usr/share/doc/sasl2-bin/README.Debian 
#OPTIONS="-c" 
 
#make sure you set the options here otherwise it ignores params above and will not work 
OPTIONS="-c -m /var/spool/postfix/var/run/saslauthd" 
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sudo dpkg-statoverride --force --update --add root sasl 755 /var/spool/postfix/var/run/saslauthd 
This may report an error of "--update given" and the "/var/spool/postfix/var/run/saslauthd" 
directory does not exist. You can ignore this because when you start saslauthd next it will be 
created. 
6. 10 Summary 
The focus of this chapter was: (1) additive homomorphic encryption; and (2) cashing (proxy) re-
encryption to secure data sent to the cloud and transited from the cloud to a user. This chapter 
tested the proposed authentication scheme as well as compared schemes in a real server 
environment using contact, communication exchanges, cryptographic operations, end-to-end 
authentication and disruption as metrics. For test Key generation and distribution initialization 
step the Bank generates two kinds of key pairs based on the additive homomorphic encryption. 
For Simulations and Performance Evaluation, in this chapter, I use Network Miner to parse libcap 
files to do a live packet capture of the network traffic between cloud provider and the client. From 
the screenshot on this chapter we can recognize that there are 42 packets of data sent and all these 
packets are completely encrypted as the clear text is 0%. The analysing of Public Server link 
between cloud provider and client can be explained as port: 8063 open with TCP protocol and the 
port sent 20 packets = 16.529 with 0.00% clear text. Also they received 18 packets = 3.190 byte 
with 0.00% clear text. Also it can be observed that the time comparison between bank to client 
through cloud (public) is above 25 msc at the stage of the direct link between bank and client 
while the best one is less than 5 msc in the direct stage between public and private. Also it can be 
observed that the bytes comparison for time between public to private is 25 msc while 15 msc 
between private and the bank and in the link between bank and the public it is 10 msc. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion and Future Work 
 7.1 Conclusion 
The security of a system can be seen as a chain of protection methods, and the global level is just 
as strong as its weakest link. In the ﬁnancial world there exist tools, like user behaviour proﬁling, 
which are starting to be considered, and that in fact, have been used by the banks for many years 
in the “real world” in the form of back-end controls. From the dot com boom, banks have tried to 
push the entire business logic, authentication included, to the front end (the user’s computer), as it 
is easier for them. The possibility of ubiquitous transactions and distinction between ‘safe’ and 
‘dangerous’ ones vanished too. All of these get worse in the cases of user’s identity or credential 
theft, which need more advanced measures and, curiously, a return to traditional back-end 
controls should be expected. In the last term, exclusively technical protection methods seem not to 
be able to completely solve the situation. The focus is towards trying to increase the resistance of 
the system, instead of its invulnerability that, in any case, cannot be completely achieved in 
general purpose operating systems. The objectives of this research work were: (1) to propose and 
implement a novel safety operating system that is isolated against O.S. threats like masquerading, 
modification, Trojan and viruses; (2) to investigate how traditional authentication and 
cryptographic techniques can be used judiciously to provide an authentication scheme that does 
not depend on direct server availability and recipient network connectivity for security processing 
of received transaction; (3) to propose and implement an alternative access control credential to 
digital certificate to banking client; (4) establish the comparative advantage of combining 
symmetric and asymmetric based schemes over using completely asymmetric based schemes. 
7.2  Overview of Key Contributions 
The main focus of this thesis has been revision of a functional tamper proof-based access 
control scheme for untrusted PC when accessing online banking. The study develops a trust 
Operating System, proposed and implemented a new protocol called Secure Transaction 
Sharing (STS) to grant the security communication between client and the bank via cloud 
provider and finally develops a new financial, cloud reference architecture framework 
appropriate to financial sector needs. The proposed scheme’s objectives were realized 
through simulation. Presented below is an overview of key contributions.  
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(1) Revision and functional tamper proof authentication appliance   
An authentication Tamper proof designed for extremely high security demands and confidentiality 
of the online banking application used the biometric security technology system. Tamper proof is 
also an on-chop authentication system; all the authentications are run inside the USB key without 
the host OS’s help. At the same time, installing the entire software environment on the USB 
tamper proof flash is controlled by the tamper proof key. 
The system is a combination of hardware and software as shown in figure 5.2. Based on the USB 
key and fingerprint scanner, the tamper proof device integrates a plug-and-play USB2.0 device 
without driver; Tamper proof can be divided into three stages as described in chapter 5 section 
5.3.1. We have developed and integrated a fingerprint based authentication security portable 
custom-built software environment inside the USB device. With the help of the system the clients 
can work in a movable security environment freely, as well as have high-level protection of 
confidential information. From the testbed in chapter 6 in figure 6.6 we notice that client interface 
(public) percentage is 13.27% with carry of 2.725 packets representing 543.63 KB. And from 
Table 5.3: boot time in Milliseconds is 6517.00 while windows bootable time is 12868.00, from 
Table 5.2:  comparison O.S. Performance test is 01:08:37 and website loading 00:10:01while 
windows booting is 02:13:88 and website is 00:16:35 and from this figure performance is 50% 
better than the current status.  
(2)  Applied Automatic time drift management scheme 
 I proposed and implemented an amendment Online banking security appliance automatically 
managing the clock drift for every individual tamper proof. The usage of time-based algorithms 
has a number of major benefits: the generated one time password can be used more than once and 
they have a very limited life span thereby requiring the fraudster to immediately consume a 
captured one time password, discouraging phishing attacks.  
(3)  Used fingerprint authentic factor 
I established a fingerprint encryption module to the USB Key device and developed a suite of 
fingerprint encryption programs both on the host OS (Windows XP) and the tamper proof USB 
Key device. The communication is based on the USB mass-storage protocol with custom-defined 
SCSI RBC set command.  
(4)  Propose and implement a new protocol, Secure Transaction Sharing (STS)) 
I proposed and implemented a new protocol, Secure Transaction Sharing (STS). In our statement 
setting, the Bank encrypts data locally to ensure privacy. Moreover the Bank shares the 
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authentication access to cloud provider as out of band and other authentication channel access.  
To facilitate fine-grained access control, the asset of attributes is associated with each client’s 
account transaction, which helps to control client access to a specific set of account fields for each 
authorized user. The Bank issues a decryption key tamper proof for each authorized client account 
to protect the authentication service against attack; the Secure Transaction Sharing (STS) 
Authentication Mechanism has been proposed. Two different scenarios were considered: in the 
first scenario, we assumed that the attacker cannot spoof source addresses. A threshold is set for 
the number of failed authentication attempts which we assume is distributed as part of the security 
policy.   In the first scenario (non-encrypted scenario), when STS is used as a mitigation 
mechanism delivery ratio improves by 81.1% or 9.5% compared to when no security mechanism 
is used respectively. The average latency of transfer when STS is used to combat attacks is 1272 
seconds which is 7.1% of TTL compared to 2214 seconds or 12.3% of TLL when pillaer-1024 is 
used. In terms of overhead ratio, STS reduces the overhead ratio by 48.49% compared to when no 
security mechanism is adopted.  
(5)  Study and develop a trust Operating System  
I proposed and implemented our O.S. by rebuilding the puppy Linux boot loader framework 
utilized to transfer measurement values from Application to Kernel. Several mechanisms were 
implemented for communicating between application and kernel, such as a grant table, ring 
buffers, an event channel, and Store. We use those mechanisms to transfer the measurement 
values from Application to Kernel. We implement two modules for inter control communication: 
a front-end module (FE) in an interface and a back-end module (BE) in Kernel. To transfer the 
measurement values, the Application first shares the ring buffers at operating system management 
(O.S.M), which transfer measurement values by using a grant table. The key function in this 
process is gnttab_grant_foreign_access.  
(6)  Development of a reference architecture Framework 
A comprehensive survey of reference architecture framework and building model techniques in 
cloud computing and banking sector was provided. Modelling use in cloud architecture can be 
found in figure 6.13 chapter 6.  Three architecture domains were used (cloud model, security 
control model and compliancy). The other side of the banking architecture mode as found in 
figure 6.12 chapter 6 covers four layers (client, common services, functional system and back end 
system. The design according to the target operating model requirements is consequently 
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represented within different structures of the architecture leading to delay in performance and 
unclear security approach. 
 While newly designed reference architecture was addressed in figures 6.14- 6.15 non-core 
domains have been outsourced and flexibility has been added to allow for a plug-and-play 
approach towards new distribution channels and products through Cloud integrated solutions. The 
performance percentage should go up because of worrying less about non-core banking software 
and hardware provisioning.  
The proposed architecture model provides clear security, dedicated area against unwanted layers 
as shown in figure 6.15 in chapter 6, leading to increasing the efficiency and performance of the 
system. This means that fewer building blocks are required to apply architecture resulting in lower 
communication cost.  
 7.3 Future Work 
Though the defined objectives set in section 1.1 have been met by the work presented in this 
thesis, some possibilities exist for future extension. The future direction regarding the extension of 
this research work is described below: 
 There are still some avenues of attack left open. Obviously if an attacker can 
threaten the client directly, or deceive them sufficiently, the client may deliberately 
authorize a transaction to the attacker. There is only so far that technical solution can 
go to prevent such abuses and such attacks are difficult to control. 
 Tamper proof device do nothing to keep the transaction log secret, the primary 
interface for transaction is still the computer, protecting against reading of the 
transaction log requires all interaction to be done through the trusted bath and this 
would significantly increase the cost. 
 A complete access control system discussed in chapter 3 incorporating issues with 
limiting user access to unauthorized accounts, efficiently revoking users’ privileges 
without re-encrypting massive amounts of account data and re-distributing the new keys 
to the authorized users, collusion between users, and issuing changes to a user’s access 
privileges is still undergoing thorough research.  
 Network control can be categorized into access control and admission control, and their 
individual implementation should not degrade the Quality of Service (QoS).  It will be 
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interesting in future to see the possibility of having a common scheme that implements 
both access and admission controls. 
 Cryptography is no more than another link in the chain. Most of the times, it is probably 
the strongest link, but there are many other weak links which decrease the security level 
until an unacceptable level for carrying out electronic commerce. 
 The implementation of this work was based on authentication threading with focus on 
only overlay network entities. It will be interesting to exploit the multi-threading 
concept in future to see how the data mule can handle multiple requests from different 
sources to different destinations at the same time.  
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Appendix A 
Public Cloud 
In this system we check only tamper proof ID and fingerprint; if it is right then it sends all 
variables to private cloud. 
In public cloud the tamper proof ID and fingerprint is checked then these four values are sent to 
the private cloud (bank): 
strKey = SendToPrivate(Tamper proofID, UserName, UserPassword, UserFingerPrint) 
 
And the username is encrypted: 
UserName = EncryptText(UserName, "SUCCESS") 
The function that is used for encryption: 
Function EncryptText(ByVal plaintext AsString, ByVal password AsString) 
Dim wrapper AsNewSimple3Des(password) 
Return wrapper.EncryptData(plaintext) 
EndFunction 
The function that checks the tamper proof ID: 
Function isClient(ByVal Tamper proofID AsString) AsInteger 
Dim tblName AsString = "tblConfirmTamper proofID" 
Dim ClientID AsInteger = 0 
Dim OleCon AsNewSqlConnection 
Dim OleTableE AsSqlDataAdapter 
Dim OleDSE AsNewDataSet 
Dim strSQL AsString = "SELECT Tamper proofID FROM tblConfirmTamper proofID WHERE 
Tamper proofID='"& Tamper proofID &"'" 
Try 
            OleCon.ConnectionString = "Data 
Source=.\SQLEXPRESS;AttachDbFilename=|DataDirectory|\PublicCloud.mdf;Integrated 
Security=True;User Instance=True" 
            OleCon.Open() 
            OleTableE = NewSqlDataAdapter(strSQL, OleCon) 
            OleTableE.Fill(OleDSE, tblName) 
            ClientID = OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(0) 
            OleDSE.Clear() 
            OleDSE.Dispose() 
            OleTableE.Dispose() 
            OleCon.Close() 
            OleCon.Dispose() 
Catch ex AsException 
EndTry 
Return ClientID 
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EndFunction 
 
 
 
And the function that sends these values to private: 
Function SendToPrivate(ByVal Tamper proofID AsString, ByVal UserName AsString, ByVal 
UserPassword AsString, ByVal UserFingerPrint AsString) AsString 
Dim wData AsString 
Dim strPost AsString 
Dim ServerURL AsString 
Dim IsSuccess AsBoolean = False 
        UserName = EncryptText(UserName, "SUCCESS") 
        strPost = "Tamper proofID="& Tamper proofID 
        strPost = strPost &"&UserName="& UserName 
        strPost = strPost &"&UserPassword="& UserPassword 
        strPost = strPost &"&UserFingerPrint="& UserFingerPrint 
        ServerURL = "http://192.168.1.199:8064/TempConvert.asmx/ClientKey" 
        wData = WRequest(ServerURL, "POST", strPost) 
Return wData 
EndFunction 
If Tamper proof ID is wrong then a message Tamper proof ID is wrong is displayed and the 
application stops here.  
 
If private return value does not fail then it sends these values to the bank and also the username is 
encrypted: 
UserName = EncryptText(UserName, "SUCCESS") 
The other three values are encrypted by a random key generated in the private provider: 
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 Dim encTamper proofID = EncryptText(Tamper proofID, strKey) 
Dim encUserPassword = EncryptText(UserPassword, strKey) 
Dim encUserFingerPrint = EncryptText(UserFingerPrint, strKey) 
 SendToBank(encTamper proofID, UserName, encUserPassword, encUserFingerPrint) 
 
The function that sends these values to the bank is: 
Sub SendToBank(ByVal Tamper proofID AsString, ByVal UserName AsString, ByVal 
UserPassword AsString, ByVal UserFingerPrint AsString) 
Dim strPost AsString 
Dim ServerURL AsString 
Dim IsSuccess AsBoolean = False 
        UserName = EncryptText(UserName, "SUCCESS") 
        strPost = "Tamper proofID="& Tamper proofID 
        strPost = strPost &"&UserName="& UserName 
        strPost = strPost &"&UserPassword="& UserPassword 
        strPost = strPost &"&UserFingerPrint="& UserFingerPrint 
        ServerURL = "http://192.168.1.199:8067" 
        Response.Redirect("http://192.168.1.199:8067?" + strPost) 
EndSub 
 
 In private provider it checks if these four variables match or not, by decrypting the username to 
match these values  
decUserName = DecryptText(UserName, "SUCCESS") 
 
 
The function that is used for decryption: 
Function DecryptText(ByVal encryptedtext AsString, ByVal password AsString) 
Dim wrapper AsNewSimple3Des(password) 
Return wrapper.DecryptData(encryptedtext) 
EndFunction 
If there is no matching found then the application stops here and the client receives a message that 
the username or password is wrong 
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Also in private there was a random key generated for encryption and this key was sent to the bank 
and to the client if these values are matching. 
strKey = GetRandomKey(lengthKey) 
 
This key takes random length (each time it has a different length between 10 and 30): 
Dim r AsNewRandom 
Dim lengthKey AsInteger = r.Next(10, 30) 
 
The function to generate a random key: 
Function GetRandomKey(ByVal KeyLength AsInteger) 
'Dim seconds As Integer 
Dim seconds = DatePart("s", Now) 
Dim strKeys AsString = 
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789" 
Dim r AsNewRandom 
Dim sb AsNewStringBuilder 
Dim idx AsInteger = r.Next(0, strKeys.Length) 
For i AsInteger = 1 To KeyLength 
            idx = r.Next(0, strKeys.Length) 
            idx = Math.Truncate(1 + Math.Sqrt(idx * seconds / 2)) 
            sb.Append(strKeys.Substring(idx, 1)) 
Next 
Return sb.ToString() 
EndFunction 
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The function that checked these values: 
<WebMethod()>PublicFunction ClientKey(ByVal Tamper proofID AsString, ByVal UserName 
AsString, ByVal UserPassword AsString, ByVal UserFingerPrint AsString) AsString 
Dim tblName AsString = "tblConfirmClient" 
Dim tblNameKey AsString = "tblClients" 
'Dim blnSeccess As Boolean = False 
Dim ClientID AsInteger = 0 
Dim strKey AsString = "fail" 
Dim OleCon AsNewSqlConnection 
Dim OleConKey AsNewSqlConnection 
Dim OleTableE AsSqlDataAdapter 
Dim OleTableEKey AsSqlDataAdapter 
Dim OleDSE AsNewDataSet 
Dim OleDSEKey AsNewDataSet 
Dim decUserName AsString 
        decUserName = DecryptText(UserName, "SUCCESS") 
 
Dim strSQL AsString = "SELECT Tamper proofID,UserName,UserPassword,UserFingerPrint 
FROM tblConfirmClient WHERE Tamper proofID='"& Tamper proofID &"' AND 
UserName='"& decUserName &"' AND UserPassword='"& UserPassword &"' AND 
UserFingerPrint='"& UserFingerPrint &"'" 
Try 
            OleCon.ConnectionString = "server=OMECO-ERP1-PC\BSSERVER;Initial 
Catalog=BankDB;Integrated Security=True;" 
            OleCon.Open() 
            OleTableE = NewSqlDataAdapter(strSQL, OleCon) 
            OleTableE.Fill(OleDSE, tblName) 
            ClientID = OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(0) 
If ClientID > 0 Then 
Dim r AsNewRandom 
Dim lengthKey AsInteger = r.Next(10, 30) 
                strKey = GetRandomKey(lengthKey) 
Dim strKeySQL AsString = "UPDATE tblClients SET UserKey='"& strKey &"' WHERE 
ClientID = 1" 
Try 
                    OleConKey.ConnectionString = "server=OMECO-ERP1-PC\BSSERVER;Initial 
Catalog=BankDB;Integrated Security=True;" 
                    OleConKey.Open() 
                    OleTableEKey = NewSqlDataAdapter(strKeySQL, OleConKey) 
                    OleTableEKey.Fill(OleDSEKey, tblNameKey) 
                    OleDSEKey.Clear() 
                    OleDSEKey.Dispose() 
                    OleTableEKey.Dispose() 
                    OleConKey.Close() 
                    OleConKey.Dispose() 
Catch ex AsException 
'MsgBox(ex.Message) 
EndTry 
 
Else 
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                strKey = "fail" 
EndIf 
            OleDSE.Clear() 
            OleDSE.Dispose() 
            OleTableE.Dispose() 
            OleCon.Close() 
            OleCon.Dispose() 
Catch ex AsException 
' MsgBox(ex.Message) 
EndTry 
Return strKey 
EndFunction 
The bank checked these values by comparing them to database values when decrypting these 
values using a key generated in private. 
decKeyPassword = DecryptText(UserPassword, strUserKey) 
decKeyTamper proofID = DecryptText(Tamper proofID, strUserKey) 
decKeyUserFingerPrint = DecryptText(UserFingerPrint, strUserKey) 
If these values are matching then the client can access his/her account. 
 
 
 
The function that is used to check matching: 
PublicFunction ClientLogin(ByVal Tamper proofID AsString, ByVal decUserName AsString, 
ByVal UserPassword AsString, ByVal UserFingerPrint AsString) AsString 
Dim tblName AsString = "tblClients" 
Dim ClientID AsInteger = 0 
Dim strKey AsString = "fail" 
Dim OleCon AsNewSqlConnection 
Dim OleTableE AsSqlDataAdapter 
Dim OleDSE AsNewDataSet 
Dim OleConKey AsNewSqlConnection 
Dim OleTableEKey AsSqlDataAdapter 
Dim OleDSEKey AsNewDataSet 
Dim strUserKey AsString 
Dim decKeyPassword AsString 
Dim decKeyTamper proofID AsString, decKeyUserFingerPrint AsString 
Dim strKeySQL AsString = "SELECT UserKey FROM tblClients WHERE ClientUserName='"& 
decUserName &"'" 
Try 
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            OleConKey.ConnectionString = "server=OMECO-ERP1-PC\BSSERVER;Initial 
Catalog=BankDB;Integrated Security=True;" 
            OleConKey.Open() 
            OleTableEKey = NewSqlDataAdapter(strKeySQL, OleConKey) 
            OleTableEKey.Fill(OleDSEKey, tblName) 
            strUserKey = OleDSEKey.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(0) 
            decKeyPassword = DecryptText(UserPassword, strUserKey) 
            decKeyTamper proofID = DecryptText(Tamper proofID, strUserKey) 
            decKeyUserFingerPrint = DecryptText(UserFingerPrint, strUserKey) 
            OleDSEKey.Clear() 
            OleDSEKey.Dispose() 
            OleTableEKey.Dispose() 
            OleConKey.Close() 
            OleConKey.Dispose() 
Catch ex AsException 
EndTry 
Dim strSQL AsString = "SELECT 
ClientID,ClientFirstName,ClientSecondName,ClientThirdName,ClientFourthName FROM 
tblClients WHERE ClientPassword='"& decKeyPassword &"'" 
Try 
            OleCon.ConnectionString = "server=OMECO-ERP1-PC\BSSERVER;Initial 
Catalog=BankDB;Integrated Security=True;" 
            OleCon.Open() 
            OleTableE = NewSqlDataAdapter(strSQL, OleCon) 
            OleTableE.Fill(OleDSE, tblName) 
            ClientID = OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(0) 
            ClientName = OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(1) &" "& 
OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(2) &" "& OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(3) &" 
"& OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(4) 
If ClientID > 0 Then 
                Session("ClientID") = ClientID 
                Session("ClientName") = ClientName 
                Session("uname") = decUserName 
                Session("pass") = UserPassword 
                Session.Add("acno", 1) 
                Session("AccountID") = 0 
Else 
                strKey = "fail" 
EndIf 
            OleDSE.Clear() 
            OleDSE.Dispose() 
            OleTableE.Dispose() 
            OleCon.Close() 
            OleCon.Dispose() 
Catch ex AsException 
EndTry 
Return strKey 
EndFunction 
 
Public cloud functions: 
Client Function: 
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This function takes two parameters (Tamper proof ID, fingerprint); it checks if it is the client or 
not by comparing this value and the value from the database (tblConfirmTamper proofID, 
fingerprint).      
 
 
 
FunctionisClient(ByValTamper proofIDAsString) As Integer 
Dim tblName AsString = "tblConfirmTamper proofID" 
Dim ClientID AsInteger = 0 
Dim OleCon AsNewSqlConnection 
Dim OleTableE AsSqlDataAdapter 
Dim OleDSE AsNewDataSet 
Dim strSQL AsString = "SELECT Tamper proofID FROM    
                                tblConfirmTamper proofID WHERE Tamper proofID 
                        ='"& Tamper proofID &"'"    
Try 
   OleCon.ConnectionString ="DataSource=.\SQLEXPRESS;   
                           AttachDbFilename=|DataDirectory|                
                           \PublicCloud.mdf; 
                           Integrated Security=True;  
                           User Instance=True" 
OleCon.Open() 
   OleTableE = NewSqlDataAdapter(strSQL, OleCon) 
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   OleTableE.Fill(OleDSE, tblName) 
   ClientID = OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(0) 
   ClientName=OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(1) 
&" "& 
              OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(2)  
&" "& 
              OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(3) 
&" "& 
              OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(4) 
 
    OleDSE.Clear() 
    OleDSE.Dispose() 
    OleTableE.Dispose() 
    OleCon.Close() 
    OleCon.Dispose() 
Catch ex AsException 
EndTry 
Return ClientID 
EndFunction 
 
Send To Private – bank interface - Function: 
This function takes four parameters (Tamper proofID, UserName, UserPassword and 
UserFingerPrint) and sends these values to private cloud.  
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Function SendToPrivate (ByValTamper proofIDAsString,ByVal UserName As String, 
ByVal UserPassword AsString, ByVal UserFingerPrint 
As String) AsString 
Dim wData AsString 
Dim strPost AsString 
Dim ServerURL AsString 
Dim IsSuccess AsBoolean = False 
UserName = EncryptText (UserName, "hatim") 
UserPassword = EncryptText (UserPassword, "hatim") 
strPost = "Tamper proofID="& Tamper proofID 
strPost = strPost &"&UserName="& UserName 
strPost = strPost &"&UserPassword="& UserPassword 
strPost = strPost &"&UserFingerPrint="& UserFingerPrint 
ServerURL = "http://192.168.1.199:8064/TempConvert.asmx/ClientKey" 
wData = WRequest(ServerURL, "POST", strPost) 
Return wData 
EndFunction 
 
Send To Bank – database-  Function: 
This function takes four parameters (Tamper proofID, UserName, UserPassword and 
UserFingerPrint) and sends these values to the bank.  
 
 
 
 
SubSend ToBank  (ByValTamper proofIDAsString, ByVal UserName AsString, 
ByVal UserPassword AsString, ByVal UserFingerPrint  
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               As String)  
    Dim strPost AsString 
    Dim ServerURL AsString 
Dim IsSuccess AsBoolean = False 
 UserName = EncryptText(UserName, "hatim") 
    UserPassword = EncryptText(UserPassword, "hatim") 
strPost = "Tamper proofID="& Tamper proofID 
strPost = strPost &"&UserName="& UserName 
strPost = strPost &"&UserPassword="& UserPassword 
strPost = strPost &"&UserFingerPrint="& UserFingerPrint 
ServerURL = http://192.168.1.199:8067 
    Response.Redirect("http://192.168.1.199:8067?" + strPost) 
EndSub 
 
Request function: 
Send data via http protocol to the web service taking three parameters (URL, method and 
POSTdata) 
 
Function WRequest(ByVal URL AsString, ByVal method AsString, ByVal POSTdata AsString) 
AsString 
Dim responseData AsString = String.Empty 
Try 
Dim hwrequest AsHttpWebRequest = WebRequest.Create(URL) 
            hwrequest.Accept = "*/*" 
            hwrequest.AllowAutoRedirect = True 
            hwrequest.UserAgent = "http_requester/0.1" 
            hwrequest.Timeout = 600000 
            hwrequest.Method = method 
If hwrequest.Method = "POST"Then 
                hwrequest.ContentType = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" 
Dim encoding AsNewASCIIEncoding() 
Dim postByteArray() AsByte = encoding.GetBytes(POSTdata) 
                hwrequest.ContentLength = postByteArray.Length 
Dim postStream As IO.Stream = hwrequest.GetRequestStream() 
                postStream.Write(postByteArray, 0, postByteArray.Length) 
                postStream.Close() 
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EndIf 
Dim hwresponse As Net.HttpWebResponse = hwrequest.GetResponse() 
If hwresponse.StatusCode = Net.HttpStatusCode.OK Then 
Dim responseStream As IO.StreamReader = New 
IO.StreamReader(hwresponse.GetResponseStream()) 
                responseData = responseStream.ReadToEnd() 
EndIf 
            hwresponse.Close() 
Catch e AsException 
            responseData = e.Message 
EndTry 
Return responseData 
EndFunction 
Button_Click (Button Confirm): 
When pressing this button and if all data is correct, then the internet banking home page for this 
client will be displayed.   
 
 
ProtectedSub Button1_Click(ByVal sender AsObject, ByVal e As 
                 System.EventArgs) Handles btnConfirm.Click 
Dim ClientID AsInteger = 0 
Dim Tamper proofID AsString 
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Dim UserName AsString 
Dim UserPassword AsString 
Dim UserFingerPrint AsString 
Dim strKey AsString 
Tamper proofID = txtTamper proofID.Text 
UserName = txtUserName.Text 
UserPassword = txtUserPassword.Text 
UserFingerPrint = txtUserFingerPrint.Text 
ClientID = isClient(Tamper proofID) 
If ClientID > 0 Then 
Session("Tamper proofID") = Tamper proofID 
     strKey = SendToPrivate(Tamper proofID, UserName, UserPassword,  
                            UserFingerPrint) 
If strKey.Contains("success") Then 
 SendToBank(Tamper proofID, UserName, UserPassword,  
                    UserFingerPrint) 
Else 
         labMessage.Text = "UserName or Password is Wrong!!!" 
EndIf 
Else 
 labMessage.Text = "Tamper proof ID is Wrong!!!" 
EndIf 
EndSub 
 
<WebMethod()>PublicFunction ClientKey(ByVal Tamper proofID AsString, ByVal  
UserName AsString, ByVal 
UserPassword As 
String, ByVal UserFingerPrint AsString) AsString 
Dim tblName AsString = "tblConfirmClient" 
Dim ClientID AsInteger = 0 
Dim strKey AsString = "fail" 
Dim OleCon AsNewSqlConnection 
Dim OleTableE AsSqlDataAdapter 
Dim OleDSE AsNewDataSet 
Dim decUserName AsString, decPassword AsString 
        decUserName = DecryptText(UserName, "hatim") 
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        decPassword = DecryptText(UserPassword, "hatim") 
Dim strSQL AsString = "SELECT Tamper proofID,UserName,UserPassword,UserFingerPrint 
FROM tblConfirmClient WHERE Tamper proofID='"& Tamper proofID &"' AND 
UserName='"& decUserName &"' AND UserPassword='"& decPassword &"' AND 
UserFingerPrint='"& UserFingerPrint &"'" 
Try 
            OleCon.ConnectionString = "Data 
Source=.\SQLEXPRESS;AttachDbFilename=|DataDirectory|\basic.mdf;Integrated 
Security=True;User Instance=True" 
            OleCon.Open() 
            OleTableE = NewSqlDataAdapter(strSQL, OleCon) 
            OleTableE.Fill(OleDSE, tblName) 
            ClientID = OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(0) 
If ClientID > 0 Then 
                strKey = "success" 
 
'get { return txtName.Text; } 
Else 
                strKey = "fail" 
EndIf 
             OleDSE.Clear() 
            OleDSE.Dispose() 
            OleTableE.Dispose() 
            OleCon.Close() 
            OleCon.Dispose() 
Catch ex AsException 
' MsgBox(ex.Message) 
EndTry 
Return strKey 
EndFunction 
Internet Banking 
Client Login Function: 
This function receives four variables and checks these values by comparing them to database 
values if matched return is a success.  
PublicFunction ClientLogin(ByVal Tamper proofID AsString, ByVal decUserName AsString, 
ByVal decPassword AsString, ByVal UserFingerPrint AsString) AsString 
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Dim tblName AsString = "tblClients" 
Dim ClientID AsInteger = 0 
Dim strKey AsString = "fail" 
Dim OleCon AsNewSqlConnection 
Dim OleTableE AsSqlDataAdapter 
Dim OleDSE AsNewDataSet 
Dim strSQL AsString = "SELECT 
ClientID,ClientFirstName,ClientSecondName,ClientThirdName,ClientFourthName FROM 
tblClients WHERE ClientUserName='"& decUserName &"' AND ClientPassword='"& 
decPassword &"'" 
Try 
            OleCon.ConnectionString = "Data 
Source=.\SQLEXPRESS;AttachDbFilename=|DataDirectory|\Database.mdf;Integrated 
Security=True;User Instance=True" 
            OleCon.Open() 
            OleTableE = NewSqlDataAdapter(strSQL, OleCon) 
            OleTableE.Fill(OleDSE, tblName) 
            ClientID = OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(0) 
            ClientName = OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(1) &" "& 
OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(2) &" "& OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(3) &" 
"& OleDSE.Tables(tblName).Rows(0).Item(4) 
If ClientID > 0 Then 
                Session("ClientID") = ClientID 
                Session("ClientName") = ClientName 
                Session("uname") = decUserName 
                Session("pass") = decPassword 
                Session.Add("acno", 1) 
                Session("AccountID") = 0 
Else 
                strKey = "fail" 
 
EndIf 
            OleDSE.Clear() 
            OleDSE.Dispose() 
            OleTableE.Dispose() 
            OleCon.Close() 
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            OleCon.Dispose() 
Catch ex AsException 
'ClientName = ex.Message 
'OleCon.Close() 
EndTry 
Return strKey 
EndFunction
Appendix B.  
 
 
 
 
 
185 
Appendix B 
Result Testing Server Security 
Information Gathering 
 Spider/crawl for missed or hidden content : 
 There is no any information valuable for any hacker when used a spider/ crawl script in our 
programmers  
 
 Check the Webserver Metafiles for information leakage files that expose content, such 
as robots.txt, sitemap.xml, .DS_Store:   
This page is not available, sensitive metafile information to be exposed.  
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 Check the caches of major search engines for publicly accessible sites: 
 Google cash check to remove unnecessary information 
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 Perform Web Application Fingerprinting:  
Used secure channel   with pattern encrypted. 
 
 Identify user roles: 
  User right for any clients and admin from local network inside the bank only 
 
Appendix B.  
 
 
 
 
 
188 
 
 Identify application entry points:  
Logging page is highly secure with multi authentication factor and more than two channel 
way with mutual direction  
 Identify client-side code: 
 Token care for source code and SSL 
 Identify multiple versions/channels (e.g. web, mobile web, mobile app, web services):  
Web services limited used to the system only, there is no direct access to bank server, all 
services complete after authentication.  
 Identify co-hosted and related applications: 
 There no any co-hosted code or application  
 Identify third-party hosted content: 
 Our code is isolated completely  
Configuration Management 
 Test for security HTTP headers (e.g. CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS): 
  X-Frame-Options 
This header can be used to prevent Click Jacking in modern browsers.  
Use the same-origin attribute to allow being framed from urls of the same origin or deny 
blocking all. Example: X-Frame-Options: DENY  
Authentication 
Authentication 
 Is the process of verification that an individual or an entity is who it claims to be. Authentication 
is commonly performed by submitting a user name or ID and one or more items of private 
information that only a given user should know.  
Wireshark   
Is a network sniffer or protocol analyzer as a software application or hardware device which is 
capable of intercepting traffic and logging it for further analysis. A packet sniffer is very crucial 
for network analysis as well as troubleshooting. This log can be analyzed to: 
 Study the interaction of different machines. 
 Analyze the packets that are passing by. 
 Learn more about the underlying protocols. 
 Detect the flaws in the network. 
 Examine security issues. 
Let’s dive deep into this fantastic tool and understand some of its features: 
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After installing the application and starting it, the first thing to do is to choose the Interface(s) to 
start with. Interface list displays all the interfaces present on the machine so we can choose the 
one(s) we want to listen on. Before starting the capture on the network, we should also specify 
whether we want to capture packets in promiscuous mode or not. Promiscuous mode if enabled 
(enabled by default) allows Wireshark to capture all the packets it can over the network, else only 
packets to and from the machine running Wireshark will be captured. We can decide on this 
function from the options button in the Capture Interfaces list and start the process of capturing 
the packets. Now based on the amount of network traffic, the packets will be captured and listed 
on the interface in real time for analysis. 
 
Figure b.1: shows the interface list and the options to start the capture. 
First thing you’ll notice from this packet capture is that Wireshark uses different color coding for 
different packets. This color coding helps us to distinguish between different packet types and 
hence is useful for quick overview. For example, black foreground on green background is used to 
display HTTP packets while the reverse is used to indicate ICMP errors. These color coding 
combinations can be customized according to personal preference. 
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Figure b.2: displays the color coding in the captured packets. 
We have seen how Wireshark captures packets in real time and displays them on the interface; 
now let’s see how to filter these packets. 
Packet filtering is a very essential feature. We can see that during the capture, there are various 
kinds of packets (protocols) that are captured and we need to focus on some specific packets. 
Wireshark allows traffic filtering based on different filters, which can be specified before as well 
as after the capture. We can simply input the protocol name in the filter bar and press Enter to see 
the packets of that specific protocol on the interface with the rest all removed. For example, if we 
need only HTTP traffic on the interface, we can simply input ‘http’ (without quotes) into the filter 
box and get the result. Wireshark also supports advanced filters which include expressions, IP 
address, MAC address, port number etc. 
Some of the example filters are as following: 
Ethernet broadcast: eth.addr==ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 
IP address 212.0.146.122: ip.addr==192.168.0.1 
UDP only: udp 
No ARP and no DNS: not arp and!(udp.port==53) 
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Figure b.3 shows the packets being listed according to the applied filter. 
All these filters are built-in to the application and can be accessed by clicking on the filter button. 
But this is not all: Wireshark also allows users to create custom filters and add them to this list 
and use them in future. This task can simply be accomplished by clicking on the ‘New’ button in 
the filter list and specify the filter name and filter string. For example, we can create a filter 
capturing packet from a specific IP range: 
IP Range 192.168.0.0./24: ip.addr==192.168.0.0/24 
The top block of the interface shows all the packets captured based on the filter applied, the 
middle block consists of all the detailed information regarding the packet selected in the top 
block, and the lowest block displays the hexdump of the selected packet. To analyze a packet, we 
simply need to select it in the top block and browse through the information in the middle block 
like the IP address, MAC address and other details related to the protocol structure. The 
information we selected in the middle block is displayed with the corresponding presence in the 
hexdump. 
Let’s analyze a simple packet now. ARP filter has been applied so that the packets displayed are 
ARP packets only. We have selected an ARP request packet in the top block; an ARP request 
packet is broadcasted with the IP address that needs to be resolved with the MAC address. Now 
we can browse through all the information in the middle block like Sender MAC address, Sender 
IP address, Target IP address, protocol size etc. Figure 4 shows the ARP packet details. 
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Figure b.4. ARP packet analysis  
Wireshark also allows seeing the communication between two machines as a stream. We can 
simply select a packet and right click on it, and then based on the protocol, we can select the 
option to follow the stream and view the exact communication. This feature is quite useful if we 
need to understand the communication between two machines or if we are looking for some 
specific information (e.g. password) that is being passed between them. The text below shows a 
sample TCP stream. 
GET / HTTP/1.1 
Host: 212.0.146.122 
Connection: keep-alive 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.11 (KHTML, like surrey) 
Chrome/23.0.1271.95 Safari/537.11 
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch 
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 
DNT: 1 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Date: Wed, 08 Oct 2014 08:10:29 GMT 
Appendix B.  
 
 
 
 
 
193 
Server: Apache/2.2.14 (Ubuntu) 
Last-Modified: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 07:45:00 GMT 
ETag: “2c58a-b1-4a2e722183700″ 
Accept-Ranges: bytes 
Vary: Accept-Encoding 
Content-Encoding: gzip 
Content-Length: 146 
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100 
Connection: Keep-Alive 
Content-Type: text/html 
……….NK..0..s.qol.7……(._I..p{+..f….39.r..Mw.P…….:;.g.+.4…_..a………,_..5.Y..:d……;e..e
@X……E…………9…i..h4*…..GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1 
Host: 212.0.146.122  
Connection: keep-alive 
Accept: */* 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.11 (KHTML, like surrey) 
Chrome/23.0.1271.95 Safari/537.11 
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch 
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 
DNT: 1 
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found 
Date: Wed, 08 Oct 2014 08:10:29 GMT  
Server: Apache/2.2.14 (Ubuntu) 
Vary: Accept-Encoding 
Content-Encoding: gzip 
Content-Length: 240 
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=99 
Connection: Keep-Alive 
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1 
 
……….MO]K.0.}….I..mj..!0…u.M…-.)..&…o.!.p..{>8..Tok.okx.. 
..s.]…q[. 
b%.+S....-x.L.<sf.Ti.}<k^.%.....bx=f.g.;8.3.(..I 
[.......F..V..7.'y......-..d:M&p....../.......H......y4..R.Z.mw.m...c 
6..@....$..y..u>.2g...Z.}S........."... 
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Using Wireshark, we can create ACL (Access Control List) rules for different firewalls including 
Cisco IOS, IP Filter, NetFilter, Windows Firewall, etc. These rules can be applied to the 
appropriate firewall interface. To utilize this feature, we simply need to navigate to the Tools 
menu and select the Firewall ACL Rules options. 
 Figure  shows the firewall ACL rules option present and Lua console in Wireshark. 
 
 
 
Wireshark provides support for Lua. Lua is a lightweight yet powerful programming language. It 
can be used to write dissectors and taps. 
Wireshark also allows saving the captured packets into various formats which can be utilized for 
later analysis by Wireshark or any other packet analysis applications. Similarly, Wireshark is also 
capable of reading packets from various different format packet captures. 
Apart from the GUI interface, we can also utilize the power of this tool through the command line 
version ‘tshark’. Below is the listing of the options provided by tshark:  
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Session Management 
 Is a process by which a server maintains the state of an entity interacting with it. This is required 
for a server to remember how to react to subsequent requests throughout a transaction. Sessions 
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are maintained on the server by a session identifier which can be passed back and forward 
between the client and server when transmitting and receiving requests. Sessions should be unique 
per user and computationally very difficult to predict. 
 
 Test for user enumeration:  
Make sure your usernames/user ids are case insensitive. Many sites use email addresses for 
usernames and email addresses are already case insensitive. Regardless, it would be very 
strange for user 'smith' and user 'Smith' to be different users. 
 
 
 Test for brute force protection:  
If an attacker is able to guess passwords without the account becoming disabled due to failed 
authentication attempts, the attacker has an opportunity to continue with a brute force attack until 
the account is compromised. Automating brute-force/password guessing attacks on web 
applications is a trivial challenge. Password lockout mechanisms should be employed that lock 
out an account if more than a preset number of unsuccessful login attempts are made. Password 
lockout mechanisms have a logical weakness. An attacker that undertakes a large number of 
authentication attempts on known account names can produce a result that locks out entire blocks 
of user accounts. Given that the intent of a password lockout system is to protect from brute-force 
attacks, a sensible strategy is to lockout accounts for a period of time (e.g., 20 minutes). This 
significantly slows down attackers, while allowing the accounts to reopen automatically for 
legitimate users.  
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Also, multi-factor authentication is a very powerful deterrent when trying to prevent brute force 
attacks since the credentials is a moving target. When multi-factor is implemented and active, 
account lockout may no longer be necessary. 
 Test for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel 
 
 
 Test password quality rules :  
A key concern when using passwords for authentication is password strength. A 
"strong" password policy makes it difficult or even improbable for one to guess the 
password through either manual or automated means. The following characteristics 
define a strong password Password Length 
Longer passwords provide a greater combination of characters and consequently make it more 
difficult for an attacker to guess.  
 Minimum length of the passwords should be enforced by the application.  
o Passwords shorter than 10 characters are considered to be weak ([1]).  
While minimum length enforcement may cause problems with memorizing passwords among 
some users, applications should encourage them to set passphrases (sentences or combination of 
words) that can be much longer than typical passwords and yet much easier to remember.  
 Maximum password length should not be set too low, as it will prevent users from 
creating passphrases. Typical maximum length is 128 characters.  
o Passphrases shorter than 20 characters are usually considered weak if they only 
consist of lower case Latin characters.  
 Every character counts!!  
o Make sure that every character the user types in is actually included in the 
password. We've seen systems that truncate the password at a length shorter than 
what the user provided (e.g., truncated at 15 characters when they entered 20).  
o This is usually handled by setting the length of ALL password input fields to be 
exactly the same length as the maximum length password. This is particularly 
important if your max password length is short, like 20-30 characters.  
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 Test remember me functionality 
Test for autocomplete on password forms/input : 
 
 Password mechanisms should allow virtually any character the user can type to be part of their 
password, including the space character. Passwords should, obviously, be case sensitive in order 
to increase their complexity. Occasionally, we find systems where passwords aren't case sensitive, 
frequently due to legacy system issues like old mainframes that didn't have case sensitive 
passwords. 
Test password reset and/or recovery 
Test password change process:   
The password change mechanism should require a minimum level of complexity that makes sense 
for the application and its user population. For example:  
Password must meet at least 3 out of the following 4 complexity rules  
at least 1 uppercase character (A-Z)  
at least 1 lowercase character (a-z)  
at least 1 digit (0-9)  
at least 1 special character (punctuation) — do not forget to treat space as special characters too  
at least 10 characters  
Appendix B.  
 
 
 
 
 
200 
at most 128 characters  
not more than 2 identical characters in a row (e.g., 111 not allowed)  
 
 Test CAPTCHA 
No CAPTCHA information (except the image itself) stored on the client side. The client has no 
"control" over the CAPTCHA content and CAPTCHA images always randomly generated 
without possibility to perform image preprocessing, segmentation and classification, finally 
CAPTCHA images not be reused. 
 Test multi factor authentication:  
Used Multi-factor authentication (MFA) to logon or process a transaction:  
Implement One Time Passwords (OTP) as Authentication schemes, using a hardware token, also 
be key in fighting attacks such as CSRF and client-side malware. 
 Test for logout functionality presence 
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 Test for user-accessible authentication history:  
The login page and all subsequent authenticated pages exclusively accessed over TLS. The initial 
login page, referred to as the "login page", served over SSL and TLS.  
 
Session Management 
Establish how session management is handled in the application (eg, tokens in cookies, token 
in URL): 
 Many implementations of this control include the challenge token in GET (URL) requests as well 
as POST requests. This is often implemented as a result of sensitive server-side operations being 
invoked as a result of embedded links in the page or other general design patterns. These patterns 
are often implemented without knowledge of CSRF and an understanding of CSRF prevention 
design strategies. While this control does help mitigate the risk of CSRF attacks, the unique per-
session token is being exposed for GET requests. CSRF tokens in GET requests are potentially 
leaked at several locations: browser history, HTTP log files, network appliances that make a point 
to log the first line of an HTTP request, and Referer headers if the protected site links to an 
external site.  
In the latter case (leaked CSRF token due to the Referer header being parsed by a linked site), it is 
trivially easy for the linked site to launch a CSRF attack on the protected site, and they will be 
able to target this attack very effectively, since the Referer header tells them the site as well as the 
CSRF token. The attack could be run entirely from javascript, so that a simple addition of a script 
tag to the HTML of a site can launch an attack (whether on an originally malicious site or on a 
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hacked site). This attack scenario is easy to prevent, the referer will be omitted if the origin of the 
request is HTTPS. Therefore this attack does not affect web applications that are HTTPS only.  
The ideal solution implemented in our solution is to only include the CSRF token in POST 
requests and modify server-side actions that have state changing affect to only respond to POST 
requests. This is in fact what the RFC 2616 requires for GET requests. If server-side actions are 
guaranteed to only ever respond to POST requests, then there is no need to include the token in 
GET requests.  
In most JavaEE web applications, however, HTTP method scoping is rarely ever utilized when 
retrieving HTTP parameters from a request. Calls to "HttpServletRequest.getParameter" will 
return a parameter value regardless if it was a GET or POST. This is not to say HTTP method 
scoping cannot be enforced. It can be achieved if a developer explicitly overrides doPost() in the 
HttpServlet class or leverages framework specific capabilities such as the AbstractFormController 
class in Spring.  
For these cases, attempting to retrofit this pattern in existing applications requires significant 
development time and cost, and as a temporary measure it may be better to pass CSRF tokens in 
the URL. Once the application has been fixed to respond to HTTP GET and POST verbs 
correctly, CSRF tokens for GET requests should be turned off.  
  
ZK token used for authentication  
 Check session tokens for cookie flags (httpOnly and secure):  
All cookies, even the secret ones, will be submitted with every request. All authentication 
tokens will be submitted regardless of whether or not the end-user was tricked into submitting 
the request. Furthermore, session identifiers are simply used by the application container to 
associate the request with a specific session object. The session identifier does not verify that 
the end-user intended to submit the request. 
Data Validation 
 Test for authenticaton  
Use security authentication and security layer (SASL) for application and SMTP AUTH. 
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First you will need to install the libsasl2-2, sasl2-bin and libsasl2-modules from the Main 
repository [i.e. sudo apt-get install them all]. 
Note: when using Ubuntu 6.06 (Dapper Drake) the package name is libsasl2. 
We have to change a few things to make it work properly. Because Postfix runs chrooted 
in /var/spool/postfix we have change a couple paths to live in the false root. 
(ie. /var/run/saslauthd becomes /var/spool/postfix/var/run/saslauthd): 
 
 Note: by changing the saslauthd path other applications that use saslauthd may be affected.  
 
First we edit /etc/default/saslauthd in order to activate saslauthd. Remove # in front of 
START=yes, add the PWDIR, PARAMS, and PIDFILE lines and edit the OPTIONS line at the 
end: 
# This needs to be uncommented before saslauthd will be run automatically 
START=yes 
 
PWDIR="/var/spool/postfix/var/run/saslauthd" 
PARAMS="-m ${PWDIR}" 
PIDFILE="${PWDIR}/saslauthd.pid" 
 
# You must specify the authentication mechanisms you wish to use. 
# This defaults to "pam" for PAM support, but may also include 
# "shadow" or "sasldb", like this: 
# MECHANISMS="pam shadow" 
 
MECHANISMS="pam" 
 
# Other options (default: -c) 
# See the saslauthd man page for information about these options. 
# 
# Example for postfix users: "-c -m /var/spool/postfix/var/run/saslauthd" 
# Note: See /usr/share/doc/sasl2-bin/README.Debian 
#OPTIONS="-c" 
 
#make sure you set the options here otherwise it ignores params above and will not work 
OPTIONS="-c -m /var/spool/postfix/var/run/saslauthd" 
Note: If you prefer, you can use "shadow" instead of "pam". This will use MD5 hashed password 
transfer and is perfectly secure. The username and password needed to authenticate will be those 
of the users on the system you are using on the server. 
Next, we update the dpkg "state" of /var/spool/postfix/var/run/saslauthd. The saslauthd init script 
uses this setting to create the missing directory with the appropriate permissions and ownership: 
sudo dpkg-statoverride --force --update --add root sasl 755 /var/spool/postfix/var/run/saslauthd 
This may report an error that "--update given" and the "/var/spool/postfix/var/run/saslauthd" 
directory does not exist. You can ignore this because when you start saslauthd next it will be 
created. 
Finally, start saslauthd: 
sudo /etc/init.d/saslauthd start 
Testing 
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To see if SMTP-AUTH and TLS work properly now run the following command: 
telnet localhost 25 
After you have established the connection to your postfix mail server type 
ehlo localhost 
If you see the lines 
250-STARTTLS 
250-AUTH 
among others, everything is working. 
Type quit returning to the system's shell. 
Configuring saslauthd to Default 
If you don't want to run Postfix in a chroot, or you'd like to not use chroot for troubleshooting 
purposes you will probably also want to return saslauthd back to its default configuration. 
The first step in accomplishing this is to edit /etc/default/saslauthd comment the following lines 
we added above: 
#PWDIR="/var/spool/postfix/var/run/saslauthd" 
#PARAMS="-m ${PWDIR}" 
#PIDFILE="${PWDIR}/saslauthd.pid" 
Then return the saslauthd dpkg "state" to its default location: 
dpkg-statoverride --force --update --add root sasl 755 /var/run/saslauthd 
And restart saslauthd: 
sudo /etc/init.d/saslauthd restart 
Using Port 587 for Secure Submission 
If you want to use port 587 as the submission port for SMTP mail rather than 25 (many ISPs 
block port 25), you will need to edit /etc/postfix/master.cf and uncomment the line  
Submission inet n      -       n       
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Test for SSI Injection: 
 SSL Client Authentication, also known as two-way SSL authentication, consists of both, browser 
and server, sending their respective SSL certificates during the TLS handshake process. Just as 
you can validate the authenticity of a server by using the certificate and asking a well-known 
Certificate Authority (CA) if the certificate is valid, the server can authenticate the user by 
receiving a certificate from the client and validating against a third party CA or its own CA. To do 
this, the server must provide the user with a certificate generated specifically for him, assigning 
values to the subject so that these can be used to determine what user the certificate should 
validate. The user installs the certificate on a browser and now uses it for the website.  
It is a good idea to do this when:  
 It is acceptable (or even preferred) that the user only has access to the website from only 
a single computer/browser.  
 The user is not easily scared by the process of installing SSL certificates on his browser 
or there will be someone, probably from IT support that will do this for the user.  
 The website requires an extra step of security.  
It is also a good thing to use when the website is for an intranet of a company or organization.  
It is generally not a good idea to use this method for widely and publicly available websites that 
will have an average user. For example, it wouldn't be a good idea to implement this for a website 
Appendix B.  
 
 
 
 
 
206 
like Facebook. While this technique can prevent the user from having to type a password (thus 
protecting against an average keylogger from stealing it), it is still considered a good idea to 
consider using both a password and SSL client authentication combined 
Denial of Service 
 Test for anti-automation 
In our server we used mavis-new is a wrapper that can call any number of content filtering 
programs for spam detection, antivirus, etc. 
Installation 
To begin, 
sudo apt-get install amavisd-new spamassassin clamav-daemon 
Install the optional packages for better spam detection (who does not want better spam 
detection?): 
sudo apt-get install libnet-dns-perl libmail-spf-query-perl pyzor razor 
Note: Replace libmail-spf-query-perl with libmail-spf-perl 
Install these optional packages to enable better scanning of attached archive files: 
sudo apt-get install arj bzip2 cabextract cpio file gzip lha nomarch pax rar unrar unzip unzoo zip 
zoo 
Configuration 
Clamav 
The default behaviour of Clamav will fit our needs. A daemon is launched (clamd) and signatures 
are fetched every day. For more Clamav configuration options, check the configuration files 
in /etc/clamav. 
Add clamav user to the amavis group and vice versa in order for Clamav to have access to scan 
files: 
sudo adduser clamav amavis 
sudo adduser amavis clamav 
Risky Functionality - File Uploads 
 Test that acceptable file types are whitelisted 
The basic concept behind application whitelisting is to permit only good known files to 
execute, rather than attempting to block malicious code and activity. Application whitelisting 
accomplishes its objectives by creating a list of approved hashes and allowing only files with 
approved hashes to execute. The general concept is quite simple, and in our application is 
applying.  
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 Test that file contents match the defined file type 
A ROOT file is a suite of consecutive data records (TKey's). If the key is  located past the 32 
bit file limit (> 2 GB) then some fields will  be 8 instead of 4 bytes: 
    1->4            Nbytes    = Length of compressed object (in bytes) 
    5->6            Version   = TKey version identifier 
    7->10           ObjLen    = Length of uncompressed object 
    11->14          Datime    = Date and time when object was written to file 
    15->16          KeyLen    = Length of the key structure (in bytes) 
    17->18          Cycle     = Cycle of key 
    19->22 [19->26] SeekKey   = Pointer to record itself (consistency check) 
    23->26 [27->34] SeekPdir  = Pointer to directory header 
    27->27 [35->35] lname     = Number of bytes in the class name 
    28->.. [36->..] ClassName = Object Class Name 
    ..->..          lname     = Number of bytes in the object name 
    ..->..          Name      = lName bytes with the name of the object 
    ..->..          lTitle    = Number of bytes in the object title 
    ..->..          Title     = Title of the object 
    ----->          DATA      = Data bytes associated to the object 
 
 The first data record starts at byte fBEGIN (currently set to kBEGIN). 
 Bytes 1->kBEGIN contain the file description, when fVersion >= 1000000 
 it is a large file (> 2 GB) and the offsets will be 8 bytes long and  fUnits will be set to 8: 
    1->4            "root"      = Root file identifier 
    5->8            fVersion    = File format version 
    9->12           fBEGIN      = Pointer to first data record 
    13->16 [13->20] fEND        = Pointer to first free word at the EOF 
    17->20 [21->28] fSeekFree   = Pointer to FREE data record 
    21->24 [29->32] fNbytesFree = Number of bytes in FREE data record 
    25->28 [33->36] nfree       = Number of free data records 
    29->32 [37->40] fNbytesName = Number of bytes in TNamed at creation time 
    33->33 [41->41] fUnits      = Number of bytes for file pointers 
    34->37 [42->45] fCompress   = Compression level and algorithm 
    38->41 [46->53] fSeekInfo   = Pointer to TStreamerInfo record 
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    42->45 [54->57] fNbytesInfo = Number of bytes in TStreamerInfo record 
    46->63 [58->75] fUUID       = Universal Unique ID 
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Risky Functionality -  
 Test for Authentication and Authorization issues 
Test for CSRF: 
 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a type of attack that occurs when a malicious Web site, 
email, blog, instant message, or program causes a user’s Web browser to perform an unwanted 
action on a trusted site for which the user is currently authenticated. The impact of a successful 
cross-site request forgery attack is limited to the capabilities exposed by the vulnerable 
application. For example, this attack could result in a transfer of funds, changing a password, or 
purchasing an item in the user's context. In effect, CSRF attacks are used by an attacker to make a 
target system perform a function (funds Transfer, form submission etc.) via the target's browser 
without knowledge of the target user, at least until the unauthorized function has been committed.  
Impacts of successful CSRF exploits vary greatly based on the role of the victim. When targeting 
a normal user, a successful CSRF attack can compromise end-user data and their associated 
functions. If the targeted end user is an administrator account, a CSRF attack can compromise the 
entire Web application. The sites that are more likely to be attacked are community Websites 
(social networking, email) or sites that have high dollar value accounts associated with them 
(banks, stock brokerages, bill pay services). This attack can happen even if the user is logged into 
a Web site using strong encryption (HTTPS). Utilizing social engineering, an attacker will embed 
malicious HTML or JavaScript code into an email or Website to request a specific 'task url'. The 
task then executes with or without the user's knowledge, either directly or by utilizing a Cross-site 
Scripting flaw (ex: Samy MySpace Worm). 
HTML 5 
 Test for Web Storage SQL injection 
Check CORS implementation:  
Cross Origin Resource Sharing 
Validate URLs passed to XMLHttpRequest.open. Current browsers allow these URLs to be cross 
domain; this behavior can lead to code injection by a remote attacker. Pay extra attention to 
absolute URLs.  
Ensure that URLs responding with Access-Control-Allow-Origin:  
we do not include any sensitive content or information that might aid attacker in further attacks. 
We Use the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header only on chosen URLs that need to be accessed 
cross-domain. Don't use the header for the whole domain.  
Allow only selected, trusted domains in the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header. Prefer 
whitelisting domains over blacklisting or allowing any domain (we do not use * wildcard nor 
blindly return the Origin header content without any checks).  
Keep in mind that CORS does not prevent the requested data from going to an unauthenticated 
location. It's still important for the server to perform usual CSRF prevention.  
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While the RFC recommends a pre-flight request with the OPTIONS verb, current 
implementations might not perform this request, so it's important that "ordinary" (GET and 
POST) requests perform any access control necessary.  
Our system discard requests received over plain HTTP with HTTPS origins to prevent mixed 
content bugs.  
Don't rely only on the Origin header for Access Control checks. Browser always sends this header 
in CORS requests, but may be spoofed outside the browser. Application-level protocols should be 
used to protect sensitive data.  
 Check Offline Web Application 
Error Handling 
 Check for Error Codes:  
The application may return a different HTTP Error code depending on the authentication attempt 
response. It may respond with a 200 for a positive result and a 403 for a negative result. Even 
though a generic error page is shown to a user, the HTTP response code may differ which can 
leak information about whether the account is valid or not. 
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Hacking Packets Analysis 
 
Figure b.7: NetworkMiner to parse libcap  
Sent: 42 packets (15,278 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.197 (Windows) : 18 packets (3,190 Bytes), 0.00 
% cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 2639 -> 8063 : 12 packets (2,309 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 2647 -> 8063 : 4 packets (172 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 8055 -> 7003 : 2 packets (709 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.199 (Windows) : 14 packets (11,420 Bytes), 
0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 2641 -> 8067 : 4 packets (776 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 8067 -> 2641 : 10 packets (10,644 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
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Figure b.8: Sent Packets 
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Figure b.9:  sent packet traff result 
Received: 33 packets (27,839 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.197 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.199 (Windows) : 19 packets (16,419 Bytes), 
0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 8063 -> 2639 : 13 packets (15,432 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 8063 -> 2647 : 3 packets (132 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 7003 -> 8055 : 3 packets (855 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.199 (Windows) : 14 packets (11,420 Bytes), 
0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 2641 -> 8067 : 4 packets (776 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 8067 -> 2641 : 10 packets (10,644 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
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Figure b.10: Received Packets 
 
Figure b.11: received packet result 
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Incoming sessions: 2 
 Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2639 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2639 (1829 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 8063 (14900 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:36 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:46 PM 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2641 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2641 (615 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 8067 (10220 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:36 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:47 PM 
 
Figure b.12: In coming sessions 
Outgoing sessions: 3 
 Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 7003 
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Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 7003 (735 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 8055 (629 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:46 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:46 PM 
 Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 8063 
Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 8063 (0 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2647 (0 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:39 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:44 PM 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2641 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2641 (615 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 8067 (10220 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:36 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:47 PM 
 
Figure b.13: Outgoing sessions 
Open TCP Ports: 
 TCP 2639 - Entropy (in \ out): 62.95 \ 72.29 Typical data (in \ out):                                  \ 
CET /iiaees/ta leoeotn 1..tg  tt 
 TCP 2641 - Entropy (in \ out): 75.50 \ 72.42 Typical data (in \ out): eretoen eeis 
eentGeetteeeitnente \ 
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Figure b.14: Open TCP Ports 
Analysing Public  Server: 
 IP: 192.168.1.197 
 MAC: Unknown 
 Hostname: 
OS: Windows 
TTL: 128 (distance: 31) 
Open TCP Ports: 8063 
TCP 7003 - Entropy (in \ out): 69.20 \ 69.01 Typical data (in \ out): HTTP/1.1 
000 Cootaeeee/ 
ontrol:  \ tose /testaoot te/seeoeotioe/ se 
Sent: 20 packets (16,529 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
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192.168.1.197 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.199 (Windows) : 19 packets (16,419 Bytes), 
0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 8063 -> 2639 : 13 packets (15,432 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 8063 -> 2647 : 3 packets (132 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 7003 -> 8055 : 3 packets (855 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.197 (Windows) -> 255.255.255.255 : 1 packets (110 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext 
(0 of 0 Bytes) 
UDP: 50414 -> 1211 : 1 packets (110 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
 
Received: 18 packets (3,190 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.197 (Windows) : 18 packets (3,190 Bytes), 0.00 
% cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
 TCP: 2639 -> 8063 : 12 packets (2,309 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
 TCP: 2647 -> 8063 : 4 packets (172 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
 TCP: 8055 -> 7003 : 2 packets (709 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
Incoming sessions: 2 
 Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 7003 
Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 7003 (735 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 8055 (629 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:46 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:46 PM 
 Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 7003 
Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 8063 (0 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2647 (0 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:39 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:44 PM 
Outgoing sessions: 1 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2639 
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Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2639 (1829 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 8063 (14900 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:36 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:46 PM 
 
 
Sent Analysis: 
Device 
from 
 
TCP 
Decid
e to 
TCP Session 
start 
Session 
end 
Sessio
n time 
Byte encrypte Without 
encryptio
n 
B/C Researc
h packet 
Without 
encryptio
n 
Direc
t 
Public 
Sever 
 
8063 
Privat
e 
263
9 
10/21/201
4 3:00:36 
pm 
10/21/201
4 3:00:46 
pm 
10 1490
0 
10 7 4 14900 9148 5435 
private  
8063 
bank 164
7 
10/21/201
4 3:00:39 
pm 
10/21/201
4 3:00:44 
pm 
5 629 5 5 5 629 429 324 
bank  
8067 
public 124
1 
10/21/201
4 3:00:36 
pm 
10/21/201
4 3:00:47 
pm 
11 1022
0 
11 11 3 10220 7417 6189 
              
              
Table b.1 sent analysis   
encrypted: 
  
Network traffic from the current research analysis 
 Without Encryption 
 
Network traffic without encryption 
 B/C 
  
Direct Network traffic from client to Internet Banking Server 
 
Time Comparison 
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Figure b.15: time comparison  
 
 
Bytes Comparison 
 
 
Figure b.16: byte comparison  
Sent: 20 packets (16,529 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
0
2
4
6
8
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12
Research Without Encryption Direct
Public to Private
Private to Bank
Bank to Public
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
Research Packets Without Encryption Direct
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Private to Bank
Bank to Public
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Sent Packets : 20 packets 
Packets size : 16,529 Bytes 
192.168.1.197 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.199 (Windows) : 19 packets (16,419 Bytes), 
0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
 192.168.1.197  : Server IP “Public Server” 
Windows : Client OS 
192.168.1.199: Server IP “ Private Server” 
Windows : Server OS 
19 packets : Number of packets 
16,419 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
TCP: 8063 -> 2639 : 13 packets (15,432 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
8063 : server port (public server) 
2639 : client port 
13 packets :  number of packets 
15,432 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
TCP: 8063 -> 2647 : 3 packets (132 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
8063 : server port (Public server) 
2647 : client port 
3 packets :  number of packets 
132 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
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0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
TCP: 7003 -> 8055 : 3 packets (855 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
7003 : server port (Public server) 
8055 : server port (Private server) 
3 packets :  number of packets 
855 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
 
Figure b.17:  Send To Private Function 
192.168.1.197 (Windows) -> 255.255.255.255 : 1 packets (110 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 
Bytes) 
UDP: 50414 -> 1211 : 1 packets (110 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
Received Analysis: 
Received: 18 packets (3,190 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
Received  packets  : 18 packets   
packets  size : 3,190 Bytes 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.197 (Windows) : 18 packets (3,190 Bytes), 0.00 % 
cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.199: client IP 
Windows : Server OS 
192.168.1.197  : Server IP “ Public Server” 
Windows : client OS 
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18 packets : Number of packets 
3, 190 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
TCP: 2639 -> 8063 : 12 packets (2,309 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
2639 : client port  
8063 : Server  port “ Public Server”  
12 packets :  number of packets 
2,309 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
TCP: 2647 -> 8063 : 4 packets (172 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
2647 : client port  
8063 : Server  port “ Public Server”  
4 packets :  number of packets 
172 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
 
TCP: 8055 -> 7003 : 2 packets (709 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
8055 : Server  port “ Private Server” 
8063 : Server  port “ Public Server”  
12 packets :  number of packets 
2,309 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
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0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
 
Figure b.18:  Private Server Function 
 
 
 
 
Analysing Client, Private Server and Bank Server 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) 
 IP: 192.168.1.199 
 MAC: Unknown 
 Hostname: 
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OS: Windows 
TTL: 128 (distance: 31) 
Open TCP Ports: 
 TCP 2639 - Entropy (in \ out): 62.95 \ 72.29 Typical data (in \ out):                                  \ 
CET /iiaees/ta leoeotn 1..tg  tt 
 TCP 2641 - Entropy (in \ out): 75.50 \ 72.42 Typical data (in \ out): eretoen eeis 
eentGeetteeeitnente \ 
Sent: 42 packets (15,278 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.197 (Windows) : 18 packets (3,190 Bytes), 0.00 
% cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 2639 -> 8063 : 12 packets (2,309 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 2647 -> 8063 : 4 packets (172 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 8055 -> 7003 : 2 packets (709 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.199 (Windows) : 14 packets (11,420 Bytes), 
0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 2641 -> 8067 : 4 packets (776 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
  TCP: 8067 -> 2641 : 10 packets (10,644 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
Received: 33 packets (27,839 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.197 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.199 (Windows) : 19 packets (16,419 Bytes), 
0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 8063 -> 2639 : 13 packets (15,432 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 8063 -> 2647 : 3 packets (132 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 7003 -> 8055 : 3 packets (855 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.199 (Windows) : 14 packets (11,420 Bytes), 
0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 2641 -> 8067 : 4 packets (776 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
TCP: 8067 -> 2641 : 10 packets (10,644 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
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Incoming sessions: 2 
 Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2639 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2639 (1829 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 8063 (14900 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:36 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:46 PM 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2641 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2641 (615 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 8067 (10220 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:36 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:47 PM 
Outgoing sessions: 3 
 Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 7003 
Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 7003 (735 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 8055 (629 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:46 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:46 PM 
 Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 8063 
Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 8063 (0 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2647 (0 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:39 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:44 PM 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2641 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2641 (615 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 8067 (10220 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:36 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:47 PM 
Sent Analysis: 
Sent: 42 packets (15,278 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
Sent Packets : 42 packets 
Packets size : 15,278 Bytes 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.197 (Windows) : 18 packets (3,190 Bytes), 0.00 % 
cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
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192.168.1.199  : Client IP 
Windows : Client OS 
192.168.1.197: Server IP “ Public Server” 
Windows : Server OS 
18 packets : Number of packets 
3,190 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
TCP: 2639 -> 8063 : 12 packets (2,309 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
2639 : client port 
8063 : server port (public server) 
12 packets :  number of packets 
3,190 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
 
TCP: 2647 -> 8063 : 4 packets (172 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
2647 : client port 
8063 : server port (public server) 
4 packets :  number of packets 
172 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
TCP: 8055 -> 7003 : 2 packets (709 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
8055 : server port (private  server) 
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7003 : server port (public server) 
2 packets :  number of packets 
709 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
 
Figure b.19:  Send To Private Function 
 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.199 (Windows) : 14 packets (11,420 Bytes), 0.00 % 
cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
192.168.1.199  : Client IP 
Windows : Client OS 
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192.168.1.199: Server IP “ Bank Server” 
Windows : Server OS 
14 packets : Number of packets 
11,420 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
TCP: 2641 -> 8067 : 4 packets (776 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
 2641 : client port 
8067 : server port (Bnak Server) 
4 packets :  number of packets 
776 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
 
Figure b.20:  Send To Bank Function 
 
TCP: 8067 -> 2641 : 10 packets (10,644 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
8067 : server port (Bnak Server) 
2641 : client port 
4 packets :  number of packets 
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776 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
Received Analysis: 
Received : 33 packets (27,839 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
Received  packets  : 33 packets   
packets  size : 27,839 Bytes 
192.168.1.197 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.199 (Windows) : 19 packets (16,419 Bytes), 
0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
 192.168.1.197  : Server IP “ Public Server” 
Windows : Server OS 
192.168.1.199: client IP  
Windows : client OS 
19 packets : Number of packets 
16,419 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
TCP: 8063 -> 2639 : 13 packets (15,432 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
 8063 Server  port “ Public Server”  
2639 : client port  
13 packets :  number of packets 
13,432 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size  
TCP: 8063 -> 2647 : 3 packets (132 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
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 8063 : Server  port “ Public Server”  
2647 : client port  
3 packets :  number of packets 
132 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
TCP: 7003 -> 8055 : 3 packets (855 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
7003 :  
8055 : Server port “ Private Server” 
3 packets :  number of packets 
132 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) -> 192.168.1.199 (Windows) : 14 packets (11,420 Bytes), 0.00 % 
cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
 192.168.1.199  : Server IP “ Bank Server” 
Windows : Server OS 
192.168.1.199: client IP  
Windows : client OS 
14packets : Number of packets 
11,420 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
TCP: 2641 -> 8067 : 4 packets (776 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
2641 : Client port 
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8067 : Server port “ Bank Server” 
4 packets :  number of packets 
776 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
TCP: 8067 -> 2641 : 10 packets (10,644 Bytes), 0.00 % cleartext (0 of 0 Bytes) 
8067 : Server port “ Bank Server” 
2461 : Client port  
10 packets :  number of packets 
10,644 Bytes : packets size 
0.00 % cleartext : no clear data 
0 of 0 Bytes : Cleartext size 
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Figure b.21:  Bank Server Function 
 
Analysing Incoming sessions 
Incoming sessions :  2  
Number of Incoming sessions :  2 sessions 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2639 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2639 (1829 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 8063 (14900 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:36 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:46 PM 
Server: 192.168.1.199 :  Server IP 
Windows : Client OS 
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2639 : Server Port 
Client: 192.168.1.197 : Public Server IP 
Windows : Client OS 
8063 : Public Server Port 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2641 
Server: 192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 2641 (615 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 8067 (10220 data bytes sent), Session start: 
10/21/2014 3:00:36 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:47 PM 
Server: 192.168.1.199 :  Server IP 
Windows : Client OS 
2641 : Server Port 
Client: 192.168.1.199 : Bank Server IP 
Windows : Client OS 
8067 : Bank Server Port 
 
Analysing Outgoing sessions 
Outgoing sessions :  3 
Number of Outgoing sessions :  3 sessions 
Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 7003 
Server: 192.168.1.197 (Windows) TCP 7003 (735 data bytes sent), Client: 
192.168.1.199 (Windows) TCP 8055 (629 data bytes sent), Session start: 10/21/2014 
3:00:46 PM, Session end: 10/21/2014 3:00:46 PM 
Server: 192.168.1.197 :  Server IP 
Windows : Server OS 
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7003 : Server Port 
Client: 192.168.1.199 : Private Server IP 
Windows : Client OS 
8055 : Private Server Port 
 
 
Sessions 
Frame 
nr. 
Client host C. 
port 
Server host S. 
port 
Protocol Start 
Time 
40 192.168.1.199(Windows) 2947 192.168.1.197(Windows) 8063   
Table b.2: session table 
Clearext: 
.pcap file:  
” C:\Users\Administrator.OMECO-ERP1-PC\Desktop\NetworkMiner_1-6-1\NetworkMiner_1-6-
1\Captures\ NM_2014-10-21T15-00-29.pcap” 
version encoding soap Envelope soap soap Header 2005 discovery Action Action Header soap 
Body Resolve Address Address Resolve Body Envelope version encoding soap Envelope soap 
soap Header 2005 discovery Action Action Header soap Body Resolve Address Address Resolve 
Body Envelope GET Host Windows Accept Cookie ASP Connection version encoding soap 
Envelope soap soap Header 2005 discovery Action Action Header soap Body Resolve Address 
Address Resolve Body Envelope private Server ASP NET Date Tue Oct GMT PUBLIC head title 
body form method post action div class input type hidden name value div class input type hidden 
name value div table border style width height align center class table border style width style 
width 100 align center class src JPG style height align center top class table border style width 
100 height class links style width class span style right input name type text class style height 
style height top class span style input name type text class style height span style input name type 
text class style height span style input name type text class style height style height top input type 
submit name value Confirm class style table border style width height style class span form 
Appendix B.  
 
 
 
 
 
236 
version encoding soap Envelope soap soap Header 2005 discovery Action Action Header soap 
Body Resolve Address Address Resolve Body Envelope GET Host Windows Accept Cookie ASP 
Connection Not Found private Server ASP NET Date Tue Oct GMT PUBLIC head title Detailed 
Error Not Found style type body Helvetica code code pre first first padding legend padding legend 
color solid solid solid solid link visited color width color background background width width 
width solid solid table 100 width width table alt table alt color clear clear preferred padding body 
div header Server Error Application div Internet Information Services div content div class legend 
Error Summary Error Not Found The resource you are looking for has been removed had its name 
changed temporarily unavailable div class legend Detailed Error Information div table border 
class alt Module Web Core class alt Handler Error Code div table border class alt Requested 
Physical Path public images class alt Method User div class clear div class legend Most likely 
causes The directory file specified does not exist the Web server The contains error custom 
module such access the file div class legend Things you can try Create the content the Web server 
Review the Create tracing rule track failed requests for this status code and see which module 
calling For more information about creating tracing rule for failed requests here div class legend 
Links and More Information This error means that the file directory does not exist the server 
Create the file directory and try the request again View more information GET Host Windows 
Accept Cookie ASP Connection Not Found private Server ASP NET Date Tue Oct GMT 
PUBLIC head title Detailed Error Not Found style type body Helvetica code code pre first first 
padding legend padding legend color solid solid solid solid link visited color width color 
background background width width width solid solid table 100 width width table alt table alt 
color clear clear preferred padding body div header Server Error Application version port version 
port version port version port version port POST Web Services Protocol Host 444 Expect 100 
Continue version encoding soap Envelope soap soap Body Body Envelope private Server ASP 
NET Date Tue Oct GMT version encoding soap Envelope soap soap Body Body Envelope Found 
private Location Server ASP NET Date Tue Oct GMT head title Object moved body Object 
moved here GET Host Windows Accept Cookie ASP Connection private Server ASP NET Date 
Tue Oct GMT PUBLIC head title Home Page style type title Aqua style type color padding color 
padding color color body form method post action div class input type hidden name value input 
type hidden name value input type hidden name value input type hidden name value input type 
hidden name value input type hidden name value false value value submit script src type script src 
type script type function context context data context false var script src type script type Sys 
undefined throw new Error ASP NET Ajax failed load script src type div class input type hidden 
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name value input type hidden name value div class title strong Internet script type Sys table width 
100 height top width style alt Skip Navigation Links src width height style div table style 
document document src alt Account Summary style class this this style class title Account 
Summary and Recent Account Summary style height div style display table style style height div 
style width src alt class this this style class style height table style style height div style width src 
alt class this this style class Funds Transfer style height table style style height div style width src 
alt class this this style class Cheque Book Request style height version encoding soap Envelope 
soap soap Header 2005 discovery Action Action Header soap Body Resolve Address Address 
Resolve Body Envelope version encoding soap Envelope soap soap Header 2005 discovery 
Action Action Header soap Body Resolve Address Address Resolve Body Envelope.   
